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PREFACE

This thesis examines political party opposition in
the Dominican Republic.

The major focus of this study is

on the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) as it oper-

ated since the 1966 presidential elections.

The examination

of the PRD was undertaken because of a definite void in the

study of opposition politics in Latin America.

Also, the

investigation of the PRD in Dominican politics serves, as a

means of exploring the problems involved with forming and
utilizing democratic institutions and procedures in order
to cope with or control conflicts between the government

and opposition groups.

The bulk of the research for this study of the

Dominican Republic and the PRD was conducted in the summer
of 1972 when this writer interviewed a number of Party

leaders and those with a working knowledge of Dominican
politics.

While in the Dominican Republic extensive

research was also undertaken at the Archivo Nacional where
secondary sources such as newspapers, magazines and documents were examined.

The actual writing of the thesis was

accomplished in 1973 and 1974 with the aid of current news
reports and analyses to help keep abreast with the con-

stantly changing political climate in the Dominican Republic.
v
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In order to compile the data and complete this

study

,

it is necessary to extend gratitude to a number of

very helpful and concerned people.

Special gratitude goes

out to those PRD members, especially Casimiro Castro,

Emmanual Espinal and Rueben Suro, who answered questions
and gave up their time to aid an inquisitive graduate stu,

dent.

Thanks also goes to the United States Embassy Staff,

especially Charles Blum who was most cooperative and

expanded my understanding of Dominican politics.

Senor

Julio Julia of the Archivo Nacional and his staff must also
be thanked for their gracious hospitality.

A study such as this is not only the result of personal interviews and library research, but also of encour-

agement, kindness and criticism from a number of very con-

cerned and considerate colleagues.

Initial thanks must go

to Professors Edward Williams and Harry Kantor who were

instrumental in directing me toward an academic career with
an interest in Latin American politics.

Professors Harvey

Kline and Jane Loy must also be singled out as quite helpful
in reading and criticizing the final draft of the thesis.

The person most deserving of my thanks and admiration is

Professor Howard Wiarda.

His constant help and attention

from the early days of planning to the guided tour of the

Dominican Republic to the tedious work of writing and
rewriting were invaluable.

Without exaggeration this thesis
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would not be possible if not for Professor Wiarda's
guidance.
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for her invaluable assistance.

Finally, very special
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This study seeks to describe and analyze the

interaction of the opposition Partido Revolucionario
Dominj:

£anQ

(PRD)

with the government of Joaquin Balaguer in the

most recent period of Dominican history, 1966-1973.

The

major concern in the examination of opposition— government

interaction is to determine the general character of the
PRD response to the policies and actions of the Balaguer

regime.

In the Dominican political system, where the once

powerful PRD was relegated to a secondary position and the

government showed little regard for the guarantees and procedures of democratic opposition, the subject of opposition-

government serves as a helpful guide for judging the role
and current status of political parties, traditional leadership patterns and Anglo-American style democracy.
The investigation of the PRD opposition to the

Balaguer government is presented from four research perspectives.

Because the PRD envisioned itself as a revolu-

tionary party of social change and therefore posed a threat

vm
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to the Balaguer regime. Party
leaders,

especially the

former PRD president of the country,
Juan Bosch, were
continuously concerned with formulating and
expounding a
number of strategic positions that would
serve as a means
of responding to governmental initiatives.
These strategic

alternatives caused a wide range of discussion and
dissension in the Party ranks, especially with regard
to Bosch's

controversial thesis of "Dictatorship with Popular Support"

which advocated complete rejection of the Balaguerian political system.

As a corollary to the PRD strategic alternatives,
the Party engaged in a wide array of opposition tactics

that served to visibly remind the Balaguer government that
the PRD was still active and able to challenge the regime.

The tactics of the legislative walk-out, nationwide education,

street marches, and radio broadcasts of Juan Bosch

were but some of the overt responses of the PRD to the Balaguer government.
The strategic and tactical responses of the PRD not

only lengthened the gap between opposition and government,
but caused serious disruptions within the PRD ranks.

From

1966-1973 the Party seemed constantly in the throes of an

internal rebellion between moderate, pro-democratic activists
and radical abstentionists

.

The in-fighting eventually led

to the resignation of Juan Bosch and the splitting of the

X

PRD into two distinct parties.

While the PRD was concerned with the
matter of
internal dissension, the Balaguer
government was quite
active in attempting to decrease the
Party's
power.

Presi-

dent Balaguer in conjunction with his close
aides, military
advisors and National Police lieutenants
began a successful
three-pronged attack on the PRD.

in

an attempt to weaken

the influence of the PRD in Dominican society,
the Balaguer
regime began full scale efforts to (1) depoliticize
the

pro-PRD support through massive economic programs;

(2)

subvert PRD leaders, associations and policy alternatives
by clever use of bribery, infiltration and public relations

techniques; and

(3)

repress known PRD activists

with, a

long

list of terror tactics.

Faced with a governmental regime that was intent on
solidifying its hold on the Dominican political system and
on internal leadership structure rent with factionalism,
the PRD since 19 66 has shown definite signs of a gradual but

persistent decline in political influence and opposition
effectiveness.

At the heart of the PRD's problem in the

Dominican Republic is the ability of President Balaguer to
mix and balance the Anglo-American democratic institutional
structures (a constitution, parties, elections, legislatures)

with the more traditional elements of Spanish rule such as

paternalistic leadership, strong military collaboration in

XI

government, vigorous suppression of human rights and

consistently conservative policy-making.
The PRD, which has a long history of respect for

An gl° American democracy, has had to face the reality of
3-

political system that, although visually democratic,

deprives the Party- of the ability to effectively challenge
the ruling regime.

President Balaguer has brought a "new

look" to the political system with his introduction of a

democratic framework and full-scale economic development.

Unfortunately for the PRD, President Balaguer has not forgotten the manner in which the dictator Trujillo handled
the opposition.

As a result the PRD has had to pay a high

price for remaining an opposition party in the Dominican
Republic.
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CHAPTER
LATIN AMERICAN OPPOSITION:

I

AN INTRODUCTION

The study of Latin American politics and political

behavior has traditionally been approached with general

uneasiness and a great deal of apprehension.

Those schooled

in the institutional and procedural framework of Anglo-

American democracy are often baffled by the maze of coup
d etats,

civil wars, assassinations, guerrilla uprisings,

student demonstrations, and general strikes that are so

prevalent in this region.

This unique atmosphere of conflict

and confrontation has caused some uninitiated observers of

Latin American politics to characterize the activity within
the political arena as "unpredictable," "unexplainable," or

even "mysterious

"
.

Faced with this constantly reoccurring situation of
rampant instability in Latin America, those interested in the
politics of this area have long sought to explain the history

perhaps the best introduction to the Latin
American political tradition which may help to clear up many
of the misconceptions about the character of politics in this
region see Howard Wiarda's article, "Toward a Framework for
the Study of Political Change in the Ibero-Latin Tradition See
The Corporative Model" in World Politics January, 1973
also Lawrence Graham's unpublished article, "Latin America Illusion or Reality: A Case for a New Analytic Framework for
the Region (Unpublished paper, Department of Government, University of Texas, 1969 ).
1-For

,

1

.

2

of governmental unrest and thereby
put an end to many of the

more common stereotypes about political power
and leadership
change.

In this study of the Partido Revolucionario
Domini-

cano (PRD), President Balaguer, and Dominican
politics since
1966 an attempt will be made to examine and
make some judge-

ments on one of the. commonly held reasons for Latin
American
instability

the constant struggle between the opposition

groups outside of political power and the governing regime
that controls political power. 2
The conflict between opposition and government is

perhaps as old as Latin America itself, indeed as old as
"the political system."

Since this region was discovered

conflict has emerged as a normal adjunct of political behav-

Witness the antagonism between Indian and explorer.

ior.

King and creole. Liberal and Conservative, landowner and campesino, left-wing guerrillas and right-wing military officers
as examples of the dynamic tension that has constantly sur-

faced in Latin America.

A study of the PRD in Dominican

politics would thus seek to add a new chapter to this ongoing

historical process of interaction and conflict between those
2 The struggle between opposition and government is
discussed in a more theoretical manner in an interesting
chapter entitled "Some Theoretical Dimensions of the Idea of
the Enemy" by David Finlay in Enemies in Politics David
Rand McNally,
Finlay, Ole Holsti, Richard Fagen (New York:
,

1969)

.

3

on the fringes of national power and
those who are the
dominant political force. 3

The task of analyzing PRD opposition in the
present
Dominican administration of Joaquin Balaguer has
been eased

somewhat by the work of a number of scholars interested
in
the peculiarities of Latin American politics and the
"rules

of the game" that contribute to this unique political
behavior.

The writings of two American political scientists,

Charles Anderson and Kalman Silvert, are the most illumi—
ns-ting with regard to the problem of opposition— government

conflict and the instability that it stimulates.

Both

scholars have earned high praise for their ability to make
sense out of the so-called "mysterious" nature of Latin

American politics.
Anderson posits the theory that a lack of political
legitimacy is at the heart of Latin America's chaotic internal situation.

The fact that elections do not serve as the

^

final determination of political victory and that a number
3A

fuller discussion of the problem of oppositions
in Latin America is provided by Robert Dix in a paper
entitled "Oppositions and Development in Latin America," a
paper prepared for delivery at the 196 7 Annual Meeting of
the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois,
September, 1967.
^

"Toward a Theory of Latin American Politics," Occasional Paper No. 2, Graduate Center for Latin American
Studies, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee (February, 1964) and also published in his book Politics and
Economic Change in Latin America (Princeton, N.J.: Van
Chapter 4.
Nostrand, 1967)
,

4

of "power contenders" are ever anxious to
ascend to political

power by means other than elections has now been accepted
as
a key interpretation of the structure and process
of Latin

ioan politics.

As Anderson relates/ power is not

exchanged in a formal/ procedural/ and electoral manner in

Latin America as is the case in many Western nations; power
is rather won through some show of force which alerts society
to the importance and dominance of the "power contender."

Latin American society thus has no tradition of a "loyal"
opposition/ as in the Anglo-American tradition, nor does it
have the support for the passive acceptance of periodic transfers of national power.

The Latin American tradition appears

to be that of a zero-sum-adversary system in which political

power is attained and maintained by the dominant "power contender" through vigorous, and at times merciless, attacks on
the opposition.

The unwritten law of the Latin American

political system seems to be respect the power of the winner
and keep the opposition in check.
The theories of Anderson go a long way toward explaining what seems like errant, irrational behavior in Latin

American politics.

As Anderson describes, politics in this

region follows a very understandable course provided one
recognizes the unique interaction between opposition and

government and the overall weakness of democratic institutions and practice.

5

Another noted Latin American scholar,
Kalman Silvert,
expands upon Anderson's "power contender"
thesis by
suggesting that instability in Latin American
politics is often

vital to the development of these modernizing
societies. 5
Silvert shows that the so-called "unpredictability"
commonly
associated with politics in this region is wrongly
understood.
To Silvert there is a great deal of rational
behavior
in the constant fluctuations prevalent in Latin
American

politics.

As Silvert relates,

"Unpredictable" and "unstable" are the two
adjectives most often applied to Latin American
politics. The implication of both pejoratives
are partially erroneous. As a matter of fact,
°n e of the easiest things to predict is instability itself
And second, some types of revolutionary disturbance do not indicate instability.
If the normal way of rotating the executive in a
given country is by revolution,
then it is
not facetious to remark that revolutions are a
sign of stability.
.

.

.

.

Silvert like Anderson is attempting to show his
readers the importance of viewing Latin American politics
from a Latin American perspective.

Without some apprecia-

tion for the fundamental differences in Latin American culture and society, a truly realistic appraisal of politics

and political behavior in this region will never be attained.
5 Kalman

Silvert, The Conflict Society: Reaction and
Revolution in Latin America (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1966)
Chapters 1, 2, and 17.
,

^Ibid.

,

p . 19
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The traditions of elite control,
authoritarian dictatorship,
paternalistic leadership, opposition conflict,
and frequent
instability necessitate that those studying
Latin American
societies do not approach their task with
the biases
of

Anglo-American representative democracy, change
by regular
elections, and general acceptance of the
governmental

frame-

work

^
.

Although Anderson and Silvert are at the forefront of
this movement to explain the conflict prevalent in
Latin

American politics, their studies do not complete the examination of the unique quality of politics found in this region.
The major interest of these writers is in forming theoretical

interpretations of Latin American instability without really

explaining the intricate complex of social, economic, and

political factors that are involved in specific, country-by-

country opposition to the governing regime.
In order to investigate more precisely the inter-

actions between the opposition groups and the government

Merle Kling and Kenneth Johnson have devoted considerable
^For excellent discussion of the historical roots of
the traditional practices of Latin American politics see Glen
Dealy, "Prolegomence on the Spanish American Political Tradition," Hispanic American Historical Review 48 (February
1968); Lyle N. McAlister, "Social Structure and Social Change
in New Spain, " Hispanic American Historical Review 43 (August
1963) and Ronald C. Newton, "On Functional Groups, Fragmentation and Pluralism in Spanish American Political Society,"
Hispanic American Historical Review 50 (February 1970)

7

attention to the causes of political
instability in Latin
America. Kling posits the view that
instability is the
result of a rigid socioeconomic structure
in Latin America
which forces individuals and groups who
seek
status and

financial security to grab hold of the reins
of government. 8
Kling feels that to many Latin American
"out" groups the

quickest way to position and power is by attaining
political
dominance

Johnson expands upon Kling' s thesis by examining what
he believes to be three crucial sources of political
insta-

bility.

Johnson sees entrepreneurial deficiencies (passive

and so-called

ability

(a

flight" capital)

,

a high degree of substitut-

lack of administrative specialization)

and accel-

erated urbanization and overpopulation as the primary

determinants of political instability.

All these factors

coalesce to form a large group of dissatisfied, change
oriented, and power hungry groups who constantly challenge

highly fragile political systems.
8 Merle

Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Political
Instability in Latin America, " Western Political Quarterly 9
(March 1956)
21-35.
See also Martin Needier' s Political
Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence and
Evolutionary Change (New York: Random House, 1968)
:

^Kenneth F. Johnson, "Causal Factors in Latin American Political Instability, " Western Political Quarterly 17
432-466.
(September 1964)
:

8

Despite the efforts of Kling and Johnson
to narrow
the examination of opposition conflict with
the governing
regime, a full and complete understanding of
the interaction
between those out of power and those in power in
Latin

American politics is still lacking.

What has not been

attempted in any great detail up to the present is an
investigation of the operational aspects of opposition conflict

with the governing regime.

In simple language it is time

that scholars of Latin American politics seek to answer the

question of how the opposition "power contenders" operate in
a specific political system and how the governmental leaders

of that political system respond to the maneuvers of the

"out" groups.
It must be emphasized initially that in some areas
of Latin American studies a sophisticated examination of

opposition forces is already underway.

Spurred on by the

seminal work of Robert Dahl and others, scholars have begun
the investigation of the role and activities of Latin Ameri-

can oppositions

There has been considerable work under-

taken with regard to the premier "opposition group" in Latin

•^Robert Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western
Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) and his
most recent volume edited with Samuel Huntington entitled
Regimes and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press,
See also Ghita Ionescu's and Isabel de Madariaga's
1973)
Past and Present of a Political Institution
Opposition:
For a view of Opposition in the Third
Watts, 1968)
(London:
World see Edward Shils, "Opposition in the New States of Asia
and Africa," and Hans Daadler, "Government and Opposition in
the New States," both in Government and Opposition February,
.

.

,

1966.
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America— the armed forces.

The literature available on the

armed forces seeks to examine key topics of
opposition
behavior like strategies and tactics of
opposition to the
existing regime, internal conflict within the
armed forces
over the shape of the opposition role, and the
reaction in

government and society to military opposition policies.
Unfortunately, even though this area of Latin American military operations is coming under greater scrutiny, much of
the research emphasis still remains on topics of social

mobilization within the ranks, increasing professionalization, modernizing roles and the like.

When one moves from these studies of the armed forces
as an opposition group to the other societal groups in Latin

America like student associations, labor unions, middle class
organizations, and particularly political parties, it becomes

extremely difficult to find adequate research which seeks to
uncover the structure and activities of these "power contenders.

"-*-2

Many times the literature dealing with these

established urban groups and their politics has been
l^See for example Alfred Stepan, The Military in
Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, N.J.:
Politics:
See also Robert Potash, The
Princeton Univ. Press, 1971)
Army and Politics in Argentina 1928-1945 (Stanford: Stanford
Univ. Press, 1969)
.

12see for example Orlando Albonez, "Student Opposition
in Latin America," Government and Opposition November, 1966
and James Payne's excellent discussion of labor opposition in
Yale University
Peru, Labor and Politics in Peru (New Haven:
Press, 1965)
,

10

overshadowed by the more spectacular activities
of rural
peasant unions and guerrilla groups who have
been quite
vocal in the recent era. 13 The interest rural
opposition
receives coupled with the pervasive nature of military
intervention often leaves the urban groups to be viewed as
extraneous or secondary to the normal flow of politics in

Latin America.
The sparsity of data with regard to political party

opposition in Latin America is particularly surprising.

Although the military is often the most visible and successful "out" group, and the revolutionary guerrillas the most

controversial opposition force, parties remain one of the few
(if not the only)

of the established urban-based groups in

Latin America that view opposition to the governing regime as
a political exercise and seek to criticize and restructure

existing policy by working within a framework of Anglo-

American style democracy.
The political and Anglo-American nature of party

opposition in Latin America is not meant to suggest that the
activity and importance of groups like students, the labor
unions, and the middle class is minimal.

But what is

13 Rodolfo Stavenhagen' s edited work Agrarian Problems
Doubleday
a nd Peasant Movements in Latin America (New York:
and Company, 1970) provides a good discussion of peasant
opposition while Richard Gott in Guerrilla Movements in Latin
America (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1971) offers the

most comprehensive examination of guerrilla opposition.

11

suggested is that parties in Latin America, especially

opposition parties, seek to perform an unusual and extremely
difficult task as agents of political change.
unlike any group in this region,

Parties,

(at least theoretically)

seek to unify a diversity of groups and group demands and

then work within the existing democratic structure to achieve
a rearrangement of national power and policy alternatives . 14

In Latin America, however, where Anglo-American democracy and

democratic procedure are poorly understood and rarely
respected, the activity of political parties seems woefully

out of place and perhaps even hopeless.

The long-standing

traditions of competing "power contenders" and violent shifts
of political leadership make parties and elections the excep-

tion rather than the rule in the attainment of national power.

The unique function of interest aggregation in a

weakly constructed democratic atmosphere that political parties are called upon to perform in Latin America thus adds a
new dimension to the study of opposition politics.

A group

like a political party that has consistently attempted to

oppose the governing regime in a manner that is unfamiliar
and often not recognized in Latin America seems worthy of
14a good discussion of Latin American political parties in the modern era and the problems they face can be
gained by reading Robert E. Scott, "Political Parties and
Policy-making in Latin America" in Joseph LaPalombara and
Myron Weiner, Political Parties and Political Development
Princeton Univ. Press, 1966) .
(Princeton, N.jT:

12

much closer examination.

Latin American parties by engaging

in thoroughly Anglo-American activity have
introduced an

alternative opposition system to this region, a
system that
appears to challenge the accepted manner of attaining
power

and shifting leadership.

Before drifting more deeply into this matter of party

opposition and democracy, it is essential to comment in a
more detailed manner on the nature and character of democratic
institutions in Latin American nations (particularly the

Dominican Republic) and the difficulty involved in matching
the traditional goals of Anglo-American democracy with the

realities of society and politics in this area.

If this study

is to develop a complete analysis of party opposition in the

Dominican style democracy of Joaquin Balaguer, it seems

appropriate that some initial mention be made of the problems
involved with relating the Anglo-American democratic frame-

work to the sociopolitical system in the Dominican Republic.
The difficulty with examining and making judgements

on democracy and democratic practice in Latin American coun-

tries like the Dominican Republic is that the above terms

are understood and interpreted differently than in the United
States or Great Britain.

Democracy in the Anglo-American

tradition means a binding respect for the law, an appreciation for constitutional structures and processes like separa-

tion of powers and checks and balances, an acceptance of

13

elections as the final determination of
political power, a
healthy encouragement of opposition activity,
and, perhaps
most of all, a recognition that basic human
rights must be
guaranteed.
In the Latin American context, though,
and in
particular in the Dominican Republic of Joaquin
Balaguer,

democracy is not understood in the Anglo-American
sense.

Granted there is an acceptance by Balaguer of the formal
signs of democracy like constitutions, parties, elections,
a tripartite governing system,

a loyal opposition,

verbal pledge to respect human rights.

and a

Beneath this for-

mality, however, one often finds in the Balaguer regime a

lingering of the traditional vestiges of political behavior
and governmental practice like authoritarian leadership,

personalis tic decision-making, vigorous suppression of
legitimate dissent, and a nagging disrespect for basic human
rights

What this duality often means in Latin American countries like the Dominican Republic is that claims of democracy

and democratic practice by leaders similar to Balaguer must
be viewed with a great deal of suspicion.

Balaguer, as will

be shown, constantly characterizes his regime as democratic
and actively seeks to develop the outward signs of Anglo-

American democracy.

Yet despite these claims and promises,

all visible actions of the government point to the fact that

democracy as we know it in the United States or Great Britain

14

is being ignored.

There is ample evidence available
to show
that the "Balaguerian" democracy
has a proclivity for
breaking laws, ignoring the constitutional
processes, rigging
elections, suppressing the opposition,
and denying human
rights

Because of the dual nature of democracy
in Latin
America, a number of interesting circumstances
arise which
must be pointed out if the PRD opposition to
President Balaguer is to be understood. Firstly, the use by
Balaguer of a
formal governmental structure, which serves to
"soften" the

realities of Dominican politics, makes the task of
explaining
the internal mechanics of the political system quite
difficult.

Often times the mixture of democratic formality with

authoritarian rule creates a picture of contradictions that

must be sifted through in order to present the correct view
of Dominican politics and policy-making.

Secondly, the dual

nature of Latin American democratic regimes like Balaguer'

makes any group that has a respect for Anglo-American institutions and seeks to work within those institutions susceptible to intimidation and great disappointment.

A group like

the PRD that has a long history of respect for Anglo-American

democracy (and what is more is populated by many activists
who have an abiding admiration for American or British governcan become quickly disillusioned when faced with Bala-

ment)

guer

'

s

refusal to play by the rules of Anglo-American

15

democracy.

Thirdly, the fact that Balaguer follows
two

differing roads of democracy (and furthermore
firmly believes
that this mixture can be termed democracy)
makes him less
open to criticism, especially from the outside
world.
Despite the constant and often reprehensible diversions
from

Anglo-American democracy that occur in Dominican politics,
Balaguer can always point proudly to the fact that his country
has a constitution, three branches of government, active

P°litical parties, open elections, a free press and a tranquil
and supportive citizenry.
In a real sense the democracy

— Dominican

style

— which

will be examined in this thesis is not only a complicated mixture of form and substance, but an ingeneous formula for

maintaining and expanding power.

Dominican democracy is a

classic example of government for appearance sake with President Balaguer serving as the master of sleight of hand.
Research on Party Opposition

Although the inherent contradictions found in political party activity, and especially opposition activity, in

Latin America would seem to be an interesting research topic,
there is very little in the way of scholarly involvement in
this area.
party,

^

Paul Lewis' study of the Paraguayan Febrista

Robert Alexander's examination of the Communist
15 Paul Lewis,

Febrista Party (Chapel
Press, 1966)

The Politics of Exile, Paraguay's
University of North Carolina
Hill”:

16

party in Venezuela,

1*

and Donald Mabry’s recent investigation

of Mexico's PAN Party 17 are the most
notable research efforts

on political party opposition in Latin America.

Added to

these three specific studies of political party
opposition
are a dearth of other investigations of parties
which

incor-

porate in a tangential manner some discussion of
opposition
8
activity.
The major problem with these studies is that for the

most part they are too confined.

Lewis' Febrista study is of

an exile party which has not participated in Paraguayan poli-

tics for some forty years.

Alexander's view of the Vene-

zuelan Communist party is also limited in that it examines a

minor revolutionary party in a political system that is the

most stable in contemporary Latin America.

Mabry's study

of PAN concerns itself with a party that is increasing in

strength, but still is not a formidable challenger of the
PRI

Unfortunately there is little in the way of research

.

^Robert Alexander, The Communist Party
(Stanford, Cal.:

of Venezuela

Hoover Institution Press, 1969).

-^Donald Mabry, Mexico's Accion Nacional-A Catholic
Alternative to Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse Univ. Press,
1973)

.

-^Good examples of such research are Harry Kantor's
study of the Aprista Party in Peru entitled The Ideology and
Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953) and John Martz' study of the
Accion Democratica Party in Venezuela entitled Accion DemoEvolution of a Modern Political Parity In Venezuela
cratica:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1966)
(Princeton, N.J.:

17

that specifically examines the opposition
activity of a

party that is a major contender for power and has
previously
controlled the reins of national government.
One of the primary reasons for this omission it seems
is that most Latin American scholars choose to investigate

political parties at

visibility

-the

point of highest involvement and

national oloctions

.

Latin American parties are

constantly examined as they organize potential voters, campaign for party candidates, formulate platforms, fill patronage positions, and deliberate in the legislative chamber.

The emphasis is clearly on examining parties in power or as

they seek power

There is no question that these studies of parties at

election time are most important, primarily because they
reveal the intricacies of party organization at peak effiYet something is missing in a presentation of this

ciency.
sort.

What seems to be lacking is a total analysis of the

parties.

Such an analysis would view the parties function-

ing, or trying to function, along a time span which includes

mere than just the preparation for national elections.

What

is necessary to complete the picture of Latin American par-

ties is a view of opposition activity and behavior in the

intervals between elections.

Political parties must be

examined when they are not in the thick of an election campaign, but are struggling to stay alive in a hostile
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environment of power hungry
leaders and apathetic citizens.
Parties in a secondary political
position, as will be shown,
try much harder to perform
their designated functions whether
they be educating the populace,
restructuring
ideology,

recruiting new members or financing
the organizations' debts.
What parties in the. opposition
must face,
however, is a con-

stant barrage of internal and external
problems ranging from
factionalism, loss of patronage, government
repression and
just simply a declining audience.

A useful examination of political parties
is thus one
in which the focus is not on the
electroal winner, but

on the

loser whose task it is to remain a viable
political force in
an atmosphere frequently of intimidation,
repression, organi-

zational collapse, and public apathy.

By placing emphasis on

opposition party activity and behavior not only will parties
be examined in a more realistic light, but closer scrutiny

will be given to the unique structures and practices of Latin

American leadership, policy formation, and social change.
Parties will not be seen as the normal participants of politics in Latin America; but rather as "artificial" organiza-

tions that have never been recognized as the final determi-

nators of leadership and power as in the Anglo-American tradition.

In the end a complete view of an opposition party like

the PRD will offer

a,

clear- guide to the strengths and weak-

nesses of these Western oriented agents of political change

functioning in a thoroughly Latin atmosphere.
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Introductio n of the Two Opponents
The importance of examining in a less
theoretical

manner the opposition conflict with the
governing regime in
Latin America and the need to expand upon
the existing information concerning the "operational" aspects
of political
party opposition brings us to the Dominican
Republic and the
Part ido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD)
it would have been
quite possible to examine the central theme of
opposition
.

versus government in another Latin American nation and
within

another political party that is out of power.

But as will be

shown below, the Dominican regime of President Joaquin Balaguer
and the activities of the PRD since the elections of June,
1966 provide one of the most beneficial interactions between

winner and loser that is available in contemporary Latin

American politics.
The choice of the Dominican Republic, the Balaguer

government, and the PRD opposition in most recent history
(since 1966)

is based on a number of reasons.

In the first

place Dominican politics from June, 1966 onward takes a new
route.

Prior to this date the Dominican Republic had for a

full year period been in a state of constant unrest.

The

Dominican Republic beginning in May, 1961 experienced the

assassination of its long reigning dictator, Rafael Trujillo,
the initial introduction of democratic institutions, the
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nation's popularly elected
president in forty years (the
PRO'S Juan Bosch), a tragic coup
against Bosch's government,
a period of extreme economic
stagnation, and a ravaging
civil war that was only ended by
a controversial United States
intervention. 19
Thus

m

June,. 1966 the Dominican Republic
could look

back only on confusion, hatred, and
misguided hopes. With the
unfortunate events of the previous five years
behind them and
the desire to begin an era of peace and
prosperity, the

Dominican people went to the polls in June,
1966 to choose a
leader.

Despite the failure of democratic politics since
1961

and the almost total lack of understanding and
respect for

democratic institutions on the part of Dominican elites
and
the general public, the Dominican Republic once again
followed
the road of democratic practice.

World opinion, political and

economic pressure from the United States government, and an

unquenchable desire for participation and social reorganization on the part of many new groups in society convinced

Dominican elites that they must attempt a second effort at

Anglo-American democracy.
Dominican leaders, it must be emphasized, were not
terribly interested in forming the political system into an
open,

law-abiding democracy on par with the United States or

19 Howard Wiarda's book The Dominican Republic - Nation
in Transition (New York:
Praeger, 1969) offers the most com-

prehensive view of this historical progression.
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Great Britain.

They were primarily concerned
with creating
a political system that
fulfilled the expectations
of the

outside world.

(especially the United States
government) and
quieted those groups in the Domincan
Republic who clamored
for a government that respected
parties, elections, legislatures and personal rights. The
decision then to follow

Anglo-American style democracy was a mere
tactic,
means of consolidating power without alienating

a practical

or arousing

those elements so important for the economic
redevelopment of
the country.
Dominican leaders, and in particular President
Balaguer were well aware that democracy in
their country
,

would have its own character and would in many
ways come into
conflict with the recognized norms for establishing a
govern

mental system modeled on that of the United States or
Great
Britain.
In the election of 1966 Joaquin Balaguer

(a

former

Trujillo puppet president in the last days of the dictator's
power) was victorious over the reluctant PRD candidate Juan

Bosch (the deposed president of the country whose revolutionary promises incurred the rath of the conservative ele-

ments in the country)

.

With his victory assured Balaguer

outwardly promised to form the Dominican Republic into a
thriving democratic system and above all to strive to form a

government of cooperation and conciliation in which the opposition would play a significant role.

Bosch, for his part.
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reluctantly promised to abide by
the results of the election
and to provide the Dominican
governmental system with a
vigorous opposition voice.

And so with Balaguer's victory and
Bosch’s promise
the Dominican Republic set out
on this
strange course of

building a democratic structure on
top of an age old system
of authoritarian rule, personalistic
leadership, status quo
decision-making, and suppression of all
challenges to the
dominant economic, social, and political
forces. Although
there was this pledge of democratic
practice, many in the
Dominican Republic wondered whether democratic
institutions
could curtail the ingrained hostilities stored
up after years
of conflict between competing classes and
ideologies.
The Dominican effort in 1966 to rebuild the
country

after the civil war along psuedo-democratic lines
thus seems
to offer an excellent research area for examining
the con-

flict between opposition and government, PRD and Balaguer.

With the victory of Balaguer, Juan Bosch and the PRD assume
the role of democratic opposition and begin to work within
the institutional framework of Dominican politics.

From 1966

onward it is possible to trace and analyze the interactions

between the PRD and the Balaguer government and point out the

major changes in their relationship.

As will be shown, the

interaction between the PRD and the Balaguer regime provides
a fascinating glimpse not only of Dominican politics, but
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also of the extreme hardships
that an opposition party
must
face in a political system
in which democratic
institutions
and practice are often mere
window dressing.
But more than just analysing
the interactions of the
PRD and the Balaguer regime,
the investigation of
Dominican
politics in the contemporary
period will serve
as an aid to

understanding a virtually unknown,
yet crucial, era in this
nation's history.
it is the consensus of most
experts that
with the conclusion of the 1965
civil war the Dominican
Republic entered into a new era.
As the country lay in ruins
after the war it was the job of
Dominican leaders to pick up
the pieces and redevelop the
nation.
Yet because of the
intricacies of the civil war situation
and the added involvement of the United States, journalists
and scholars

have taken

considerable interest in the pre-1966 period,
while generally
ignoring the important political activities
occurring since
the June, 1966 elections. 20

The investigation of the PRD in opposition since
June,
1966 will thus seek to close a quite noticeable void
in polit-

ical research.

The study of the PRD and the Balaguer regime

does not purport to be a comprehensive examination of
the

20There have been a few scholarly and journalistic
articles on the Dominican Republic since 1966 which will be
to in the course of the thesis.
Only one book of any
consequence has been written about politics in the Dominican
Republic since 1966 Carlos Maria Gutierrez' The Dominican
Republic:
Rebellion and Repr ession (New York! Monthly Review

—

Press, 1972)

.
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total Dominican political system
in this period, but it must
be emphasized that the interactions
of the prd and the Bala-

guer regime go a long way toward
explaining modern day
Dominican politics. Because of the
smallness of the nation,
the bifurcation of the Dominican
populace into two readily
observable political camps, and the strength
of the nation's
two caudillos, Balaguer and Bosch,
the study of the PRD and
its opposition status covers most of what
can be termed

politics in the Dominican Republic.

In fact it has been sug-

gested somewhat facetiously that all one has to do
in the
Dominican Republic is listen to what Balaguer and Bosch

are

saying in order to determine what the tenor of politics
is
going to be like in the future.
Some Implications of PRD Opposition
for Latin American Politics:
Themes for Discussion

Although the discussion of the PRD and its interaction
with the Balaguer regime is at the heart of this study, it is
important to stress that the conflict between opposition and

government in the Dominican Republic calls into question a
number of problems in politics, social organization, and

national development that are of great importance to Latin

America in general.

As this thesis will point out, the efforts

of the PRD to develop and maintain a viable opposition in

Balaguer*

s

Dominican Republic stirs up interest as to the cur-

rent influence of political parties in the Latin American
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context, the continuation and
sophistication of the
paternalistic governing system, and
the prospect for the
development of Anglo-American style
democratic institutions
and procedures in this region.
Through the interaction of
the PRD and the Balaguer regime
it will be possible to expand
our understanding and make more
concise judgements about
areas of larger importance to Latin
America. Furthermore,
with the political situation changing
rapidly in Latin

America in the present era of widespread
military involvement
national politics and increasing emphasis
on

m

economic

modernization and technological development,
it seems that
the struggle of the PRD against Balaguer
must be examined in
a larger perspective.

So as to alert the reader to the impli-

cations of the PRD-Balaguer conflict a brief
introduction of
the problems surrounding political party
activity, paternalistic leadership, and Anglo-American democracy
in Latin

America is provided below.
The fate of Latin American political parties

.

The

opposition dilemma of the PRD, although in some respects
unique to the Dominican political system, cannot be divorced
from a lessening of the influence and effectiveness of party

organization in modem day Latin America.

The rise in

modernizing demands, the expanded role of the military, and
the general failure of liberal democratic leadership has left

parties and party systems in dire straits.

There is ample
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supporting evidence to show
that political parties which
once were at the forefront
of national power are no
longer
central to the development
process in Latin America. 21 New
elites (or perhaps the old elites
in "new clothing") have
sprung up to challenge the onetime
dominance of political
party elites and to offer alternative
roads to national
integration, leadership recruitment,
interest articulation,
and policy implementation. The
failure of political parties
Latin America has even caused some
scholars to comment on
what can only be termed the "death"
of party politics in
this region. 22

m

Despite these gloomy statements and predictions
about
the declining influence of political
parties,
there are those

who still feel that parties can continue to
play a role in
the changing tenor of politics and economic
development that
is engulfing Latin America.

Political parties, according to

these analysts, must strive to develop their capacity
for

integrating Latin American populations and for channeling
the interests of the people to the centers of power.

What

parties must come to realize, however, is that the chance of
21 See Douglas Chalmers,

"Parties and Society in Latin
America," paper presented at the American Political Science
Association meeting in Washington, D.C., September, 1968.
2

An example of such writing can be found in Susan
Bodenheimer, "La crisis del movimiento socialdemocrata en
America Latina," Estudios Internacionales (Chile) No. 12,
enero-marzo, 1970, pp. 544-567.
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institutionalizing democratic
systems with set procedures
for changing political
power and guarantees that
party
organizations will remain at
the core of the decision-making
appartus is remote, if not
impossible . 23
The discussion then of the
PRD opposition must be
Placed in the context of this
current controversy over the
status and role of Latin American
political parties. It
will be the task of this study
to view not just the history
of the PRD opposition to Balaguer,
but to use the example of
the PRD as a means of making some
judgements about parties
and party activity in the modernizing
environment of Latin
America. Party oppositions like the
PRD can in a real sense
serve as a kind of political barometer.
If the PRD, despite
its problems with the Balaguer regime,
shows itself to be a
generally strong, active, and influential
force in Dominican
politics, it might be necessary to reevaluate
some of the

warnings currently in vogue about the decline
of party dominance in Latin America.
If on the other hand
the PRD,

because of governmental pressure, shows itself
to be a weak

organization and unable to challenge Balaguer, then it
becomes necessary to pay more attention to those who
question
the viability of political parties in modern day Latin
Aitierica.

^Scott, "Political Parties and Policy-making in

Latin America."
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T he emerging author!
arian-paternalistic

1 eader
Besides viewing the larger
implications of the PRD opposition
for Latin American parties,
it is important also to
examine
the activities of President
Balaguer as an example

of an

emerging type of authoritarian-paternalistic
leader in a
tradition bound modernizing state.
The system of paternalism
and the paternalistic leader is
of course crucial to an under
standing of Latin American politics.
The centralization
of

power in the hands of one "patron''
figure who deals out favor
to his supporters and admonishes
(or terrorizes) his detractors has been in evidence throughout the
history of Latin

American society. 24

The Dominican heritage is likewise

replete with evidence of the paternalistic
leader and the
undying influence that he has had on future
generations.
The traditional element of paternalism in Latin
America, though, does not mean that this form of
leadership
ana control cannot change and modernize in order
to meet the

new demands of a new era.

It will thus be the task of this

thesis to examine not only the PRD opposition, but President

Balaguer as an example of a modern paternalistic leader who
has improved and expanded the techniques of power politics
24

An analysis of paternalistic leadership and administration can be found in Magali Sarfatti, Spanish
Bureaucratic-Patrimonialism in America (Berkeley:
Institute
for International Studies, University of California, 1966),
and Claudio Veliz, "Centralism and Nationalism in Latin
America," Foreign Affairs 47 (October 1968):
68-83.
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and social control so necessary
in a complex and demanding
developing nation.
In many respects Balaguer
can be seen as an emerging

model of Latin American leadership.

As the thesis will show,

Balaguer has the keen ability
to balance off conflicting
forces in Dominican society,
while at all times enhancing his
own position. He is at once the
savvy politician, the suave
statesman, the humble public servant,
and the brutal repressor.
In this contradictory union is
perhaps the key
to

understanding the new paternalistic leader
in Latin America
that Balaguer mirrors. Balaguer is
a caudillo who has gotten
off the horse and placed himself in
the limosine.
He has

successfully bridged the gap between the
militaristic patron
and the modernizing administrator.
Balaguer'

s

ability to accomplish this transition to

modern leadership, while maintaining an element
of traditional practice can best be seen in his interaction
with the
PRD opposition. The daily initiatives taken by
the govern-

ment against the PRD reveal the ability of Balaguer to mix
repression with more modern techniques of public relations
and co-optation.

By thus viewing Balaguer and his response

to the PRD we not only see the total picture of opposition

activity in the Dominican Republic, but we also begin to

recognize this new manner of conducting politics in Latin

America which blends aggressive economic development with
strong-willed political control.

—

n

^
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sa^ascrag.

in discussing the
conflict

between the PRD and Balaguer
it is well neat
impossible to
ignore the status of democracy
and democratic practice
in the
Dominican Republic. In fact
what is being examined
in this
study of the PRD opposition
is the course of the
so-called
Dominican "experiment" in
democracy that was initiated
after
the 1965 civil war.
The interaction of the
PRD with the
Balaguer government is but one
aspect of
the total story of

Dominican democracy in the modern
period.

As alluded to earlier, the
Dominican Republic in the
recent era has been functioning
politically under a Balaguerdesigned democracy. The trappings
of democracy-a

constitution, a legislature, elections,
parties, legalized opposition
groups, and a free press-are all
present in the Dominican

Republic and are proudly paraded in full
view for the world,
and especially the United States,
to see. As we will see,
however, much of the Dominican "experiment"
in democracy is
cosmetic, as the institutional framework
constructed after
the 1965 civil war does not function
autonomously or effectively, but responds to the encouragement and
direction of

President Balaguer and his supporters.
The rather weak dedication of the Balaguer regime

toward democracy and democratic practice as conceived in
the

Anglo-American sense and by the PRD sets the stage for a
fuller, more comprehensive discussion of the current status
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and future possibilities
of Anglo-A.erican style
democracy
Lat
AmerlCan societies. with the
success of administrations like Balaguer s and
the recent decline of
democratic regimes throughout
the region, Latin American
politics
seems to have returned to an
earlier era when government
was
purely an exercise in
authoritarianism, and democracy was

“

“

'

hardly ever mentioned.

There is in short a quite
evident

movement afoot in Latin America
to discredit the institutions
and procedures of democracy as
incompatible with the traditional manner of conducting politics
in this region, and
moreover, detrimental to the speedy
modernization
of these

developing nations.
The dilemma of democratic failure
in the Dominican
Republic and in many Latin American
countries calls out for
an answer not only because these
nations have been unwilling
or unable to model their governmental
structure after the
United States or Great Britain, but more
importantly because
there are still sizeable portions of Latin
American society

that believe democracy and democratic practice
hold the

answer to the long range goals of national development
and

revolutionary change.
5 For

Therefore, the problems of the

some background information about the failures
of democracy in Latin America, especially with regard to
Western expectations about the institutionalization of democratic practice see the report of the Economic Commission for
Latin America (ECLA) , Economic Survey of Latin America 1968:
Some Aspects of the Latin American Economy towards the End of
the 1960*5 (New York:
United Nations Economic and Social
Council, 1969)
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democratic

experiment” in the Dominican
Republic can serve
as an excellent backdrop for
the study of democracy and
its
future in Latin America. The fact
that the Dominican Republic
started anew in 1966 to develop a
viable democratic system

makes this country and its political
actors probably the best
and most recent guide to the pitfalls
and potential of AngloAmerican style democracy in a Latin atmosphere.
The Structure of the Thesis
The choice of the Dominican Republic, the
Balaguer
regime, and the PRD in the most recent era
as the setting and
the participants for this study of
opposition-government inter-

action necessitates that a formal structure for
pursuing this
analysis be introduced at this point. Since the
major emphasis
of this study will be on attempting to determine
the "opera-

tional" aspects of the PRD opposition, this thesis will
be

divided into five main chapters.

An historical and socio-

logical chapter will follow this introduction and seek to lay
the groundwork for a fuller understanding of Dominican society

and politics.

The major emphasis in this chapter will be on

pointing out the heritage, customs, traditions, and leadership

components that have helped to form the unique quality of

Dominican life.

This historical and sociological chapter will

also incorporate a brief discussion of the PRD in the pre-1966

period to aid in an understanding of this major actor in the
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conflict between opposition
and government. Following
this
chapter the thesis will move
into the heart of the discussion of opposition party
activity in the Balaguer years
and
examine four areas that will
illustrate the interactions
between opposition and government.
The first area, to be examined
will be the opposition
s trategies employed by
the PRD in order to combat the
policies and actions of the Balaguer
regime.
In this chapter on
strategies a number of opposition
"grand plans" that the PRD
developed in order to maintain its
position within Dominican
politics will be examined in detail,
what will be stressed
in this discussion, though, is not so
much the number or the
content of the strategies but the PRD’s constant
readjust-

ment of its strategy positions so as to
compensate for new
situations that arose as a result of policies or
actions

taken by Balaguer.

Besides viewing the strategies that the PRD formulated, a complementary chapter on opposition
tactics employed

by the Party to implement its policies toward the Balaguer

regime will also be introduced.

As with the opposition

strategies of the PRD it is possible to point out an extensive array of tactics used by the Party ranging from the

legislative "walk out" to radio broadcasts to huge street
1

demonstrations to the threat of a general strike.
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Following upon the discussion
of the pro's outward
attempts at engaging in
opposition political activity,
emphasis will shift to an indepth
investigation of the internal
m ac hinery of the Party and
the extensive difficulties
that it
encountered as an opposition.
Problems in maintaining ideological purity, avoiding harmful
intra-party squabbles.
increasing the quantity and quality
of its leadership ranks,
strengthening its organization structure,
and expanding its
financial base will be investigated.
All of the above demands
can be considered central to the
smooth functioning of any
political organization. But within
opposition parties the
effective performance of these functions
is hampered
by the

powerlessness of the organization nationally,
the natural
dissension that crops up within a losing
political party, and
the enormous advantages that the party in
power attains in
the way of garnering patronage and other
financial and economic benefits.

The fourth major section concerning the PRD will
view
the Party and its problems as the recognized
Dominican

political opposition from a different perspective.

The PRD

will be examined in terns of its relationship to the Balaguer

government and the efforts of that regime to weaken the once
powerful hold of the PRD on the Dominican populace.

It is a

well known fact in Latin American politics that many political parties in a secondary position vis-a-vis the national
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government are often times
subject to systematic
intimidation
and repression. As will
be shown with regard
to the PRD in
this contemporary period,
the Balaguer regime
followed a
similar path of anti-opposition
behavior, only to a much
greater extent, and, in all
fairness, in a more ingeneous
manner
The chapter on the Balaguer
regime’s efforts to stymie
the PRD will be concerned
with three major ploys used
by the
Dominican president and his
supporters,
since June, 1966 the
PRD has been subject to a
continuous wave of depoliticizati on
.

s ubversion

and repression.

The PRD has constantly been
faced

by the government's attempts
at shifting the attention of
the
Dominican people from political
concerns such as the character
Of the power structure in
the country and the possibilities
of
revolutionary change to purely economic
concerns as housing,
road building, education, wages and
industrialization. The
goal of this activity is to wipe
clean from the Dominican
people's consciousness the memory of a
nation which only a
few years ago was in the clutches of
a fierce political battle,
a battle that was headed by the PRD
and aimed at achieving

modernization from within a completely new social
framework.
When the government was not depoliticizing the
Dominican populace it was working overtime to subvert
the Party

leadership of the PRD by offering lucrative governmental
positions to those within the organization whose allegiance
was
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at best marginal or by
attempting to reduce the
associational
ties of the PRD in the labor,
peasant, and middle class sectors.
Where the depoliticization efforts
were in the main
subtle maneuvers to gain public
support, the subversive
activities of the Balaguer regime
were overt, intimidating
and often ingeneous. The subversive
tactics reveal a regime
intent on halting PRD effectiveness.
The final and most serious tactic
of the Balaguer
regime was its concerted effort to emasculate
the PRD leadership ranks by vicious campaigns of murder,
harassment, incarceration and kidnapping. The government,
through its repressive agents in the military and the National
Police, seemed
intent on punishing the PRD for its determination
to remain
a vigorous political force in Dominican
society.

Unfor-

tunately, the picture of repression against the PRD
will

offer some of the saddest views of contemporary Dominican

politics

After this discussion of strategies, tactics, internal
party politicis, and the responses of the Balaguer regime to
the PRD opposition, there will be a concluding chapter in

which an attempt will be made to summarize the plight of the
PRD opposition since 1966 and to comment on the possibilities
of democratic opposition in the future.

Also in this con-

cluding chapter there will be a general discussion of the

Dominican political system and the place that opposition

^^
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activity has in that
system This discussion
bring together the data
on PRD-government
conflict into a
more understandable
whole by describing the
nature and character of Dominican
politics.

wm

The discussion of the
PRD opposition to the
Balaguer
regime thus is not a simple
matter. Besides the
intricacies
of opposition-government
interaction this study will
seek to
begin the reevaluation of
the wider issues of Latin
American
societies like the future
potential of political parties,
the
sophistication of paternalistic
leadership, and the dilemma
of Anglo-American style
democracy in Latin America.
But where
this thesis will serve as
a means of examining some
recent
changes in Latin American
politics, the primary aim of
this
research to expand the current
knowledge about the structure
and process of Dominican
development. Far too little is
understood about the mechanics of
Dominican politics and
government. Research emphasis must
now be placed on determining the complexities of policy
formation and implementation
in the Dominican Republic.
In a sense we have just scratched
the surface of politics and
government in this country and
have become too concerned with
assassinations, coups and civil
wars.
Now in a period of stability and relative
tranquility
we must attempt to build from the existing
knowledge of

Dominican politics and construct
Dominican political process.

a

fuller picture of the

CHAPTER

II

DOMINICAN HISTORY AND THE PRD:

A LEGACY

OF CONFLICT, DEPENDENCY AND

UNFULFILLED PROMISES
Every country in Latin America is in some way touched
by its history.

The vestiges of strict class structure,

unequal distribution of goods and services, paternalistic

caudilloism and rampant instability can still be found in

many countries of this region.

Some analysts find the impor-

tance of history so strong in many Latin American countries
that they have developed theories which suggest that these

societies never "lose" their past.

What happens is that new

ideas, institutions and procedures are grafted onto the

already existing traditions and culture forming a unique

union or "museum" of the past and the

present.-*-

Perhaps this view of Latin American history and
change is nowhere more applicable than in the Dominican
^Charles Anderson's article, "Toward a Theory of
Latin American Politics," on the "power contenders" in Latin
American politics concludes by making an important observation about the fact that society and politics in this region
are a melting pot or as Anderson terms it a "museum" of
structures, traditions, customs and ideologies that refuse
to die, but rather retain their legitimacy and compete with
all that is new. As Anderson suggests, many times the past
has been victorious over the present as Latin American
society and politics refuse to change.
38
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Republic.

This country, like the other
countries of Latin
America, is steeped in the
distinctive social and cultural
heritage that was brought to this
region by the Spanish
colonists and has come to be entrenched
through some one
hundred and fifty years of national
development. The sad
legacy of oppressive leaders, numerous
foreign interventions, brutal class and regional
struggles and unvelievable
economic backwardness, however, has had
a profound influence
on modern day Dominican society.
Many, if not
all, of the

problems that have plagued the Dominican
Republic throughout
its history still dominate the national
scene and seem as
far away as ever from satisfactory solution.

The Dominican

Republic, in a real sense, is a country whose
past has never

been able to be laid to rest.

Although the legacy of Dominican history is certainly
a tragic comment on the

misuse of power and the crying need

for social equality and economic modernization, the
develop-

ment of Dominican society from its independence in 1821
cannot be ignored or forgotten as a "bad dream."

The impor-

tant connection between past Dominican history and contem-

porary sociopolitical behavior necessitates that the study
of the PRD in opposition be preceded by a thorough examina-

tion of the past.

Without a proper grounding in the essen-

tials of Dominican history, the often times unexplainable

and sad events that this country and its people have had to
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endure cannot be placed in their
proper perspective.
No history of the Dominican
Republic

and the PRD can

be initiated without first
mentioning some of the basic geographical, social and cultural
characteristics of the country, its people and its heritage. 2
The Dominican Republic,
a country of nearly five million
people, shares the former
Spanish island of Hispaniola with
French-speaking Haiti.
Situated in the Caribbean between Puerto
Rico and Cuba, the

Dominican Republic is a study in contrasts.

Stretching

through the heart of the country is the Central
Cordillera,
a mountainous range which reaches heights
of over 10,000 feet

in some areas.

The Central Cordillera creates numerous lush

green valleys of excellent farm land of which the Cibao
region is the most famous and populous.

In the Eastern third

of the country and in some parts of the Southwest,
however,

the Dominican climate has created a semi-arid desert region.

Economic productivity in these areas is quite low and the

population is in many respects the most deprived in the
nation.

The structure of the land and the Caribbean climate
has greatly influenced the character of the natural resources

and economic development in the Dominican Republic.
9

•

,

The

A more indepth discussion of the Dominican geography
and other social and cultural characteristics can be found in
the Dominican Republic Election Factbook June 1, 1966 (Washinton, D.C.:
Institute for the Comparative Study of Political
Systems, 1966)
.
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nation's greatest natural resource is
sugar cane. Due to a
long history of interest and
involvement by foreign families
and corporations the Dominican Republic
has become one of
the world's leading exporters of sugar
cane and
sugar cane

by-products.

One cannot journey very far in the
Dominican

Republic without noticing the endless fields
of sugar and the
thousands of peasants wielding the machete as
they cut the
cane.

Recent findings of nickel deposits and other
minerals

have expanded the country's resource potential,
but the

Dominican people maintain a strong reliance on the
export

revenue gained from sugar.

This strong reliance has done

nothing to quash the view of many that the Dominican Republic
is destined to remain a one— crop economy.

Although the backbone of Dominican society is in the
sugar cane fields, the economic, social and political life of
the country is centered in the capital city of Santo Domingo
(pop. 900, 000)

.

Santo Domingo is a vibrant, expanding city

which attracts not only the middle class seeking the excitement and financial benefits of the urban area, but also the
rural peasantry who venture to the capital in search of a
3

For perhaps the most recent view of the economic
situation in the Dominican Republic the Balaguer government
has put out a twenty-four page advertisement in the New York
Times of June 9, 1974 which touches on nearly all areas of
national development. Of course one must recognize that the
advertisement is definitely pro-government and does not have
to be believed. Nevertheless, the discussion of the Dominican
economy is extremely helpful and one of the few comprehensive
examinations of the length and breadth of the changes achieved
or undertaken in the Balaguer years.

better life away from the
land.
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Much of the economic

modernization that has been
achieved in the Balaguer
years
can be seen in and around
the capital city. New
housing
particularly in evidence as the
government has had to
make room for the great influx
into the city.
Where the city of Santo Domingo
is the center of
the new Dominican society,
the second largest city of
Santiago (pop. 132,000) is the
best example of the old, traditional Dominican society, situated
in the Cibao valley
region, Santiago is a slower
paced city with
deep roots in

the country's past and a community
of landed aristocrats who
exert a strong influence on political
leaders and policymaking in the capital city.

The Dominican Republic, it must be
emphasized, is
not merely land, resources and cities.
The Dominican Republic is also people.
To better understand the Dominican
people one can point out some general
characteristics, like
the fact that 80% are of mixed blood

and Negro)

,

(primarily Caucasian

that the majority live in rural areas (upwards

of 60%), and that the birth rate increase
of 2.9% yearly is

one of the highest in Latin America.

But to develop a more

precise and meaningful view of the Dominican people it is
important to stress their "Spanishness

,

"

With traditions

and customs of Spain that go all the way back to Columbus
(Santo Domingo is the first city built in the New World)

,

it

IS not difficult to
understand the Catholicism
of many
Dominioans (98%), the
importance of the family
unit, the
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general formalism found in
social and business
relations,
and the rather stringent
social class system that
separates
Dominicans of different economic
backgrounds.
The overarching influence
of this Spanish heritage
has not only effected the
beliefs, behavior and relations
of
the Dominican people, it has
also been instrumental

in forming the Dominican Republic
into a 'closed" society.
"closed
not in the sense of personal
aloofness, since the Dominicans

always show themselves to be a
kind and gracious people.
Dominican society is "closed" in the

sense of the serious

and seemingly permanent gaps
between the upper class landed
and business elites and the lower
class peasant and laboring
groups. National elites in the Dominican
Republic are
extremely reluctant about moving too
quickly into the twentieth century for fear of destroying the
atmosphere
of

security that the traditional social system has
engendered.
The history of the Dominican Republic and the
struggles of
the PRD that will be discussed below reveal the
influence of

the history and Spanish heritage on Dominican society
and the

conflict that permeates the past of this tiny country as

opposition groups have continually fought to "open up" a
"closed" system.
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The Dominican Republic
since

lfi?i

The decision to begin
this study with the
Dominican
independence movement in 1821
was not arrived at
without
some hesitation. 4 It is
possible to trace Dominican
history
back to the initial sighting
of the island by
Columbus' men
aboard the Nina. Such a
starting point would aid
in the

presentation of the early relationship
between the Spanish
explorers and the native Indian
population which was crucial
to the development of Latin
American culture and mores in
the
New World.
It is also beneficial to view
the evolution of the
island called Hispaniola by the
Spanish from its lofty position as the first center for all
colonial operations in the
New world to the neglected,
underpopulated outpost it became
he ma i° r historical works which
concern the Domini_
can Republic
are Samuel Hazard, Santo Dominao:
p^tN
HoiUnk, El pgeblo^ltsijlfano
(SanSa;o
1 9 ' Dominican Republic!
Catolica Madre y Magistra, 1971); Rayford Universidad
Logan, Haiti and
jhg, D ominican Republic (New York:
Oxford Univ. PFi ss^ 196 8)rt W
Overtaken by Events: The Dominican
R^nrH?^ from
J°
gepubiic
the Fal l of Trujillo to the Civi l War
York
oubleday, 1966); Selden Rodman, Quisgueya:
A Histo ry of the
ominican Republic (Seattle: Univ. of Washington
Press, 1964
Otto Schoenrich, Santo Domingo: A Country with
a Future (New
lork:
Macmillan, 1918) ; Sumner Welles, Naboth's Vineyardyhe Domini can Republic, 1844-1924 (New Y^k !
Pinson and
Clarke, 1928)
Howard Wiarda, The Dominican Republic - Nation
Transition (New York: Praeger, 1969)
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from 1550 to its independence
f uuence
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By
centering
attention on
•

this period of development
and decay one can more
easily
view the formation of the
Dominican heritage with its
characteristic elements of dedicated
Catholicism, vigorous economic
exploitation, elitist social
stratification, and corporative
political organization.

Yet the most advantageous
beginning for the description of Dominican history seems
to be with the formal break
with Spain and the onset of
independence in 1821. Most
scholars acknowledge 1821 as the
inception of modern Dominican history and the key date for
examining the events and
personalities that have molded the current
shape of Dominican
society and government. It is important
to remember,
how-

ever, that even though Dominican
history will be examined
from 1821 forward, the social, economic,
and political systems of this country have to a large
extent been effected by
the Spanish conquerors and administrators.
In the case of most Latin American
countries at this

crucial time of independence, the break with Spain
created a
new era of "home rule" and national development.
In the

Dominican Republic of 1821 the successful uprising against
the Spanish left the former colony at its weakest state
and

Carl Ortwin Sauer, in The Early Spanish Main
(Berkeley:
Univ. of California Press, 1969), gives one of
the more detailed accounts of the problems that Spanish
colonization brought to the Island of Hispaniola. See pp.
196-217.
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therefore open to invasion and
control by those with greater
resources. Occupying the remaining
one-third of the island,
neighboring Haiti showed great
interest in extending its
dominance and proceeded to take complete
control of the
Dominican Republic under General Jean
Pierre Boyer. 6
The takeover of the entire island by
the predominantly black Haitians produced immediate
difficulties which
were never rectified, and helped to
revitalize the lethargic
independence forces in the Dominican zone.
At the root of
the Haitian failure was the legacy of
hatred left by the
cruel Haitian generals Dessalines and Christophe
prior to
1821.

This deep-seated enmity of the Dominicans for their

black conquerors was increased further by Boyer's
decision
to revive forced labor among the populace along
with the

continuation of senseless violence and pillage by Haitian

administrators and military personnel.

7

Amidst such oppressive conditions it was not long
before the cries of revolution and freedom could be heard.
In the Dominican section of the island the call for a truly

independent nation came from Juan Pablo Duarte and his secret
6 Logan, Haiti and the Dominican Republic
gives the
most objective view of the Haitian invasion. Logan examines
the relations between the Dominican Republic and Haiti from
a Haitian vantage point, a view that is not commonly posited.
,

7

'Logan, pp. 31-34.
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society of liberators. La
Trinitaria.8 The Haitians,
under
a new leader. General
Herard, attempted to
contain the rising
revolutionary fervor of the
Dominican people, but were
unable
to control the movement
that Duarte initiated,
February
of 1844 Durate-s forces
ousted the Haitian invaders.

m

The heroism and foresight
that Duarte and his followers showed in fomenting
the revolution and seeking
to
carry it forward was in vain
as the great Dominican
leader
was unable to ward off the power
hungry advances
of two

caudillo-like figures, Pedro Santana
and Buenventura Baez.
Both Santana and Baez combined a
personal magnetism with a
ruthless determination for national
dominance to control
Dominican politics from 1845 to
1878, and thereby effectively
stifle the democratic dream of Duarte.

Although one can easily overgeneralize
about such a
long period of a nation's history, it
would not

be an exag-

geration to characterize the "era of the
twin-caudillos" as
a time when the Dominican Republic fell
increasingly
into

internal and international bankruptcy.

The results of this

inept management could be found not only in the
impoverished
state of the government's coffers, but also in the
expanded

foreign interest and intrigue that surrounded Dominican
O

Rodman, pp. 46-59.
Rodman's work contains the only
detailed examination in English of the Dominican Republic's
greatest hero.
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politics.

President Santana, besides
numerous negotiations
with the British, French and
Americans over monetary agreements, land leases and promises
of protection

from Haiti,
was most well known for his
decision to permit the Spanish
to reannex the Dominican Republic
in 1861 in an attempt to
stabilize the faltering economy and
to secure a protector
against Haiti's continuous assaults.

As with the Haitian invasion, the
reimposition of
Spanish rule on the Dominican people
created serious problems.
As the occupation forces branched
out across the

countryside causing ill-feelings and heightening
tensions,
revolutionary efforts were again undertaken to rid
the nation
of these new foreign interlopers.
In 1865 the Dominicans,
led by the brilliant general Gregorio Luperon,
were victor-

ious for a second time in forcing the evacuation
of the

Spanish.

The Dominican people had now rid themselves of the

Spanish twice over, but their future was still not secure or

bright as the other caudillo leader, Buenventura Baez, continued to take the nation down the road to financial ruin
and international dependence.

Baez, already president twice

prior to 1865, captured the executive office an additional
three more times until his final ouster in 1878.

During

Baez's last three presidencies he committed his country to
9 Ibid.,

pp.

59-70.
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number of damaging and
unpayable foreign loans, and
furthermore almost succeeded
in having the United
States
annex the Dominican Republic
(the U.S. Senate rejected
the
treaty signed with the Grant
administration) .10
a

By the t me
-

that Baez left Dominican
politics the country was sorely
in
need of enlightened leadership
that would bring some order
to the shambles left by the
politics of occupation, caudilloism and interventionism.

The resourceful leadership that
the Dominican people
so desperately needed never
surfaced.
Instead the Dominicans
had to endure the seventeen year
reign (1882-1899) of ulises
Heureaux. The paradoxical dictatorship
of Heureaux was a
unique period in Dominican history in
that the black leader
combined a fierce, repressive rule with
the introduction of
many social and economic changes that had
heretofore been
ignored.!! Although the brunt of the evaluation
given Heureaux's regime emphasizes the violent excesses,
the huge spy
nets, the phenomenal economic losses and the
continued reliance on foreign financial assistance, the fact remains
that

l°Charles Tansill's The United States and Santo
Domingo 1798-1873 (Gloucester! Peter Smith, 1967) gives a
detailed account of how Senator Charles Sumner worked to
stop President Grant's move to annex the Dominican Republic.
Sumner is now one of the few Americans to be honored by a
statue which is prominently placed in a Santo Domingo suburb.
See pp. 338-464.
11 Francis L. Willis,

lic," National Magazine

,

10,

"Heureaux and His Island RepubSeptember, 1899, pp. 563-571.
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under Heureaux educational
changes progressed steadily,
transportation and communication
links were expanded,
preferential trade agreements
were finalized and the
bureaucracy
and army were substantially
overhauled. Yet despite
the
modernizing efforts of
Heureaux, the Dominican
Republic at
the turn of the century
languished in a state of
political
and financial collapse,
with the assassination
of Heureaux
in 1899 the Dominican
people and their leaders
came to recognize the dire straits into
which caudillo politics had
led
them.
More importantly, many
Dominicans again became reconed to the fact that the
most advantageous method of
attaining economic stability and
social development was
through the guidance and assistance
of a foreign power. 12
The foreign intervention in the
name of financial
solvency and economic prosperity
(which many Dominican leaders
viewed as inevitable) came in 1905
with the establishment of
a United States customs
receivership. The Dominicans,

embroiled in internal political
upheavals between two rival
factions, turned to the United States
as the official collector of its custom duties and
administrator of the $29.5
l 2 Hoetink's

book, El Pueblo Dominicano covers one
°f the more forgotten eras of Dominican
history and thus is
a va luable contribution to an understanding
of the economic
difficulties and dependence of the Dominican Republic.
.
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President Roosevelt
wholeheartedly SU pthe Dominican request
for the receivership
to the
extent that he expanded
the meaning of the
Monroe Doctrine
to include direct
intervention of the United
States in a
sovereign nation.
The receivership of
1905, for all the future
implications it held for United
n
ited States-Dominican
relations, was
on the whole successful
as it substantially
reduced the debt
burden facing the country.
The soc ial and political
scene
also seemed to benefit
from the American
presence. The
administration of President
RamSn ciceres was perhaps
the
most visionary and democratic
in the nation’s history
Unfortunately Caceres was
assassinated leaving the
Dominican
Republic again without
effective leadership. 14
•

.

death of Caceres placed the
Dominican Republic
in a familiar position
of having to fill a poW er
void.
The
rival Jimenista and Horacista
factions attempted to fill this
void, but only brought the
country another dose of internal
Chaos. Domesti c politics
became so confused and unstable
Welles' Naboth' s Vineyard is the
best source of dai-United tates to the Dominican Republic
?
uunng tms
during
thi^pe^icd
period. “q
See especially
pp. 601-639.
..

t0 n° te that c£ceres was one of
the assassins of the dictator
Ulises Heureaux.
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r° le ° f

StateS Shifted

that of mere
t0 the COntr °
llin9 ° f nationa
l elections
to thin:
timate occupation of
the country in
1916 15
With the landing of
the United States
troops, the
Dominican Republic
experienced its third f
foreign
•

^

occupation
since independence.
a
.As was evident frQm
ions to the past
invasions, the Dominican
people did not
telish the new American
presence on their soil.
Although
the first American
governor
ernor. r=
t,i
n
„
Captain Harry s. Knapp,
„as a
compassionate and understanding
administrator, resistance
movements sprung up
throughout the nation.
The Marines
responded to these rebel
groups with force, but
succeeded
only in intensifying
the feelings of an
already hostile
population. 16

^

-i

Although the united States
occupation of the Dominican Republic evoked
considerable anti-American
bitterness,
a number of social
and economic improvements
were made in
agriculture, sanitation, road
building and education
by

American technicians.

The modernizing and
humanitarian

assistance offered by the
United States, however, did
not
lessen the tide of nationalism
mounting among the Dominican
and the Dominican Republic "^a Am ? rlcan Inte rvention in Haiti
eP
C'
Merica" Aca demy of Political
and Social Sct°n"

f^

16 Rodman,

pp. 106-127;

see also Welles, pp. 744-835.
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By 1921 the United
states came to realize
that its
interests demanded an
early departure from
the Dominican
epublic.
In anticipation of
the American
withdrawal Dominican political life
revived as national
leaders sought to
use the expected
exodus of the occupation
forces to turn the
country away from the
despotism and stagnation
of the past. 17
The hopes of these
leaders and of the United
States
were never realized as
the exit of the Marines
in 1924 soon
ushered in another period
of factionalized
politics that
returned the country to
the "normalcy” of
instability,

unpredictability and financial
bankruptcy.
the Dominican Republic
remained

Bor six years

in a state of political

impotence as the steadiness
that the United states
presence
brought gave way to incompetent
national administration.
With the advent of the
1930’s the Dominican Republic
witnessed the rise to dominance
of a man who would curtail
the pattern of internal
chaos and debility and fill
the

leadership void that had left
Dominican politics fragmented.
This man was General Rafael
Leonidas Trujillo Molina whose
thirty-one year authoritarian
regime left the Dominican Republic not only politically
quiescent, and to a considerable
extent economically prosperous,
but also the sad recipient of
17 The closing
pages of Welles' Naboth's Vinevard has
Ver 7 insightful and prophetic
comments on the future of
n
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Latin America's most
CQmplete d
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so

is

o,
overarching control,
horrible repression
Pression, „
excessive waste and
comimti/i
ruption, and, most
of all * a
lng ° Ut ° f the
democratic
aspiratin
aspirations
within the country.
•

.

Although the regime of
Rafae i Trujillo takes
a
sizeable portion of
Dominican history, the
complexity of
events that occurred
during this era can
best be examined by
analyzing the expanse
of -El Benefactor's"
control and the
effects Of that control
on the nation,
it is not without
exaggeration to state that
Trujillo's control over
the Dominican Republic was
well-near complete.
Trujillo and his family
either directly or
indirectly owned, managed,
regulated or
manipulated every major
economic concern in the
nation from
the sugar, cement and
tobacco industries to the

^

small shops

to the rural haciendas. 19

Politics was not a means
of determining policy a lternatives,
but a way for Trujillo
to organize
18 S
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* a propaganda

^^^^
_

The roies

^

ng justice a nd
protecting national
frontiers to that
of internal
surveillance and repression.
The

Bominican
Republic became Trujillo's
private estate as the
semieducated dictator amassed
control of close to
three-fourths
Of Dominican economic
activity. 2 0

The dominance of
Trujillo did not make his
regime
-mune from errors of judgement,
strategy and tactics. By
the late 1950's, after
a number of years
of economic growth
and prosperity, the
Trujillo government showed
obvious signs
of weakness.
The primary cause of
Trujillo's decline was
the dictator's incessant
desire for public adulation
free of
any revealing criticism.
In the immediate years
before his
death Trujillo became the
object of intense criticism
from
journalists, church leaders,
political exiles, neighboring
governments and his previously
staunchest ally, the United
States. 21 Faced with a declining
economy, charges
of

suppression of political enemies,
and governmental ineptitude on all fronts, Trujillo
fought back, sometimes with
20 Ibid.
21 Trujillo
•

•

went so ^ far as to track
virulent critics, Jesus de Galindez in down one of his
New York and
n
0
D° minican ^public for torture
which
led
u ?o
1:0 nis
his death.
death
See Ornes, pp. 309-338.

mn

.

.

pensive public relations
campaigns and other
times by
having a critic
murdered.
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Despite the attempts
by the Dominican
dictator to
reassert his dominance
in the country,
adverse world opinion
continued to mount and
was joined by internal
resistance
activities intent on
overthrowing the dictatorship.
Paced
With such strong
pressure it came as no
surprise to some,
and caused great relief
to many, when Trujillo
was assassinated on May 22 1961.^2
,

The death of Rafael
Trujillo, and the eventual
departs of his family, once again
left the Dominican
Republic
without substantial leadership.
But even more than leadership, the Dominican
Republic was a nation lacking
the understanding, the training
and the organization for
selfgovernment.
Trujillo- s control was so
pervasive that the
Dominican people were ill-equipped
for the role of nationbuilding and unaccustomed to
the functioning of democratic
government. After years of
dictatorship, repression, backwardness and inequality, the
Dominican people were once again
given the opportunity to control
their own destiny in an
open, competitive and fair
manner. But unfortunately,
as
will be shown, the sad legacy
of Dominican history proved an

“There are many accounts of Trujillo's
assassi na"«

.‘“i
piril, 1963
Domingof

Gali

,

s

ow Trujillo Died,” New

Republic,
:
is considered
the most reliable portraval nf

Ually happened on that highway
outside of Santo
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insurmountable obstacle
stacie tn
,
to the *
development
of stable,
democratic government.
The PRD and Dominican
Historv
Y
after the Fall or
Trujillo

Despite the seemingly
enormous obstacles
dem° CratiC
the Dominican Republic
began
task of forming the
necessary elements of
an open political
system. After some
initial difficulties
in dismantling the
Trujillo regime, (Trujillo's
son Ramfis still hoped
to retain
power) the Dominican
people came to realize
that "El Benefactor" and his highly
efficient dictatorial
organization no
longer exerted influence
nee over
o VPr the future
course of their
nation.

^

^

-f

4.

The days after the
assassination were in many ways
Chaotic as the Dominicans
engaged in a flurry of activity.
Huge street demonstrations
in praise of Trujillo's
demise
were prominent, along with
numerous incidents of violent
reprisals by the people against
hated Trujillo agents. This
was also the period of
nascent political organization
as
parties, unions, students and
middle class groups began
assembling the machinery of
democratic participation 23
.

3

a
h in hlS The Unfinished
Experiment
Democracy in ^e°n°
~
h Dominican RiFubl ic (New Yor¥;
pF
a 5 ger ,
1965) gives a fine account of the
disarray of post-Truiil 10
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D
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d
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Trujillo's last puppet
president, Joaquin Balaguer,
attempted to maintain the
existing paternalistic
system
through a deft program of
political favors and economic
disibution, but the end was
near.
In early 1962, after
the
departure of Balaguer and the
failure of a last ditch
effort
by a small group of
Trujillista military officers
to seize
Power, a Council of state was
initiated whose task it was
to
make the necessary preparations
for the country's first
free
elections in over thirty years.
Central to the success of this
movement to build a
Strong democratic framework
in the Dominican Republic
was
the emergence of a political
party system, any effort to
organize the populace on a national
level, introduce numerous
and unfamiliar issues, and
educate the Dominican citizenry
on the rudiments of democratic
behavior requires an experienced body of individuals who are
schooled in the rigors of
constructing a viable democracy. Although
political parties
are key components in developing a
democratic system
of

government, the Dominican Republic has shown
throughout its
history a marked inability to form modern,
issue-oriented

political parties.

Vineyard

As Sumner Welles comments in Naboth's

:

The history of the nation has made it evident that
P 0 ^-j-^ ca l parties
have not existed in Santo
Domingo. Dominican government has been personal
government
the future of the Republic cannot
be assured until party government in the modern
.

.
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havfbeen
Parties
3
personal government is
P olicie s.
inevitah?
cession to the
^?? ble ' and the sucb ® dlctated by a
f ew politicians,
rather
than
h
Y the great mass
of the plain
people. 24
into this void of
personalistic parties and
lifted
access to the presidency
in the Dominican
Republic stepped
116
rtldo Revolucionario
Dominican o (pro) of Juan
Bosch, a
party of the so-called
Latin American Democratic
Left which

—

revealed modern organisational
abilities and the desire
to
press for certain societal
reforms such as redistribution
of
lands and income, increased
participation in national
decision-making and nationalization
of foreign property. 25
As with most of the
structures of a newly forming
democracy,
the PRD did not have
extensive experience in handling
the

mands of active political
operation. The PRD had been
an
exile political party that
because of the repression of
the

Trujillo regime was never able
to move from propaganda
promises of radical societal
change to policy implementation
within the Dominican Republic. 26
24 Welles,

p.

911.

has comm °nly been termed an
Aprista-type
art ° f Haya de la To -e -hicfseeks
erorm irom within a J
?ad^LfrILrm%ronithi?
democratic context
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Although the PRD had a strong exile
organization
with a long history of political activity
stretching

from

New York to Puerto Rico to Caracas,
the Party was for the
most part unknown in the Dominican Republic.
The steady
stream of anti-Trujillo propaganda that was
sent forth from

numerous PRD headquarters since the Party's
inception in
1939 touched only a small audience of intellectuals
and

middle class supporters.

The peasants and urban poor, who

the PRD claimed to be speaking for, were left
virtually

ignorant of this political ally by Trujillo's stringent

censorship policy.

Nevertheless, the PRD remained a viable

political opposition in exile and a constant thorn in Trujillo's side.

With the assassination of Trujillo, the PRD, for the
first time in its long, expectant history, saw the opportunity to return home and seek revolutionary change within
a democratic context.

Almost immediately after the news of

Trujillo's death, Bosch and the PRD Executive Committee laid
plans for an organizational and educational effort in expectation of future elections. 27

The vanguard of the PRD move-

ment arrived in Santo Domingo on July
veteran political activists
Ramon Castillo

— each

27 Bosch,

—Angel

8,

1961 with three

Miolan, Nicolas Silfa and

prepared to begin the enormous task of

The Unfinished Experiment

,

pp. 3-5.

making the promises of
the Partv
1

61
n
n exile
a political reality

-in

•

in the post-Trujillo
Dominican Republic. 28
The PRD entered the
newly structured Dominican
political scene with mixed
emotions.
It is true that after
some
twenty-two years in exile,
the Party finally had
the chance
to actively engage in
political organizing. But
with this
electoral opportunity the
PRD leadership recognized
the
bstacles that lay in the
path of successful power
politics
in the Dominican Republic.
Besides the

monumental effort
that would have to be
undertaken to bring the PRD
message to
the unknowing Dominican
citizenry, the Party would
also have
to contend with hostile
political and social groups who
were
adamant in their desire to
curtail revolutionary programs
that Juan Bosch had pledged
his government to.
But as Bosch
himself stated:
le “ ned ° f
L
the time had

(Trujillo's death)
come for us (the PRD)
to re-enter the Dominican Republic
... AH of us
believed that now, after more than
twenty years of
an opportunity to lead the Dominican
oeonTi
a brighter future, and
not afford to miss that opportunity 29that we could
ad felt that
I^ad^elTth^

T

^

1

.

In the area of educating the Dominican
populace in

the basic tenents of its ideology,
the PRD showed early in

8Th date of
8th is still considered a Party
u
S?
holiday
by the
PRD and is usually a time when the Party makes
*
a major pronouncement.
,

•

i

29

Bosch, The Unfinished Experiment

,

p.

4.
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the campaign for the
presidency that it was more
thoroughly
prepared than any of the other
parties seeking national

political power.

Through the brilliant strategies
of Miolan
and the charismatic appeal
of Juan Bosch, the PRD
became
known in the countryside as
the Party
of the people, the

Party of the poor and the Party
of change. 30 The PRD S
closest rival, the Union Civica
National (UCN) led by Dr.
Vitriato Fiallo, could only muster
support from the business
community and landed aristocracy, and
never attained the
widespread identification that the PRD
did as the Party of
all the people. 31
,

E ven though the PRD was successful
in presenting

itself as the major political force
in the Dominican Republic, the Party faced a number of
obstacles which could not
be easily overcome, and which eventually
came back to haunt
the PRD.
The center of opposition to the electoral
efforts
of the PRD came from the traditionally
conservative forces

throughout Latin America
landed elite.

— the

Church, the military and the

Each of these groups felt threatened by the

30 Howard Wiarda, "Aftermath
of the Trujillo Dictatorship - The Emergence of a Pluralist Political System in the
Dominican Republic" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Glorida, 1965), pp. 253-256.
31 Fiallo and
his UCN party organization came to be
known as "tutumpotes" or "big-shots," a name that Juan Bosch
coined and used quite effectively to remind the Dominican
people exactly what Fiallo and the UCN stood for.
'

^

rhetoric and program of
the PRD. Each of
the£Je
saw
their favored position
in Dominican society
in jeopardy
because of the so-calied
"Communist- inclinations
of duan
33
Bosch.
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suspicions of the traditional
triumvirate in the
Dominican Republic prompted
a number of attempts
to foil the

PRD electoral machine.

Charges of "Marxist-Leninism"
were
made against duan Bosch;
efforts were undertaken
to curb
voter registration, and
numerous instances were
recorded
where PRD activists were
harassed, jailed or physically
mistreated while engaging in
party business. 33 y e t despite
these formidable obstacles
to effective political
participation, the PRD gained increasing
strength in all areas of
the country. As election day
neared the PRD was confident
that it had the unqualified
support of the two most populous
segments of Dominican society—
the rural peasantry and the
urban poor.

The predictions of the PRD leadership
were proven
valid as the election returns came
in on December 20 1962.
,

In what was considered a surprising
show of strength by many

observers, Juan Bosch carried the PRD to
a sweeping victory
over Fiallo and the UCN. Bosch garnered
619,491 votes for
3 2 Bosch
.

iscredit him

m

33 Ibid.

talks extensively about the campaiqn to
The Unfinished Experiment pp. 111 - 144
,

.
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diSmal 30% 0f the
vote .34

Bosch and
th
the
prd carried all but
five of the country's
provinces and
swamped Fiallo in the
capital citv
c
.
Y of Santo
Domingo 152,404
votes to 35,376.35
The victory of Juan
Bosch carried the PRD
to the
pinnacle of political
power
r in the
fho Dominican
n
P
Republic.
The
electoral margin that
Bosch received not only
established
the Party as the most
popular political force
in the nation,
but gave the PRD leader
a mandate from
which he hoped to
radically restructure
Dominican society. y et
the overwhelming support that Bosch
on received from
fr™ ..
„
the Dominican
masses
dxd not sway the traditional
forces from working
against the
revolutionary goals of Bosch
or conspiring amongst
themselves
order to destroy the Bosch
regime.

m

•

•

.

m

As the administration of
Juan Bosch entered the
National Palace in February,
1963 it became increasingly
evident that radical change
was not going to be achieved
immediately or without considerable
opposition from entrenched
Dominican elites. Although Bosch
made a number of overtures
to the opposition in terms
of cabinet appointments and
assurances of responsible modernizing
programs, those who felt
arda '
PP. 256-258!
35 Ibid

"

Afterlnath of the Trujillo Dictatorship,"
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threatened by the PRD leader
conducted a vigorous campaign
to discredit Bosch and
his policies. As Wiarda
notes:
ri° r t0 his inauguration
Bosch
ma;10r °PP osition Parties
to
cooperate with
^ith his
hgovernment in a national
unity front. Cabinet posts
and other important
mne
ti ° nS Were offered as induceP
ments.
ments
But his
h^ overtures
i
to the several parties
e
ed -- The ide& ° f the losers
cooperatIna „i?^t *lnners to establish
a functioning
y
political
? V

system was unheard of. 36

The trouble that opposition
parties heaped upon the
newly formed government of Juan
Bosch was aided in many
respects by the mercurial PRD president
himself, as he hurt
his own cause with a marked
misunderstanding of the necessities of presidential politics and a
glaring inability to

bargain with the apprehensive social groups
facing him. On
a number of occasions Bosch was
urged to act positively and
deal with the problems of land reform, tax
equalization and
educational expansion. But more often than not
Bosch showed
a cautious, almost feeble approach to
pressing national
needs.

Bosch's slow-paced response to the demands of Domin-

ican development raised a number of eyebrows in all
quarters
of the nation, and subsequently heaped more fuel
to the

fires of opposition. 37
36 ibid.,
37

p.

259.

John Bartlow Martin in Overtaken By Events makes
constant reference to Bosch's inability or unwillingness to
take the modernizing initiative and bring change to the
Dominican Republic.
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was

program
dealing

alienated large sections of the Dominican
elite h»
Y either snubbing the
influential Catholic Church
or by
refusing
Y ref
usmg +to crack down on a
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As one Dominican stated:
° nS -

people who were his mist
enthusiastic
StlC
supporters, political
liberals?38
By the summer of 1963
it had become common
knowledge
that Juan Bosch's position
in national political
power was
precarious. Rumors filled
the capital city almost
daily
that some form of coup
was in the making. At
this critical
stage in the Bosch
administration, when the
traditional elite
was overtly seeking the
president's demise, the PRD
organization increased the precarious
nature of the Bosch regime
by
openly showing signs of
displeasure with its leader.
PRD
leaders claimed that Bosch was
not producing on his promises
reform, and, worse yet, he
was not supplying jobs for PRD
supporters who expected the tide
of patronage to swing over
to their camp.
Muttenngs of "Juan Bo no sirve nada"
(Juan
38 Rodman

/

p.

169.
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Bosch is worthless)
were heard more often
within the P RD
organization. 39 The
dissatisf action within
the PRD led some
observers to conclude
that the close knit
organization that
worked tirelessly for
Bosch's victory had all
but disappeared
once Bosch won the
presidency.

As a result of this
dissatisfaction a number of
factional disputes surfaced
within the Party. Angel
Miolin ,
belreved by many to be
the driving force
behind the PRD
organization, and Diege Bordas,
Bosch's minister of Coerce
and industry, openly
fought for control of the
Party apparatus. At the same time,
the PRD congressional
group including
dosi Rafael Molina Ureha,
president of the Chamber of
Deputies, Juan Cassanova
Garrido, president of the
Senate and
Senator Thelma Frias fell
into disagreement with Bosch
over
his poor legislative reform
record and his lackluster administrative capabilities. 40

The serious difficulties
that Bosch faced in midsummer did not cease. Bosch
did make some attempts at implementing his revolutionary platform
with the signing of a

multi-million dollar foreign loan,
the beginning of a land
reform program, and the initiation
of a number of social
39 Martin,

p.

465.

40 This information
is taken from a chapter on Domin63 in an unpublished manuscript of
Howard
Wiard^entit^H^T^
:* nt rest Aggregation; Political Parties and
!
Party Systems/' Chapter XIII in Dictatorship,
Development and
ln gr
The Politica ^^ S^5 t em of the Dominican Repub^
.
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welfare efforts.

But the climate was
not ripe for a
contrnuation of Juan
Bosch's aberration.
The Church
military, business,
and land elite were
thoroughly disgusted
wxth Bosch's f avortism
toward the peasants
and the urban
laborers, his threats
concerning the validity
of private
P-perty, and his seeing
reluctance to rid the nation
of
the Communist influence. 41
This opposition came
to a head
on September 25, 1963
when a military junta
overthrew the
PPB president after
only seven months in
office. The democratic experiment that many
had hoped would be a
success
failed as a mixture of
poor leadership, impossible
modernizing demands and entrenched
social forces brought the
PRD
attempt at radical change in
Dominican society
,

to a halt.

As John Martin, former United
States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic during the
Bosch administration
states:

The bold fact is that the
Dominican politicians
V
refused to accept electoral
defefF
efeat at
at°R
Bosch s hands and so defeated
him bv
anS
Yet '
must also
saS
Bosc£*r
" OVe alarmed re P e Hed and dis-that
d
hem; th t lf they were poor
f
losers, so
?
^
aq he
^
was
a poor winner.
it is not surprising that
Ct C d aS did Bosch hi mself,
not the
Politics f ^
CraCy ' but the P°Utice of
annihilation?42°
’
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p.

719.

“"

69

With Juan Bosch safely
sequestered in San Juan,
Puerto Rico and the PRD party
offices and affiliated
associations closed down by
government decree, an interim
Triumvirate headed initially by
Emilio de los Santosand later
by

Donald Reid Cabral attempted
to restore calm and less
radical
modernizing programs. to the
Dominican nation. Reid Cabral,
a
successful businessman, ran into
numerous problems as the
Dominican leader. Frequent
outbursts of political violence
scarred the capital, and eventually
the countryside, as many
"constitutionalists" or supporters of
the deposed Juan Bosch
came under attack from the National
Police. 4 3
Under Reid Cabral the national
economy was hard hit.
Because of exceptionally low world
prices for Dominican
exports of sugar, cocoa and coffee,
inflation got steadily
out of hand, while the balance of
payments reached crisis

proportions. 44

To deepen the problems, Reid Cabral found

himself embroiled in a struggle with the armed
forces over
special import favors and charges of rampant
corruption. The
fact one of the members of the ruling Triumvirate, Emilio de los Santos, resigned when his nephew
became a victim of the increased violence in the country
as
the military cracked down, and in one tragic instance
massacred a group of rebel youths who belonged to the 14th
of June movement, a radical anti-Trujillista organization.
44 Abraham Lowenthal
in The Dominican Intervention
(Cambridge:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1972) has the most detailed
account of the Reid Cabral years available; see pp. 33-61.

Also see Jerome Slater's Intervention and Negotiation: The
United States and the Dominican Revolution (New York: Harper
and Row, 1970)
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efforts of Reid Cabral to
curtail such practices
angered the
military and weakened one of
the main underpinnings of
his
political power.

The extensive problems that
Reid Cabral encountered
as the Dominican leader in
the post-Bosch period cannot
hide
the fact that he tried, albeit
halfheartedly, to place the
country on the road to modernization.
Efforts were made to
continue agrarian reform projects,
political parties were
allowed to renew their activities,
and a strict austerity
program was undertaken to curb the
economic stagnation. 45
But for all Reid Cabral's efforts,
he remained an enemy to
most of the powerful elements in Dominican
society. To the
pro-PRD supporters, now led by the radical
Juan Pena Gomez,
the protege of Juan Bosch, Reid Cabral
symbolized the

inability of the government to crack down on
the extensive
repression that was present throughout the country
and the

unwillingness of the elites to accept the presidency
of Juan
Bosch.
To the military, Reid Cabral stood for the rigorous
efforts being undertaken to root out corruption and favoritism in the armed forces.

And to the business community,

Reid Cabral represented the hated austerity program and the

economic crisis that it was supposed to alleviate.
The PRD, for its part, tried to counteract the con-

servative drift of the Reid Cabral regime, even though Juan
45 Lowenthal,

The Dominican Intervention

,

pp. 33-61.

Bosch was out of the
country.
„
n
were reopened

The central
central party
.
headquarters
as the Par tv
y nee again attempted
to rouse the
spirits of the Dominican
masses.
The achievement of
such
maSS S ° lidaritY and
aCti ° n
easily attained as
the
PRO found itself
beset by internal
nternal f
art
factionalism
that stemmed
u
from the 1963
disagreements between
Bosch and Miolan
Although the disagreements
were part personal,
the primary

-

elections tentatively
scheduled for sometime
in 1965
Miolan, being an adroit
political tactician,
favored a renewed
effort by the PRD to
win bach power, while
Bosch, feeling the
sting of one coup, was
vigorous in his rejection
of renewed
activity. 4 6 Faced with
disagreement at the heart
of the PRD leadership
and increasing barriers
to effective
action in the Dominican
Republic, some Party members
along
with other opposition groups
turned to the plotting
of a

clandestine revolutionary
movement which would hopefully
hasten the return of Juan
Bosch and the restoration of
the
1963 constitution. 47
46
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The anti-Reid Cabral
plotting came to a
head on
Aprxl 24, 1965 when
the constitutionalists,..
a diverse
group of prd leaders,
young military officerS;
commun st
sympathizers, labor unionists,
students, and intellectuals
named Rafael Molina
Ureha, the PRO leader
in the Dominican
Chamber of Deputies under
Bosch, as its interim
president
and declared itself
the rightful governing
regime in the
country.
The declaration of the
•'constitutionalists., caused
an immediate response
from the old-line military
led primarily by tank colander
General Elias Wessin
y Wessin whose
interests coincided with the
traditional elite. The declarations of both groups set
the stage for all-out
civil war as
the question of Juan Bosch,
the PRD and radical change
in the
Dominican Republic left the
polling places and the legislative chamber and moved into
the streets.
.

As in most violent and emotional
revolutionary situations it is not easy to organize
and present in an ordered
fashion the complex of events
and personalities that surface
during such a chaotic period.
But it is possible to view the
Dominican civil war as occurring in
four distinct phases.
In the first phase a small
band of "constitutionalist" supporters freed six military officers
who were being held
prisoners for allegedly plotting to
overthrow the Reid Cabral
regime. This unprecedented action
stirred the rebel forces
to greater mobilization efforts and
awakened the conservative
military to the developing attempt to return
Juan Bosch to

power .

Ge „. Wessin

flrSt t0

.

s

response tQ

^

/

rebei

3

_

in ne 9°tiations with
the rebel government

Of Molina Urena.

when these negotiations
failed to pacify
the adamant rebel group,
Wessin ordered the strafing
of the
National Palace where the
"constitutionalists” were situated.
Thrs extreme action widened
the scope of the revolution
and
brought the angry pro-Bosch
forces into the streets.
For
three days the fighting
raged furiously as both
sides sought
to gain key sections of
the city. On April 27th
the "loyalists" (Wessin 's forces)
tried to cross the Duartebridge
which
serves as the main entrance
into the capital. Leaders
of the
"constitutionalists," at this point,
attempted to negotiate
a cease-fire using the
United States Embassy as the
mediator.
The response of the embassy was
to reject the rebels'

offer,
as Ambassador Tapley Bennett
urged the "constitutionalist"
to lay down their arms and
surrender to the "loyalists." 48
In the second phase of the civil
war the refusal of

the United States to help bring
an equitable settlement to
the crisis led to two key decisions
on the part of the

rebels.

The PRD leadership cadre, which was at
the forefront
of the rebel movement, experienced a number
of defections as

men like Pena Gomez, Molina Urena and Cassanovas
Garrido,
among others, sought asylum.
It was their judgement that the
48 Martin,

of Bennett;

pp. 705-706.
see pp. 12-13.

Slater is much more critical
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constitutionalist" cause
was doomed withoufc
Unit
nation
With key prd activists
in hiding and .Juan
Bosch unable to return
to the Dominican
Republic, the leader .
s xp of the
"constitutionalists" shifted
to Lt Colonels
Caamano Deno and Montes
Arache
n6, 5 ° Both
Rn -f-h i-v,
these men left the
meeting with the United
ted States ambassador
and returned to
the fight, according
to one source, more
for

«

.

i

the sake of

military honor than for
the return to the
1963 constitution.
The rebels had in a
sense lost their legitimacy
and were
fighting a different kind
of revolution.
The fight was now
more for survival and
revenge than for democratic
principles. 51

Although some of the major
prd activists were no
longer on the scene, the PRD
organization remained largely
intact within the rebel zone
and worked effectively to
continue the battl e against
the Wessin forces. 52 But
the void
49
S
gg.volution in Santo^ominSo (Pittsburgh~Un^°
Plttsbur 9 h
i^ess, 1970) offers a view of
the‘pRD
PRD anfth
d their decision to
seek asylum, pp. 28-30.
'
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elite fighters of the Dominican
armed forces,
thr ° UghOUt

the revolution?°holds

52Mor< no ' PP* 39-42.
Moreno is very adamant in his
f
C x. r
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that the Party orqanizaareaS despite the fact that the major
leaders of the Party were not part of
leaders^f
the rebellion in its
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created by the
departure of the key
® Y PRD
pro actl vists
opened the
way for
a number of Lef-h-w-i^
lng co ™ists
sympathizers who
,
over some crucial
organizational and
logistical posirn the
“constitutionalist" zone .
Men Ufce H4ctor
Man ° lD GOnZ ' leZ and
Fa£a Tav4ras
increasingly
called upon to advise
Caamaho Deho and
maintain strength
within the embattled
rebel zone
The importance of
these
men, though, was
not merely
iY related to
0 their
leadership abilities and their close
connections to some of
v
the key
commando
groups within the
rebel-held areas
c
=
reas of Santo
^
Domingo.
The
pro-Communist allegiances of
Aristy, Gonsales an d
Taveras
greatly i„fl ue „ ced the
course Qf Unlted
the Dominican Republic
and the eventual outcome
of the civil
•

.
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war.

With the shape of the
revolution drastically
changed,
Caamaho Deho and his men
gained surprising victories
against

loyalist forces.

The success of the rebels
and the sad
state of the demoralized
“loyalist" troops prompted Gen.
wessin to seek military
support from the United States.
On
April 28th the United States
under orders from President
P ® nnett that the Dominican
^^
f tbe rebels were not
served as the basis
stopped
i T
sld ® nt
J° hnsonl’s decision to interVene.
It is interest!™ to
hen
attem Pt was made
by the embassy to
! ‘
„
er
Communists
in the Dominican RepublicC thp -l-joi^
ab
Ut
° n6
ed
people^some Aamtl were" useftwice^some^
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°
f
the country, some were
°
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Lyndon Johnson landed
support troops in Santo
Domingo and
thereby took the Dominican
civil war into a third
and crucial stage.

”

esident Johnson, fearing
an immanent takeover
of
the nation by the
Communist sympathisers in
the Caamaho Deho
camp, felt that it was
necessary to land troops
in the city
and aid in any way
possible the fledging
"loyalist" troops 54
The United states troops
immediately set to work at
dividing
the rebel forces. After
setting up an International
Security
zone (IB.) around the
United States Embassy and
the western
part of the city, the United
States troops attacked
the

"constitutionalists" and formed a
link between the ISZ and
the "loyalist" camp at
San Isidro Air Force Base.
The effect
of this action was to split
the "constitutionalists"
and
reduce their strength and
organisation.
From this corridor
the United States soldiers
proceeded to "tighten the noose"
around the rebels in the central
city.
The "constitutionalists" came to realize that they
were being forced into a
position of weakness, a position that
would be detrimental
once negotiations for a settlement
began
again.

declaration of President Johnson was
that the United States troops were being
landed to protect
.citizens and to aid,
an "humanitarian" effort those
victims of the revolution. As history
has shown the United
6
se ved alsc as "controllers of the
revolution"
with *
^
blaS 566 LOWentha1 ' The_ Dominican
PP l3-13L
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Finely, with the fate
of the rebel
forces sealed by

the effective
maneuvering of the United
States troops, the
constitutionalists" were
re forced to meet
.

.

with United States

negotiators and representatives
of the "loyalist"
g overnment
(now called the
Government of National
Reconciliation and
headed by Trujillo assassin
Gen. Antonio Imbert
Barrera,
The bulk of the
negotiation between the rebels
and the United
States sponsored government
was conducted by a
three-man OAS
team headed by United
States diplomat Ellsworth
Bunker. 55
The negotiations lasted
for some three months
with the two
sides wrangling over key
concession points as the
deportation
of central figures in the
war, the length of the
interim
government, the status of the
1963 constitution and the
choice of a provisional leader.
By September
.

3,

1965 the

negotiations were concluded with
Hector Garcia Godoy, a
moderate diplomat, taking the
reins of power until June
1,
1966 when elections were to
be held for a permanent
national
.56
leader
The settlement in September,
1965 ended one of the
most tragic periods in Dominican
history.
From the promise
and excitement that filled the nation
in the post-Trujillo

election period, the Dominican people had
seen their first
1

analvsis^f
Revolutio^

ention nd Negotiation
^
^^
^ nelotlatlons
surrounding
Dominican

56 Ibid.,

ter
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has the best

freely elected president
in over thirty
years de P ° Se a
3
cruel civil war ensue
Th Dominican
n
Republic i„ September
ofl9
WaS
S
-Id only the necessity
o reunitin, and
rebuilding a society
that had tried to
make
e democratic
experiment work, but had
failed dismally.
The prd, as with
most political
organizations in
Dominican society, was
in disarray after
the September settleTorn
by political infighting
ment.
and the fear of
government
arassment, the PRD leadership
was only half its
former self.
Leaders like Bosch and
Pena Gomez returned to
the Dominican
poiitical scene, but other
activists like Miolan,
among
others, were noticeably
absent or unwilling to
carry the PRD
banner. Furthermore, many
middle-level organizers and
functionaries were killed in
the fighting or were
merely quiescent as they yearned for a
rest-bit from the horrible
course
that politics had taken in
their country.

“- ^ —

^

•
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The PRD with its great
setback in the civil war looked
apprehensively toward the June
elections. The remaining
activists in the PRD were
filled with deep misgivings
as many
who favored the -constitutionalistcause recognized the
fundamental problems that a
democratic governmental structure
face in a rigid Dominican
social system. The PRD had
experienced too many hardships to
think that the Dominican
Republic could leave the terrible
legacy of the civil war and
start anew on the road to democratic
development. Nevertheless

/
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Bosch began rebuilding
the PRD organisation
in
Preparation for the June,
1966 presidential
elections.
The apprehensiveness
of Bosch and the
pro over the
ability of Dominican
society to readjust to
the democratic
framework as formulated
in 1962-63 was well
founded. Bosch
and his party were
repeatedly subject to
police and military
harassment as they sought
to campaign in the
countryside.
Bosch so feared for his
life that he made
only two journeys
outside his home in Santo
Domingo. 57 Bosch and the
PRD also
ran up against a Dominican
electorate that seemed to
be
depoliticized (or just tired)
and generally unwilling
to be
invigorated with the rhetoric
of revolutionary change.
The
PRD found it increasingly
difficult to excite the Dominican

people over a Bosch victory,
since many sensed a possible
replay of the events of
1963-1965. All it seemed the
Dominican people wanted was peace
and prosperity. The promise
of
radical change did not hold their
attention as it formerly
had.

Finally, Bosch and the PRD
experienced problems in
the 1966 election campaign because
Joaquin Balaguer was
putting up a formidable challenge to
the popular revolutionary leader. Balaguer, although
strongly connected with the
° the best short articles which shows
the sad
state the
I it
that
the Dominican Republic and the PRD
were in after
1 ?" Can
e foUnd in Jaraes Petras
"Dominican RepublieRevo?
a Res toration, ”
and
New Left Review (Nov.nee‘
Dec., 1966):
75-84 and (Jan. -Feb. 1967):
64-69.
.

'
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Trujillo regime, came
out of
or exile in New
M
York as the head
of the Partido Reformist
ana
=ni began
h
to campaign actively
throughout the countryside.
Balaguer, because of
his policy
1961-62 of redistributing
Trujillo lands and
possessions
to the peasantry,
gained considerable
support from this most
populous of Dominican social
strata
u ,
strata.
Balaguer,
unlike
Bosch, was also favored
by the traditional
forces in Dominican society and thus
was able to campaign
freely spreading
his name and his promises
to the Dominican
58

-

people.

Faced with elite intransigence,
an apathetic citizenry and a popular
opponent, Juan Bosch and the
PRD went
down to defeat in the June
elections. Balaguer soundly
trounced Bosch as he gained
769,265 votes to Bosch's
525,230 votes. 59 The de£eat Qf
Juan

^^^^

a stinging blow to the
Party which only three years
before

was the most popular political
organisation in the country.
More than the loss of prestige
that comes with defeat, the
PRD in June of 1966 was faced
with the realisation that it
63 190 ' has a ver
Y comprehensive
;
analysis of^he^Qfis'
^
h
966 electlon
Period
which
points up the
diff¥on?<-?L
i
fficultie^ of? Juan
Bosch and the

PRD.

59
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" Why Bosch L °st,"
in The Lingerincr
A,— ase^ Study
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Qfr the D ominican Republic ~^dl E
ugenio
l
rn,
c ha mg-Rodr
igue z (New York: Las Americas Publ.,
1969).
See
"
Bodin
Why B flaguer Won, " in The Lingerina
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A Case stud y of t h e Dominican Republic
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ed:
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would become the
democratic opposition
in ,
n ln
a governing system
that had no real
experience or interest in
this most fundamental of political
rights. Dominican
politics had for years
been founded upon an
opposition framework of
interchanging
-HSiUos. But never before was the
nation placed in a
situation where a once
powerful political party
was relegated to an opposition
status and expected to
function effectively in this position 60

m

.

Although the Dominican
people, and in particular
the
PRD, entered into a
so-called "new democratic
phase" in their
historical development, the
future was viewed with a
mixed
sense of uncertainty and
pragmatism, wide-eyed optimism
was
a commodity that the
Dominicans could not bring to
their
political perspective. The
course of history had been
too
unkind to the Dominicans for
them to approach the Balaguer
regime with anything but
apprehension. With a
legacy that

included Spanish and Haitian
despoilment, self-serving caudillos, foreign interventions,
the longest and most repressive
dictatorship in Latin America, and
a brief attempt at democracy that ended in civil war, the
Dominican people could
hardly be expected to feel confident
with the promises of
democracy made by President Balaguer.
To most Dominicans the
Balaguer regime represented a continuation
(perhaps in a more
arlbe June 2 1966, p. 1. The PRD
captured
nnlv six Senate
^ seats and
only
twenty-six Chamber of Deputies
seats, while the PR was dominant with
twenty-one Senate
seats and forty-six Chamber seats.
'

'

sophisticated manner) of
the historical
patterns of
paternalism, factionalism,
class entrenchment,
foreign
exploitation and economic
stagnation that had been
co»n
Practice in this country
for some three hundred
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years.

The Dominicans more
than the United states
officials,
who urged them on to
this renewed effort to
develop AngloAmerican democracy, realized
that the influence of
history,
culture and social structure
cannot be easily reconstructed,
or what is more, erased.
Nevertheless, the experiment
was
undertaken, and in many
respects the fate of
opposition
politics in the new governmental
framework would be a key
sign pointing to the
success or failure of Dominican
democracy

As the body of this research
will show, however,
historical precedent would have
a crucial role in determining the future of Anglo-American
democracy in the Dominican Republic. The past does
not easily
fade away in this

country, nor do the entrenched
power groups who have a
vested interest in maintaining
the status quo. What would
change in the Dominican Republic
after 1966 is a recognition by national leaders that it
is possible, even beneficial, to maintain a semblance of
Anglo-American democracy,
while continuing to handle the matters
of politics in a
manner more compatible with past experience.
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Social and Polit ical For
ces
in the Dominican
Republic"

This introductory view
of Dominican and PRD
history
would be incomplete without
spending some time describing
the major social and
political forces that are
present in
the contemporary Dominican
Republic.
In order to better
understand the problems faced
by the PRD opposition
throughout this modern period, it
may be helpful if „ e look
not
merely at the dominance of
the Balaguer regime, but
the
groups that surround the
political system and exert considerable influence over its
operation and development. The
important point to be made here
is that although the basic
theme of Dominican politics
stressed in this thesis is the
conflict between opposition and
government, the interaction
between the PRD and Balaguer occurs
in a complex political
system where opposition strategy
and governmental policy are
the result of contact and compromise
with a number of key
social, economic, and political
groups. 61
Of course in discussing prominent
Dominican interest

For a much loader discussion of the
.
social and
al grOUpS ln the Dominica n Republic
see
The
Area
»
*
Handbook
for
t he Do minican Republic #550-54
(Washington,
F
el
studles of the American University, 1970)
qprti nn ?
9
?K
Section
#2;
Abraham
Lowenthal's article entitled "The DominRepublic; the Politics of Chaos," in Reform
ic??
and Revolulon:
Readings
Latin American Politics7~eds: Arpad von
^
and Robert Kaufman (Boston: Allyn and Bacon,
1969);
and Howard Wiarda s Dominican Republic:
Nation in Transition,
,
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groups the military
must he acknowledged
as extremely
influential. The Dominican
military ±8

^

the heart of the
political system.
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Since the days of inde-

pendence the Dominican
Republic has been led
and misled by
a series of military
leaders.
The present internal
situation rn the nation is
no different. President
Balaguer is
constantly surrounded by
military officers

who, some allege,

actually make the crucial
policy decisions, especially
with
regard to anti-opposition
strategies and tactics.
Although
such views on presidential
power are open to challenge
by
those who see Balaguer as
an independent

leader, there is
no question that the military
exerts a profound influence
the quality of politics in
the Dominican Republic.
The
knowledge that the military
has the arms, and the manpower

to remove a president and
control the country is forever
in
the minds of national leaders
and the Dominican people.

Not only is the military

a

powerful group in Domin-

ican society, but it is also a
popular group. The military
has long been a means for lower
class youth to ascend to
middle class status in Dominican
society. The promise of
a uniform, training, a
steady job and the chance of promotion has made the military an attractive
profession and one
that is highly respected (and feared)
by the people, with
the power and popularity that it
holds in Dominican

society,

the military can never be overlooked or
taken lightly by

he government or the
opposition.
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The governing regime
must

constantly work to maintain
the allegiance of the
military,
while the opposition must
seek some sort of
accomodation or
working arrangement with
a force that could
easily destroy it.
in the Dominican
Republic force is not only
the private
domain of the military.
The country also has a
National Police
force which is actually the
front line of repression
against
government opposition. Where the
military is prone
to stay

out of the public eye and
remain in their headquarters
that
surround Santo Domingo, the
National Police are found everywhere in Dominican society. They
guard banks, patrol the
streets and spend a considerable
amount of time in the poor
barrios intimidating those who would
dare act against
the

Balaguer regime.

The National Police are headed by
a mili-

tary officer and function as a military
institution. The
only difference between the National
Police and the military
is that the police are the day-to-day
reminders of authoritarian rule in the Dominican Republic,
while the military
seem content to remain the final arbiters
of political power
and thus stay aloof from the ordinary
interchange of Dominican politics 62
.

6 2 As

a point of clarification it is important to
state that in the rural areas the military is perhaps
visible than in the capital city of Santo Domingo and more
do
exert considerable influence over the peasant population.
Nevertheless the National Police receive the most publicity
as the enforcers of Balaguer' s rule.

rr

Although the anted
forces and the
National Police
mOSt VlSiblS and
inflUential

—

^

-

l

—can

society, the phenomenal
economic growth
experienced since
1966
iSed
policy-input potential of
the new
business-financial middle
class.
Traditionally a weak segmerit of Dominican
society the new middle
society,
e cl^c
c±ass is^ receiving
ed attention and
cooperation from the
Balaguer government ' Tte eCOn ° miC ad
-Sieved in Dominican society
since 1966 have been
significant not only in
terms of GNP,'
investment rates, export
conditions, and physical
infrastructure, but more
importantly from the
standpoint of a
larger, richer, more
involved and influential
middle class.

-

^
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called

Dominican miracle" is primarily
a middle class
"miracle" that has brought
the Balaguer regime and
the newly
rich closer together.
The Dominican middle class
is now the
backbone of the government
and, more important, its
legitimizer . Without middle class
support Balaguer would most
surely be a mere puppet of
the military,
with the support
Of the middle class, however,
Balaguer is an established,
popular and effective leader.
The rise

m

influence of the new middle class
does

not mean that the traditional
social groups in Dominican

society— the landed aristocracy and
the Catholic Church— are
on the decline.

The Dominican Republic remains a
thoroughly

Spanish country in which large sections
of the useable land
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are held by a small,
elite group of "latifundistas,
" while
ge numbers of poor
campesinos continue to eke
out a
meager existence on worn
out plots of land.
President Balaguer has recently attempted
to bring some changes
to the
agrarian sectors (which we
will examine later) but
,
in the
tradition of the conservative
Latin American caudillo
the
Dominican leader has been
quick to soothe the fears
of landowners who stand to lose
considerable holdings. The landowners, especially in the rich
Cibao region around Santiago,
remain a powerful interest
group for the purpose of retaining the traditional landholding
system. Despite their
efforts, however, the landowners
are slowly being pushed out
of privileged governmental
circles.
The recent drive for
.

modernization coupled with the rising
power of the urban,
industrial middle class has made the
preservation efforts
Of the landowners obsolete and
furthermore an obstacle in
the path of national development.
The economic power and

political influence of the landed aristocracy
certainly
cannot be ignored in contemporary Dominican
society, but
the new age of modernization has strained
the relationship
between the governing regime and this traditional
pillar of
conservative support.
This incidence of shifting power and influence is

also evident with regard to the Catholic Church.

Although

the Catholic Church remains a key socializing agent
in

Dominican society it
^
n/-,
Yf if- no
longer seek^ oro
° r Seems
to be able to
aa j
gam
a prominent
role in national
nsfin
politics
d governmental
do i r>\r
policy-making.
Where fho nu
ChUrCh WaS
vocal during the
Bo
,
h
osch presidency in
1963 and took
k an actlve
P«t in the peace
^

.
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Catholic hierarchy

n6d n° tiCeably
Silent

Balaguer years and has
arily °° nCerned Wlth
its ministry and
charity work.
The recent influx of
Protests
otestant ministers and
lay people has
perhaps forced the Church
to concern itself
with religious
matters, hut many
opposition leaders seem
to feel that bishops
priests have either been
intimidated into silence
by the
Balaguer regime or merely
Y support th^
the conservative
government.
The sad result of this
is shift
qhiffemphasis is that
Dominican politics has
lost its conscience.
During the frequent reigns of terror
against the PRD and the
Left in general, the Church chose
to remain out of the
political thicket
d made little or no
comment on governmental
efforts to
squelch criticism and dissent.
The Catholic Church thus
has
made no real attempt to
assert itself since 1966 as
the conscience of Dominican society,
and it appears it has no
intention of doing so in the future.
•

*.

™
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The Balaguer regime, as
shown above, is bolstered by
a number of key conservative
and/or traditionalist societal
groups.
What is missing from this
configuration of support
is the external influence
of the United States.
The United
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State no longer has a
military role in Dominican
but its economic and
strategic influence is
significant, if
not overpowering. The
role of the United states
in Dominican
politics will be touched on
at numerous points in
this discussion, but at this juncture
it is enough to say
that the
economic development of the
country is closely tied in
with
decisions on sugar quotas, aid
projects, and business investments made in Washington.
It must also be mentioned
that
although the Marines have left
Dominican shores, the United
States still sees the necessity
of maintaining a stable
proAmerican government in the Dominican
Republic. The United
States thus has a profound effect
on the shape and tenor of
internal Dominican politics.
Dominican leaders both in
government and in the opposition
recognize that the symbiotic relationship between the two
countries will be very
difficult, if not impossible, to sever.
Because of the hold
of the United States on the
Dominican future, it is not an

overstatement to say that the Americans are
the real controlling force in Dominican politics. The
United States acts
as a type of overseer who in many
instances makes decisions

that have a direct influence on the course
of Dominican

development.
This discussion of the dominant forces in Dominican

society would also be incomplete without touching on
those

groups who are furthest from the centers of governmental
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power.

Just as there are a
number of obvious
supporting
groups attached to the
government,
"c, so too are
there sectors
o
Dominican society that
can be classified
ried as the
th opposition
The Dominican
opposition forces can best
be introduced from two
perspectives. On one level
it is possible to
talk about the rural
peasantry, the urban
laborers and unemployed and the
student-intellectuals as the
dominant social
groups that generally
line up in opposition
to the government
From another viewpoint
it is also instructive
to introduce
the opposition forces
by naming the various
political party
organizations that have formed
since 1966 to challenge
Balaguer s presidency.
=>

,

'

Among the individual groups
seen as a strong source
of opposition to the
Balaguer regime, the rural
peasantry
appear crucial. The largely
rural nature of the Dominican
Republic makes the campesino a
prime electoral target of
those who wish to unseat the
governing regime. Juan Bosch's
presidential victory in 1963 was
attributed in great part to
he PRD leader s ability to
convince the peasantry that
equitable land reform would best
be achieved by his victory.
Since the 1965 civil war, however,
the peasants have remained
generally silent and content with
Balaguer 's piecemeal reform
programs. The peasants, away from
the pressurized political
climate of Santo Domingo, are extremely
difficult to politicize for the opposition, especially in
the wake of Balaguer'

91
vigorous attests to
modernise rural society
±t
important to point out
that an undercurrent
of dissatisfaction remains among
the peasants as they
see their lives
change only minimally
over the years.
it is this dissatisfactron that spurs
opposition parties to
action and causes
uneasiness among governmental
leaders.
.

^

^

The most secure base
of opposition support
in the
Dominican Republic comes
from the urban workers
and poor.
Situated in the run down
barrios of Santo Domingo,
the urban
workers and the unemployed
(and underemployed) have
given
unswerving support for
opposition activity to the
Balaguer
regime. The main stimulus
for the opposition strength
of
the urban resident is
the high unemployment rate
coupled
with the lack of government
initiative to remedy the health,

education and welfare problems
which are so prominent in
Dominican society. The urban
poor are continually heard
saying that Balaguer builds
highways and dams, but give them
no hospitals, schools or
jobs.
Support for the Left opposition by
the urban poor
has become a recognized force
in Dominican
politics.

Key

Santo Domingo based unions like
the dockworkers and the
taxi-drivers are strongly opposed to
the government for its
reluctance to equalize the economic benefits
achieved in
recent years. Without the services of
these urban workers
the Dominican economy would be in
serious straits, and the

generally strong position
that Balaguer holds
in the
political system could
be weakened
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considerably.

As in many Latin
American countries the
Dominican
university students have
constantly been at odds
with the
governing regime. The
Autonomous University of
Santo
Domingo (USAD, is a.
hotbed of anti-Balaguer
feeling which
on numerous occasions
erupts into violent
confrontations
between student groups and
the National Police.
Unfortunately, although the
students are one in their
opposition to
the Balaguer regime,
they have shown a marked
tendency to
factionalize into an almost
endless stream of dissident
groups, student opposition
covers the spectrum from
extreme
Left Maoists, Trotskyists
and Soviet-oriented Communists
to
more middle of the road
Leftists Social Christians
and PRD
groups. There is little
conservative, pro-government
support
on the Dominican campus.
The sad element of student
opposition to the Balaguer regime
is that these young Dominicans
have very little bargaining
leverage with the government.
Their call for a strike has a
minimal effect on Dominican
society compared to an action taken
by organized urban unions.
Furthermore, Dominican students are
caught in the bind of
getting a job after their university
years which tends to

make them "four-year revolutionaries."
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9eneral framew °r * of
opposition in Dominican
itics, as stated earlier,
can also be seen by
introducing
the political party
organizations that seek to
unify the
divergent opposition groups
discussed above into a
powerful
challenger of the Balaguer
regime. Besides the PRd
which
18 the SUbjeCt ° f tbiS
discussion, and the most
successful
party from the standpoint
of developing an ongoing
organizatxon for expressing dissent
against the government,
Dominican
politics is replete with a
number of parties that
represent
a vast array of ideological
sentiments.
On the center Right one
finds parties like the Movement for Democratic Integration
(MIDA) headed by former
vicepresident Augusto Lora. Prevented
by Balaguer from being
his successor to the presidency,
Lora branched out on his own
and formed a middle class party
with strong ties in the Santiago and Cibao areas. Lora is
an attractive candidate with
a political posture that is
acceptable to the dominant forces
in Dominican society, but his
party has not been able to gain
the support from the major groups
that oppose the Balaguer
regime. The MIDA thus remains a
conservative party that is
overshadowed by the conservative nature of
the government.

Also in the conservative bracket is the
Partido Quisqueya Dom inicano (PQD) of Gen. Elias Wessin
y Wessin. Wessin
is most well known for his extreme
anti-communist views which
were prominent in his decision to lead military
units against

the 'constitutionalist"
forces.
PQD, has not necessarily
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Wessin, as leader of
the

changed his views about
Conznunism,

but he has become an able
politican and recognizes
that
Balaguer can only be defeated
through some union with
the
Like the PRD, Wes sin s party
is active among the
poor
in urban and rural areas,
but unlike
1

the PRD, the PQD has

achieved no where near the
support from these groups
as the
PRD.
Wessin's ability to strengthen
the PQD has been diminished somewhat because of
his penchant for scheming
with high
military officers in order to
forcefully bring the Balaguer
regime down. Such scheming has
led to Wessin's deportation
and the decline of the highly
personalist
PQD.

At the ideological center of
Dominican opposition
politics is the Christian Democratic
Party (PRSC) and
the

Movement for National Conciliation
(MCN)
The PRSC is a
party that during the civil war period
was a tower of strength
on the side of the "constitutionalists"
as it had a powerful
organization and a number of dedicated
activists, especially
the labor union movement.
in the contemporary
.

m

era the

PRSC is definitely on the decline as its
leadership factionalizes and its support shifts to other parties.
Christian
Democracy, which was once seen as an alternative
opposition
ideology, seems no longer to provide a viable
answer to the

internal political problems in the Dominican Republic.
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TheMCN is likewise a
middle of the road party
that
is on the decline.
The MCN was originally
the political
vehicle of Hector Garcia
Godoy, the provisional
president of
the Dominican Republic
after the 1965 civil war.
After
leaving the presidency for
Balaguer, Garcii Godoy
remained
one of the most trusted
and popular leaders in
Dominican
politics.
In 1970 it was thought
by political observers
that GarciS Godoy and the
MCN might have a chance of
defeating Balaguer.
Unfortunately GarciS Godoy suffered
a heart
attack before the campaign
opened and his party lost its
leader and its inspiration. The
MCN is still active in
Dominican politics under new leadership,
but it has never
regained the popularity that it
had when Garcia Godoy was
alive
The PRD of course is considered
the dominant party
on the Left in Dominican politics,
but besides the PRD it
is possible to name a number of
other parties, psuedo parties, clubs and temporary movements
that not only seek the
demise of the Balaguer government, but also
the radical

reorganization of Dominican society.
(PCD)

The Communist Party

is perhaps the most stable Left-wing
voice besides

the PRD.

The Party has attempted to develop a strong oppo-

sition voice, although on many occasions the leadership
has
seemed more concerned with attacking the positions
of the
PRD than criticizing Balaguer.

The Communists dilemma is
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not only the competition
with the PRD for
Left-wing support
The PCD is struggling
internally with the
problem of the
correct response to
government repression and
intimation.
There are those in the
party who favor Castro-type
guerrilla
activities as the only means
of toppling the
Balaguer regime.
Others in the PCD maintain
that the Party must
continue to
organize and agitate in
Dominican society if Communism
is to
be successful, what is
missing in this interchange
is the
fact that the PCD remains
a minor party in
Dominican politics,
and whatever position it
takes will have but a
minimal effect
on the shape and tenor of
the political system.
.

While the PCD is better
organized and has a larger
membership role, the Movimiento
Popular Dominicano (MPD) has
received by far the most publicity
of any opposition party
or group. The MPD is a small
group of hardened revolutionaries who espouse the doctrine
of Castro, Mao and Guevarra.
They have been responsible for
numerous attacks on government
and National Police officials
and gained national
and inter-

national attention for their kidnapping
of a United States
air force attache and for their
bold bank robbing efforts.
The MPD feel that only through urban
guerrilla activities
can opposition groups diminish the
power of the Balaguer

government.

These like the PRD who organize and function
in

hopes of some political victory are foolish
dreamers according to the MPD.

The MPD, like the PCD, has had its internal
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difficulties which have
lessenefl its involvement
Dominican
politics and tarnished its
name among the citizenry.
MPD
members have shown a
propensity for personal
bickering which
has led to numerous
fights and an occasional
murder.
MPD members have also
linked up with government
forces
exchange for their freedom.
Many members of the
infamous
La Banda terrorist group
were ex-MPD activists who
renounced
their revolutionary aims
in order to attack the
enemies of the
Balaguer regime. The violent
nature of the MPD and their
desire to make themselves
the dominant Left-wing
opposition
force in the Dominican Republic
will necessitate further

^

m

examination of this group and
their interchange with the
PRD.
With this discussion of the
dominant
social and

political groups in present day
Dominican society the introduction to the Dominican Republic
and the setting for PRD
opposition is now complete. The
general overview of Dominican society, the sad historical
legacy of authoritarian
rule and economic inequality, and
the continuous efforts of
opposition groups to stimulate radical
change sets the stage
for the

mdepth investigation

of the PRD and its life and

death struggle with the Balaguer government.

CHAPTER III
the STRATEGIES of PRD
OPPOSITION
the first questions
that a losing political
Party like the PRD must ask
itself in the post . election
period is how it can function
with some degree of
effectiveness while in a minority
position? Although the
opposition
Party does not hold the reins
of national power, it
must

nevertheless make a determination
as to what influence it
does have within the political
system and how to employ that
influence efficiently. The
need for an honest appraisal
by
the opposition of its
capabilities and the political
climate
that it will operate in are
mandatory prerequisites for
constructing a realistic strategy
that will counteract, or
at least challenge, the policies
and actions of the governing regime. Just as the ruling
political leadership develops
its list of policy-making goals,
the opposition party must
also set forth what it believes
to be the most advantageous
approach to performing its role of contesting
governmental
decisions and representing the views of
its constituents.
Strategy thus is central to the
post-election activity of
the opposition political party.

Without some clearly articu-

lated, broadly supported opposition method
of response to

the governing regime, the minority party
will grope aimlessly
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ln the politicalJarena nnshi
~ +.
unable
to assert itself
as an

influential dissenting
voice.

More than merely setting
forth its general plans
of
opposition, the losing
political party, particularly
i„ the
Latin American context,
is faced with an even
greater task
Not only must the
opposition party formulate
a position that
will provide an effective
response to the policies
and actions
of the national government,
but it must also structure
that
position with a keen recognition
of the unique rules of
political behavior found in
Latin American
societies.

As

numerous opposition parties in
Latin America have found out
in the past, it is not
enough to merely enunciate a
series
of position statements
that the party will take while
in the
minority. Too often parties
have failed to recognize the
"unwritten rules" of Latin American
politics which render
opposition strategies meaningless
and degrade the very notion
of "loyal opposition."

Opposition strategies thus demand a
realistic
appraisal of the capabilities of the
party and of the political system. Opposition politics
is a hazardous business in
Latin America. Any political party
like the PRD in the
Dominican Republic must face the severe
limitations placed
on opposition activity and develop a
strategy that responds
to immediate political circumstances.
This is not to say
that opposition political parties are
helpless when thrust
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into a minority posltiQn
with n the r Qwn poiit
cai system _
But as the case of the
pro shows, the Balaguer
regime and
the tenor of Dominican
politics placed a great
strain on the
opposition and made opposition
strategy formation a frustrating and often times
controversial procedure.
.

.

.

Oposicion Creadnr^

After the June election defeat
by Joaquin Balaguer,
the PRD was faced with the
realization that it would have
to
examine its position and future
role in Dominican

politics.
The PRD was no longer an
exile party or the primary
national
leadership group, or even the
dominant electoral force in
the Dominican Republic.
Instead the PRD was relegated to
the position of a minority
opposition political party in a
new and shaky political system.
Despite its long history of
popularity and influence in Dominican
politics and its desire
to bring revolutionary reform
to the country, the PRD reluctantly assumed the role of providing
the Balaguer regime with
a legitimate opposition voice.
After years of fighting for
a "new" Dominican Republic, the PRD
had arrived at a point
where it found itself not only in a secondary
political

position, but worse yet, as a tacit supporter of
a regime

that it detested.

Although the PRD accepted its new position in Dominican politics, the Party was not the least bit
encouraged by
the "political climate" it was entering.

PRD leaders in the
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first place were bitter
over the election
victory. Many
Party leaders felt
Balaguer either bought
the election or
won because of repressive
measures. The election
campaign
was furthermore seen
by the Party leadership
as a preview
of the power-military,
po lice , financial and
that Balaguer could
muster against an
opposition reformist
The
y
PRD also realized the
feebleness of the democratic institutions through
which it was expected
to carry
on a viable opposition
campaign. A nation which
has been
weaned on a history of
paternalism, personalism and
military
intervention does not easily
adjust to the rigors of
democratic practice, especially
a democracy that was
haphazardly
constructed and poorly supported.
Finally, the PRD understood that the Dominican
people still retained an image
of
the Party as the major
proponent of revolutionary change
in
country. For the PRD to assume
the position of "loyal
opposition" was tantamount to
turning away from all those
who fought and died for the
"constitutionalist cause" in the
1965 civil war. The PRD was
too proud a political party to
stand idle while the Balaguer
regime governed the Dominican
Republic. 2

^

iSee James Petras "A Dominican
RepublicRpvninfi^
and Restoration" for a detailed
account oftte p^oblems
Y ““ PRD in the 1966 election ~4aig„ ^nd its
aftermath?^
'

Although Bosch accepted defeat on
promised a vigorous opposition fight. See June 14. 1966 he
El Caribe (Santo
°
Domingo) for June 14, 1966.
1
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Despite these serious
uus rp<;pTOaf-i^
reservations about the
advisability of participating
in the new democratic
experiment of President Balaguer,
the PRD smoothed over
its feelings of apprehension and
began forming an opposition
strategy
that would meet the
policies and actions of the
Balaguer
government. The early
opposition strategy of the PRD
was
based on a series of exchanges
between Juan Bosch and President Balaguer in the 1966
elections. Balaguer, perhaps
sensing his impending victory
in the upcoming elections,
but
recognizing the power of the PRD,
suggested that the two
parties engage in some form of
cooperative politics after
the election. 3 The cooperation
would be in the form of a
unity or coalition government
based on joint consultation
and non-partisan cabinet
appointments. 4

Juan Bosch never really accepted
these suggestions
of Balaguer.
To Bosch cooperation as Balaguer
presented it
was cooptation in disguise and
certain death
for the PRD as

a

distinctly revolutionary party.

Bosch stated that coali-

tion government was "impossible" since
it would only "leave

Balaguer on a number of occasions suggested
that
the two major parties enter into this
coalition, but his
statement on the day of his electoral victory
sums
inclination to create a unity government. See El up his
Caribe,
June 6, 1966. After some seven years of
political repression
against the PRD it is very difficult to believe that
Balaguer
actually was serious about some form of coalition
government.
4.

Later revelations of
talk
June, 1966 of forming
example of Colombia where the
alternate in power every four

m

Balaguer showed that there was
a National Front on the
two major antagonists would
years.
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the (opposition) road
to others." 5

The PRD may have been
deeply d sturbed wer
role as government
opposition, but the Party
eventually aid
make a decision to
participate in the Dominican
political
system of Joaquin Balaguer.
Bosch and the Party
leadership
was not about to allow
the PRD to become a
puppet of the
government or another in a long
line of indistinguishable
.

minority parties.

The PRD would work in the
system, but it
would not be used or manipulated
by that system.
Even though the PRD had
carefully avoided any acceptance of Balaguer 's cooperative
opposition overtures, the
Party in the post-election
period made some basic concessions
which showed its willingness to
tone down its revolutionary
rhetorrc.
The first tangible sign of
the PRD’s desire to

develop a working relationship
with the Balaguer government
came with the introduction of
the "Oposicion Creadora"
strategy. 6
"Oposicion Creadora," as defined by
Bosch, was
designed as a much stronger approach
to anti-regime behavior
than Balaguer planned on.
"Oposicion Creadora" pledged the
PRD to an opposition role that
sought to lessen tensions
between government and the Party. The
strategy, however.
S E1

1966.
g

Caribe, June 13, 1966; also see Ahora, June
20,

See "El Gobierno de Balaguer
y la 'Oposicion Creadora
Ahora, June 27, 1966 for the most concise explanation of what the PRD's first opposition
strategy consisted
'

of

m
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did not compromise
the right of the PRD
to challenge the
Nicies an d actions of the Balaguer
regime. The principle
of "Oposicion
Creadora" also assured
the national government
at PRD technicians and
administrators, so vital
to national
reconstructs, would be
encouraged to lend their
assistance
to the development of
the nation.

Perhaps the most significant
aspect of 'Oposicion
Creadora" was that it did
not seek the downfall of
the Balaguer regime.
"Oposicion Creadora" was not
a strategy of
strikes, demonstrations or
even revolutionary rhetoric.
The
first PRD opposition strategy
was rather an open-minded

attempt by the Party to coexist
in the new political
system
set up by the Balaguer forces.
The spirit of "Oposicion
Creadora" suggested that the PRD
realised the importance of

engendering some degree of order
and cooperation into a wartorn political system.
Furthermore, even though Balaguer's
victory was repugnant to the PRD,
the mild-mannered president
was thought by many Party faithful
to be the best of
all

possible evils, and therefore should
not be viewed as a hated
tyrant that must be toppled. 8
7 Ibid.
8

I t is a well known fact that
some
including Juan Bosch hold no real animosity members of the PRD
toward President
Balaguer. Some had Balaguer as their law
professor at the
Autonomous University of Santo Domingo, while
others were on
goo terms with the shy but friendly
president. There was
etinitely no sign of the intense hatred that
Trujillo engendered in opposition forces.
•

...
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T e extreme caution
that the PRD opposition
showed
as it entered into its
role of .'loyal opposition"
was soon
justified. The so-called
democratic structures of
the Balaguer administration fell
prey to the ingrained

paternalism
and social antagonism that
have long been a part of
Dominican politics.
One of the first areas where
the PRD noticed
the failure of democratic
opposition politics was in the
Dominican Congress. After some
initial weeks in which the
Dominican legislature functioned
in an atmosphere of coopera
tion and professional confidence,
the PRD quickly realized
that the Balaguer regime was
not interested in the proposals
of the five PRD senators and
twenty-six deputies. Countless
examples can be forwarded which
reveal the utter futility
encountered by the PRD legislative
bloc as they attempted to
conduct themselves as the "loyal
opposition." prd legislative proposals ranging from pay
raises for the urban
workers to public service projects for
outlying areas to
attempts at breaking the nation's ties
with the United States
were systematically ignored, emasculated
or reworded by the
Partido Reformista majority in the legislature 9
Even minor
bills concerned with Dominican television
commercials and
.

To PRD legislators the most offensive action of the
PR congressmen was their close cooperation with
foreign
economic concerns like the Falconbridge Nickel Company and
the Gulf and Western Company which reaped huge land
and tax
concessions from the Balaguer dominated Dominican Senate and
Chamber of Deputies.
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Child centers were ignored
by the Balaguer majority,
only
later to be reintroduced
as government sponsored
bills 1°
The controversial "Ley
Tregua" bill (sponsored
by Balaguer
and designed to curtail
political activity three
months
Prior to any election) was
perhaps the only piece of
legislation in which the PRD
Congressional delegation showed
some
effectiveness. After a huge
propaganda campaign by
the

Party and enormous pressure
placed on the president, the
bill
was withdrawn. 11

Besides these daily signs of
unwillingness on the
part of the president and his
legislative majority

to conduct politics with a measure of
respect for the PRD, the
opposition bloc of the PRD also had
to face the constant
dependence of the Partido R eformista
leadership in the Congress on Balaguer. According to one
former PRD legislator,
the opposition delegation soon
recognized how legislative
politics were really being conducted. 12
The Partido

R eformista majority was under the
complete tutelage of the
° ne f ormer PRD deputy, Emmanuel Espinal, who
at
the time of my visit was the Party's press
secretary, talked
at length to me about the corruption of
legislative practice
in the Dominican Congress.
Espinal had a seemingly endless
list of stories about the unfortunate state of
legislative
politics under the Balaguer administration. Interview,
July 10, 1972, Santo Domingo.
.

1966

.

El Caribe for August 12th and 13th and August 30th,
12 These
T-

additional viewpoints about Dominican legislative politics were gained from an interview with former PRD
deputy Ruben Suro.
Interview, July 15, 1972, Santo Domingo.
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Balaguer reg i me and acted
as its "messenger..
i„ the Dominican
Congress.
The legislature was
so lacking in democratic
procedure and professional
autonomy that the PR
leaders frequently telephoned the
National Palace to receive
instructions from the President
on how the PR should
stand on a key
legislative question. 13 The
only conclusion
legislative bloc could arrive
at was that the Dominican
Congress had lost its legitimacy
as an open and autonomous
institution and that effective
opposition activity was hope
less.
The Reformists majority was
unwilling to conduct

^^^

its

business in a spirit of cooperation
and non-partisan bargaining, and furthermore was
unable to break away from the
traditional practices of paternalistic
leadership.
PRD Opposition under Pena Gomez
The failure of democratic opposition
politics in the
Dominican legislature was but a small
indication of the

difficulties that the PRD would encounter
in Balaguer 's
political system. Soon after the installation
of the Balaguer government, the problems of the
PRD in the legislature
were expanded to other realms as Party
activists throughout
the country became the target of harassment,
injury.

Suro pointed out that not only were the PR legislators dependent on Balaguer for instructions,
but they
were well rewarded for their obedience with
lucrative kickbacks.
On the other hand Suro stated that he could safely
state that no PRD legislator made anything above his
salary
while in office.
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incarceration and assassination.
The Dominican
newspapers
recorded almost daily a
picture of political
repression
against the PRD. it
seented that the
Balaguer government had
now decided not only
to frustrate the PRD
opposition, hut
also to destroy its very
foundations. The cries
of the PRD
leadership to stop the
onslaught against the
Party went
unheeded as President
Balaguer seemed to possess
neither the
Power or the desire to act
affirmatively against the
terror.14
It appeared that
opposition politics was on
the verge of
returning to its most primitive,
Trujillista state in the
Dominican Republic as democratic
opposition was replaced by
an all-out effort to crush
legitimate dissent.
The inability of the PRD
Congressmen to participate
effectively in the Dominican
legislature coupled with the
increasing terror present in
the country prompted the PRD
leadership, under the guidance of
Juan Francisco Pena Gomez,
to "phase out" the principle
of "Oposicion Creadora."
Pena
Gomez, who took over the PRD
leadership after Juan Bosch
decided to leave the country for
Europe in November, 1966,
pronounced a strategy of hardnose
opposition that aimed at
vigorously replying to the oppressive
nature of Dominican
politics. Under Pena Gomez the PRD no
longer sought to
14The question of Balaguer' s ability to control
the
nCe
a c ucla:L °ne and will be discussed
at
length
in
?
rh
Chapters 6 and J
7.
The question of violence and police power
is central to Dominican politics since
it is connected with
the whole problem of determining exactly
who runs the
Dominican Republic.
_

.

,

«th
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Balaguer and work towards

ena Gomez actively
criticized

^

^^ ^^

government
Paper interviews, official
party pronouncements
Qr
Party radio program,

Trib™a^ocr^.

^

The PRD as a whole
too, on , m °re forceful
anti-Balaguer posture as
the younger,
-re radical Party leaders
expressed no desire to
he shaded
by Balaguer' promise
s
of opposition guarantees
and smooth
democratic procedure. To
the PRD leadership the
masquerade
was over. Opposition
politics would be played in
the traditional Dominican manner
with those in power
oppressing the
groups out of power, while
the minority fights to
retain its
influence and its very existence. 15

Although Pena G6mez instilled
in the PRD a more
realistic understanding of
opposition politics in the Dominican Republic, the fiery
leader was more adept at
opposition
rhetoric than opposition
organization
and discipline.

Under
Pena G6mez PRD opposition
strategy took on an increasingly
disparate and ill-conceived
appearance. The PRD seemed listless without Juan Bosch at the
controls.
The Party lost
adherents, its finances dwindled, its
local organizations
fell into disarray, and most importantly
its leadership cadre
15 See Ahora,
August 7,

1967 and October 9, 1967 for
G6meZ S neW Stand toward ** Balaguer
egime.
regLf^te*
The official announcement by Pena Gomez
of a new
f
Y
P Sltl °? yis-a-vis Balaguer' s government can be
found in El
p? Nac ional (Santo Domingo),
November 1 and 7, 1966.
'

r

openly voiced criticism nf
of the Party. 16
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he young and
"immature" leader

+-v>o

Pena Gomez faulted his
own leadership and
publicly
announced the g rave troubles
the Party was in as
a result of
government repression.!?
But the self _ criticism
o£
Gomez would not replace
a cohesive opposition
strategy which
set forth dynamic guidelines
to challenge Balaguer
and the
legitimacy of his regime.
The PRD under Pena Gomez
was
merely reacting to the actions
and policies of the
national
government, rather than mounting
a large scale offensive
against Balaguer.

^

In defense of Pena Gomez
some PRD activists stated

that even though the Party
experienced "difficulties" without
Bosch at the helm, his young
protege performed admirably
under great stress from conservatives
in the Party and from
increasing harassment and repression
by the government. !8
Despite such examples of understanding
and praise, the fact
remains that the PRD under PeHa
G6mez slowly became
16

P erha P s interesting to note that when older
talk about the Party under Pena Gomez
they fault
5 C f
e
r
"“urity,"
but
younger
faithful
fa!tSui praise
praL fhhis courage and his early recognition
that
democratic opposition was doomed to failure.

pph
i
^
D le
der
t^

^

,

17p

^\
^

G6rae2
nCG threatened to quit the Party leadershin
,0
? October
ac i° nal
27, 1967.
Also once Bosch
retnrn
eturned ?from Europe, Pena Gomez made a
public criticism of
leaderShlP ° f the PRD
See E1 Nacional September 26,
l970

J

,

’

,

1

Interview with Emmanuel Espinal, June
Santo Domingo.

9,

1972

indistinguishable from other
opposition parties
politics. At a time when
the Party was most

Ill

^

in need of
leadership and a strategy
for answering the
activities of
the Balaguer regime,
the PRO could only
stab
at an enemy that was far
too powerful to he
challenged hy a
disorganized and disgruntled
political party.

^

While the PRD opposition
deteriorated in the Dominican Republic, Juan Bosch
was sequestered in Spain
preparing
what the Party needed most-a
strategy for meeting the
repressive policies of Balaguer
and for revitalizing the
draining spirit and popularity
of the PRD. The importance
Of Juan Bosch-the man,
the strategist and the
polemicistcould be seen by the frequency
with which Pena Gomez and
the hierarchy of the PRD
consulted with the "asesor"

(one
Of the titles Bosch held after
leaving the Party leadership
to Pena Gomez)
The PRD waited anxiously for
Juan Bosch,
the strategies that he was
developing, and the personal
.

charisma that he brought to the
Dominican people and to
Party circles. prd faithful felt
certain that Juan Bosch
was the only challenger worthy of
opposing the power of
President Balaguer and the makeshift democracy
that he
created and corrupted.

Despite the clamor within the Party encouraging

Bosch to return home, the PRD leader was not
eager to take
up the fight for revolutionary change.

Bosch seemed

satisfy
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to remain in Spain
to write,

to direct the PRD
from abroad.

to do research, and

Prom his apartment in

Benidorm in the South of
Spain, Bosch sent forth
a continuous flow of pronouncements
castigating the Balaguer
government, praising the bravery
of the PRD activists
and almost
always criticising the
extent of United states
influence in

Dominican affairs.
Sensing the difficulties
in the PRD, Bosch slowly
exerted his influence as the
PRD leader and began
directing
the Party toward a new
opposition strategy which totally
rejected any support of the
existing Dominican political
system. This new opposition
strategy sought to push the
PRD away from participation
in the "sham" democratic
procedures and guarantees of the
Balaguer government and toward
complete non-involvement in and
legitimation of that regime.
Even tough Bosch was absent from
the Dominican Republic and
from internal party politics,
he was powerful enough to
convince the Party hierarchy to readjust
their strategy and
begin shunning any actions which might
register tacit
acceptance of the present political system.
The aim of
Bosch's maneuvers was to have the PRD not
only challenge
the present regime, but also question
its fundamental

legitimacy as a true democracy and the rightful
leadership

group within Dominican society.

Heretofore the PRD had

merely responded to the actions of the government,
but now

Bosch was determined to
have the PRD attack the
basic
foundations of the Balaguer
regime by concerted offensive
action.
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Bosch's first move in
restructuring the PRD opposition strategy was to seek
Party approval
for the tactic of

boycotting the 1968 municipal
elections.

Bosch felt that
the abstention of the PRD
from the elections would be
a
vivid comment on the lack of
support for Balaguer's "democracy" and the power of the PRD
to influence the extent of
voter turnout. After a great deal
of internal conflict in
the PRD between moderate,
pro-participation elements and
radical abstentionists , the Party
accepted Bosch's plan to
have the PRD abstain from the 1968
elections. As the

returns from the May election came in
showing an abstention
rate reaching levels anywhere from
400,000 to 750,000 votes,
radicals in the Party felt that Bosch's new
strategy of
electoral boycott was a valuable means of exposing

the weak-

ness of the Balaguer regime among the Dominican
populace.
The 1968 abstention tactic of the PRD was but
a

prelude to further actions by Bosch since the Party
leader
was committed to expanding the boycott of elections to
a

full-scale rejection of democratic practice as it was conducted in the Dominican Republic.

The importance of elec-

toral abstention as a signal of where PRD opposition

strategy was heading was made more forceful by the signing
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Of the Benidorm accord
in December, 1968.
The accord,
signed by a Commission
of the Party's
Executive Committee,
stressed the diverse
nature of the PRD
organisation and the
maSS SUPP ° rt the Part
* ““I* claim in Dominican
society
The document further
criticised the dependence
of the Dominican Republic on the
United States and pledged
to liberate
the country from this
stifling relationship.
Pi „ ally , and
most importantly, the
document stated that elections
in the
Dominican Republic are not a
guaranteed means of victory,
but can be seen under certain
circumstances to be an acceptable means of achieving
national independence. 19 what
had
started out under Pena Gomes
as a seemingly desperate

response to the repression of the
Balaguer regime had with
the Benidorm accord begun the
transformation of PRD strategy
to an opposition status
outside the normal channels
of the

Dominican political system.

Political participation along

traditional democratic avenues thus
became secondary as
Bosch pushed and pulled the PRD to a
new level of opposition
strategy.

“fi-Nacional, January 11, 1969. See also a discussion of the Benidorm accords
Boletion Buro Coordinador
e la International S o cialista en
America La tina.
— Primer

m

.

Tnmestre

,

1969. p.

3>m

.
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The decision of the PRD
not to participate in
the
Dominican political system
that was initiated with
the electoral abstention in the
1968 municipal elections
and solidified with the Benidorm
accord provided the
foundation for
what was to become the Party’s
fundamental ideological position.
Based on the rhetoric and
actions of the PRD in 1968,
it came as no surprise
when Juan Bosch formally
unveiled his
long awaited thesis on
democracy and national
development. 20

Entitl6d 5Actadura con Respaldo
Po m 1ar -n .,. t „„^ i[
with
Popular Support-the thesis
sought to clarify the conflicting
claims made about democracy in
the Dominican Republic
,

i

and the

role that the PRD should play
in forming the most realistic
and effective framework for
national development. 2
The Bosch thesis expanded the
position of the Party
taken in the Benidorm accord by
criticizing the lack of democratic institutions, procedures and
guarantees in the Dominican Republic.
in a situation of repression and
illegality
Bosch points out the utter impossibility
of conducting

fruitful democratic opposition politics.

Besides these

20 It

is important to point out that Bosch's thesis
Ct dUra CQn Res P al do Popular was introduced
incremen.T^ starting
?
as early as 1968, but was not formally pub,
u
lished
book form until 1970.

m

21 The heart
of Bosch's thesis of Popular Dictatorship
is contained in pp. 5-59 of El Promimo Paso:
Dictadura
Con
'
Respaldo Popular Santo Domingo, 1970.
,
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common PRD complaints about
politics in the Dominican
Republic, the Bosch thesis enters
new territory by claiming
that Anglo-American democracy
is unworkable in a developing
Latin American nation. 22 The
conservative social
groups,

the high degree of factionalism,
the extreme poverty, the
low level of political awareness
and participation, and the

influence of traditional customs and
procedures in a country
like the Dominican Republic make the
formation of a represen
tative democracy nearly impossible, if
not foolhardy. Quite
simply, Latin America, according to
Bosch, is not prepared
to practice Anglo-American democracy
and can never hope to
have success in staging fair elections,
transferring political power or respecting the rights of
oppositions.

What Bosch proposes in place of a traditional
democratic framework is some form of benevolent dictatorship,
or
as Shils calls it "tutelary democracy," 23

.

,

The dictator would

22 For a
fuller discussion of the Bosch thesis and its
,

implications for Latin American politics see Howard Wiarda's
"The New Developmental Alternatives in Latin America: Nasserlsm and Dictatorship with Popular Support," a paper prepared
for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Pacific Coast
Council on Latin American Studies, University of California
at Santa Barbara, November 6-7, 1970, also in article form in
Western Political Quarterly (September 1972)
464-490.
:

23 See Shils'

article "The Military in the Political
Development of New States," in The Role of the Military in
Underdeveloped Countries ed: John Johnson (New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 54.
,
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be the head of a mass
political movement much like
the PRD.
He would assume office
(either by election or by
some
"forced" change of power)
and conduct the affairs
of state
without the controls that an
Anglo-American democratic
system places on its leaders.
Once in power the popular
dictatorship would be constructed
in the manner of a syndioatist state in which the various
groups in society, such a s
the peasants or workers, feed
demands directly to the center
of power. 24 Because the
popular dictator represents
the

masses of people, rather than
specialized interests, he wil]
speed the modernizing process and
bring radical change to
the nation unencumbered by elections,
legislatures and opposition guarantees. As Wiarda states
about the Bosch thesis:
Bosch is arguing for a broad-based mass
mobilizing movement, led by a popular party
such as his PRD and committed to staying
in
power until national sovereignty and identity have been restored, until the foundations of a more just and democratic society
have been firmly established and until farreaching changes of socio-economic and
political reconstruction have been effectively implemented. 2
It is interesting to note just in the way
of commenting on

the Dictatorship with Popular Support that for
all of Bosch'
24 b ° sc

1 ,s mo(^ e i G f non-Western democratic
change is
quite similar to the Peruvian military regime which took
power in 1968.
j

25 Wiarda,

"New Developmental Alternatives."
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claims of developing a revolutionary
means of democratic
organization and national modernization,
the structure of
the "Dictatorship" is very similar
to the paternalistic
caudillo figure that Dominicans have
recognized and followed
for hundreds of years.
The only aspect of the Dictatorship
with Popular Support that has changed from
the traditional
structure of political organization is that
a new segment of
Dominican society will control the reins of
power rather than
the customary military-landed-business elite. ^6
The Bosch thesis of Dictatorship with Popular
Support

thus became the focal point for the PRD opposition
to the

Balaguer regime.

With the enunciation of the thesis, the

PRD left the Dominican political system and freed itself
to

challenge not just Balaguer, but his political system as
well.

The PRD would no longer participate in the institu-

tions and procedures of Balaguer'

conservatism and repression.

s

system of paternalism,

Instead the Party would con-

cern itself with radical, anti-regime opposition activity
that questioned the validity of the entire governing structure.

Opposition thus took on a new appearance under the

ideological guidance of the Bosch thesis.

The Dictatorship

°For a more comprehensive view of the traditional
Latin American sociopolitical structure that Bosch's thesis
seems modeled after see Howard Wiarda's "Toward a Framework
for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin
Tradition - The Corporative Model."
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with Popular Support had
in effect raised the stakes
of
political competition in the
Dominican Republic and warned
the government that the PRD
would no longer play opposition
politics according to the rules
set forth by Balaguer’s
psuedo— democracy

Although the Bosch thesis of Dictatorship
with Popular Support was introduced
with much fanfare in the Dominican
Republic and was hailed by many PRD
activists as the onlyrealistic opposition strategy the Party
could adhere to, the
thesis itself came under sharp attack
from inside and outside
the ranks of the Party. 27 Criticism
initially
was so strong

that the thesis ran into difficulty
attaining official status.
Even when the thesis was formally accepted,
strong prodemocratic elements within the Party continued
to fight the

claim that Bosch's Popular Dictatorship was
the sole opposition strategy and future guidepost of the PRD.
Critics continually harped on the vagueness of Bosch's model for
democratic change and expressed fear that the so-called
benevolent dictator could undermine the spirit of his position by

becoming a tyrant in the tradition of Trujillo.

For his part

Bosch rejected these criticisms by stating that the thesis
is an evolving framework that does not need precise definition
27 0ne of Bosch's sharpest
critics is Juan Isidro
Jimenes Grullon whose articles in Ahora took the thesis apart

and criticized it extensively. For an example of such
attacks see Ahora , June 1, 1970.

or written guarantees.
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Once in power the
dictator, because
he xb a man of the
people, will work in
the best interests
of the people.

Despite the fact that the
Bosch thesis has been
attacked vigorously from
all sides, the principle
of Dictatorship with Popular Support
has held the dominant
position
within the ideological
configuration of the PRD. The
influence of Juan Bosch has been
so overpowering within
the ranks
of the Party that even
though the thesis lacked
unanimous
support, it nevertheless
continued to set the tone for
the
Party’s position toward the
Balaguer regime and its view of
the future.
The opposition rhetoric that
the PRD sent out
through its leaders, its literature
and its radio program
was founded on the Party's belief
that the government of
President Balaguer is corrupt and
must be replaced not by an
Anglo-American democracy, but by a new
kind of democracy—

the

Dictatorship with Popular Support.
The Bosch thesis of Dictatorship with
Popular Support, besides totally revamping the
PRD's opposition strategy
and its ideological vision, has had a
noticeable impact in
other areas of the Party's behavior as well.
The PRD, in

conjunction with its decision to abstain from Dominican
28 p ar ty leaders
continually claim that the thesis is
being carefully examined and expanded by PRD
theoreticians
so that when the day comes for the Party to
step into national
power, the thesis will be sufficiently explicated
that it can
serve as the master plan for the revolution.
.
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elections, also refused
to align itself with
other minority
Parties in a movement simi
i ar to a national
frQnt of Qppo _
sition.

Parties such as the Social
Christians (prsc)
Gen.
Wessin y Wessin’s personalistic
Partido Quisgueva
<PCP) ' the M°y^ent for
Democratic Integration of ex-vicepresident Augusto Lora (MIDA) and
the Movement of Nationa!
Conciliation (MCN) headed by Hector
Ga^Ia GodoTTalong with
other smaller parties, were
anxious to form an opposition

coalition and challenge Balaguer
in the 1970 presidential
elections. 2 9 Juan Bosch and the PRD
were adamant in their

rejection of such a coalition venture.

Bosch often empha-

sized the desire of the PRD to remain
aloof from the electoral process as a result of his
commitment to the Dictatorship with Popular Support thesis.

The PRD also saw itself

as the most powerful and popular
political party in the

country and was not about to jeopardize that
position by
entering into an alliance that would lessen its
visability
and influence. As a result the PRD refused to

enter into a

union with the other "bungling" (as Bosch termed
them) opposition parties in any form of electoral coalition. 30
29

See El Nacional for April 17 and 19, 1970 for a
discussion of these parties' attempts to bring the PRD into
the coalition fold.
3Q E1

Nacional, April 30, 1970.
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Without the presence of
the PRD to anchor the
coalition, the
remaining opposition
parties were unable to
reach a firm
accord on the national
front of opposition.
The weakness of
the opposition parties
without
the PRD left the door
open

for Balaguer's victory
in the 1970 elections.
Where Bosch and the PRD
refused to unite in electoral coalition with the
moderate to conservative
opposition
parties, there was also a
grave reluctance on the part
of
the Party to link itself
with the radical Left. Bosch,
on
numerous occasions, made every
effort to castigate the
L6ftiSt «° vimi ento Popular Dominican
(mpd) for its brand of
revolutionary politics. Bosch
severely criticized the

Marxist oriented militant tactics
of the MPD saying that
they only led to more violence
and served no constructive
purpose. 31 Bosch even went as far
as to accuse the MPD of
aligning with the Right-wing in a
conspiracy to destroy the
PRD and to assassinate key leaders
like Peha G6mez. The
attacks by Bosch on the MPD were perhaps
his sharpest

(some-

times even sharper than those against
Balaguer) and were
clearly intended to separate the PRD from
the radical fringe.
The PRD was definitely anti-system and
increasingly anti-

Anglo-American democracy, but it was not about to be
replaced
33-The caustic interchanges between the MPD
and Bosch
were conducted from the end of the 1970 presidential
election
in May to October of the same year
Some examples of these
attacks can be seen by examining El Nacional September
2
.

,
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as the major revolutionary
force in the Dominican Republic.

Wxth Bosch’s announcement of
the Dictatorship with Popular
Support, the PRD felt that it had
staked out the claim as
the only real alternative to
the Balaguer regime. The PRD
was not going to abandon that
claim by entering into agreements with weak minority parties or
by supporting violent
and doctrineless revolutionaries.
It is important at this juncture to
stress the fact
that Bosch, even today, is reluctant
to link his theory of

Popular Dictatorship with the revolutionary
socialism of
countries like China, North Vietnam and Cuba.
Although he
has visited many Communist and Socialist
countries, Bosch
has stated that he is not a Marxist-Leninist
and does not
believe that such ideological constructs would mesh
with

Latin American society and politics.

^

Despite his criti-

cism of democracy and the United States, Bosch still maintains close contacts with some Western European democratic

socialist parties, i.e., primarily in West Germany and
Sweden, and talks more in terms of refining the socioeco-

nomic basis of Dominican society rather than installing

another foreign model of national development.
J

^Although Bosch uses examples from the revolutions
in Cuba, China and Soviet Russia, he is quick to separate
the Dominican Republic and the PRD from too close a connection with the revolutionary environment in these countries
and the need to develop a Marxist-Leninist revolution.
See El Proximo Paso , pp. 107-124.

~
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Bosch thes ±B_an d PRD
organi sation,

“-

-P-*

Perhaps the

of the Bosch thesis
of Dictatorship

wtth Popular support is
the affect that it had
on the PRD
organizational structure,
with the return of Juan
Bosch to
the Dominican Republic
in 1970 from his
self-imposed exile
in Spain and with the
extensive promulgation of
his thoughts
on democracy, the PRD
took on a new appearance
as an opposition party. The Party,
which was in a shambles and
hard
pressed by government supported
repression during Bosch's
sabbatical, reexamined itself
and initiated a widespread
effort to prepare the Dominican
citizenry for the eventual
success of the Dictatorship with
Popular Support.

The PRD,
after the 1970 elections and
continuing on into 1972, went
to work to reorganize the
national Party structure. 33 The
aim was to make the PRD more
representative, and subsequently more in line with the requirements
of the Bosch
thesis.
If the PRD was going to lead
a mass movement that
eventually would serve as the basis for
national development, it had to go out into the campo
and educate the peasantry and stir up their desire for radical
change.

The reorganization efforts undertaken in
the post1970 election period were all-encompassing
and persistent

m

their desire to restructure the Party and weed
out members
3

El Nacional

,

September 11, 1970.
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Who were anti-thesis. 34

After an extensive housecleaning
campaign, the PRD leadership
began an education program
which sought to make the
Dominican citizen aware of the
Bosch thesis and the corruption
of the Balaguer regime.
Everywhere one traveled in PRD
circles little white books
of Bosch's writings were
given out to prospective PRD
supporters.
The books were designed to clarify
the people's
understanding of Bosch's views on
the course of Dominican
history and the possibilities for
future change. 35

Besides this purging activity and
the emphasis on
educational preparation, the PRD found
it necessary to
revert to a practice employed in the
early 1960's of
including all strata of Dominican society
in its reorgani
zation efforts. The Party sought to
incorporate
lawyers,

doctors and other professionals into its
ranks by developing social action programs.

Prominent Dominicans were

recruited to head various PRD professional groups
and
34 One

Party leader related to me that in some areas
PRD organizers were not performing their duties
of education
and organization and in effect were helping the
Balaguer
regime by their laxity.
Interview with Casimiro Castro,
Santo Domingo, July 14, 1972. For the official announcement
of the reorganization plan see El Nacional October
17, 1970.
,

35

The PRD has an extensive propaganda network.
Besides its radio programs over the Party station, Tribuna
Democratica and the little white booklets of Bosch's
thought, the Party has recently started publishing a monthly
journal titled Politica (which according to Rueben Suro is
doing very well)
Also the Party publishes a monthly bulletin which discusses the internal organization and policy
decisions of the PRD.
,

.
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thereby bring a certain
degree of respectability
and
increased legitimacy to
the opposition movement
and to the
Bosch thesis. ^6

The most advantageous
effect of the reorganisation
efforts of the PRD in the
post-19 70 election period
was to

create a spirit of enthusiasm
and discipline. 37 Even
though
the Bosch thesis continued
to be unpopular in
some quarters
of the Party hierarchy,
it was quite evident
that the principle of Popular Dictatorship
reinvigorated the PRD and fired
the minds of many youthful
PRD supporters, with the
Bosch
thesis serving as the center
of opposition strategy and
forming a picture of future
societal organization, the PRD
found new hope in its minority
position. Where the
ideal-

istic "Oposicion Creadora" and
the lackluster leadership of
Pena Gomez brought only dissension
and demoralization to the
PRD,

the thesis of Juan Bosch germinated
a will to defeat

the Balaguer regime and to implement
a truly democratic
system. Moreover the demands of
preparing the Dominican
36 As an example
of this decision to i ncorporate
dd
la ss su PP°rt for the Party see El Nacional.
July ?J ^-?
discusses the PRD’s attempts to initiate
J?'
.

so-called "medical fronts" or teams of
PRD-oriented doctors
who will set up clinics to aid the poor of
Santo Domingo.
37 Th e prd was
so "alive" in these days that I found
it extremely difficult to contact key Party leaders
because

tney were out organizing or installing a new
Party unit
somewhere in the campQ
In summer of 1972 when I was in
the Dominican Republic the newspapers were
constantly
reporting on the organizational efforts of the PRD.
.
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People for the Popular
Dictatorship also instilled
a quite
visible sense of discipline
and determination
within the
ranks of the Party. The
PRD gave off the
appearance of a
very patient, methodical,
political organisation that
was
working diligently to lay
the foundation for a
future takeover of national power.
P RD leaders after
1970 seemed quite
prepared to wait whatever
length of time until
conditions

were ripe for their ascension
to national power.
Bosch
supported this position by
stating the PRD would pick
and
choose its battles with Balaguer,
while continuing
its

educational and mobilization efforts
with the Dominican
people 38
The transformation of the PRD
after 1970 was so
thorough and complete that the Party
even broke away from
its ties with the Aprista movement.
Throughout its exile
period and its participation in the
ill-fated experiment in
democracy during the early sixties, the
PRD was always linked
with the democratic Left reform parties
or Aprista parties
that can be found in many Latin American
nations. With the
advent of the Bosch thesis, the PRD shifted
away from its

Aprista ties and moved toward

a

new level of radical acti-

vism that Party leaders claim is modeled after
the early
38

See El Nacional January 18, 1972 for the best
example of Bosch's "new" philosophy of opposition.
,
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National Revolutionary parties
such as the PRI of Mexico 39
Bosch himself has criticized
those like United States
scholar Robert Alexander for
suggesting
.

that the PRD was

indeed an Aprista type political
party . 49 To Bosch, the
PRD has left behind those
parties that still cling to
the
hope of building Anglo-American
style democracy in Latin
America. The PRD, under Bosch,
has seen the impossibility
of achieving representative
democracy in a Latin American
context and has responded by opting
for the model of revolu
tionary democracy which is more
conducive to the special
problems of an underdeveloped nation
like the Dominican
Republic
The Current Status of PRD Strategy

Despite the desire to assert itself as a
truly distinct and aggressive opposition political
party,
the PRD is

continually faced with the reality that President
Balaguer
is a popular and powerful leader.

The PRD, for all its

claims of increasing popularity, organizational
strength,
and ideological inventiveness, cannot avoid the fact
that
the Party is in a minority position, that its
leadership

refuses to compromise with the Balaguer regime and that
the
This link with the PRI of Mexico came as an answer
to a question I posed to Emmanuel Espinal about how he would
characterize the PRD as a political party in Latin America.
40
u

El Nacional

,

May 10, 1972.

PRO'S claim of future
control of Dominican
on the hope of somehow
being swept into power.

^
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The serious predicament
of the PRD was brought
home
vividly
early 1973 when the rebel
leader of the 1965
civil war, Caamano Deho,
led a small guerrilla
operation
into the Dominican
Republic that was quickly
snuffed out by
the military.
In brief, Caamaho Deno
and a group of some
nine or ten Cuban trained
guerrillas, landed on the
South
coast of the Dominican
Republic in the province of
Azua on
February 4, 1973. The landing
immediately was detected by
military patrols. President
Balaguer wasted no time in
responding to the "mini- invasion"
as he dispatched 2,000
troops to squelch the guerrillas
and instituted a near state
of seige.
Balaguer 's actions virtually
closed down the
major population centers and stifled
all political activity.
The importance of the invasion,
however, was not necessarily
that Caamano Deno had returned
to the Dominican Republic and
attempted to renew the 1965 civil war,
but that the Balaguer

m

administration sought to link the PRD to
the invasion and
charged Bosch and Pena Gomez as the main
organizers of the
landing.

Caamano Deno and seven of the other
guerrillas

were killed within weeks of the invasion,
but the PRD and
its leaders were subjected to intensive
harassment and
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pressure from the government. 41

Although the landing and its
ramifications on the
PRD will be discussed at
greater length throughout the
remainder of this thesis, it
is important at this
juncture
to point out that the Party
was severely damaged by this

mordent.

The solidarity that had been
achieved throughout
the 1970-72 period as a result
of the reorganisation campaign was negated by the anti-PRD
repression and harassment
that followed the abortive coup
attempt. The thesis of
popular dictatorship still remained as
the ultimate guideline and catalyst for political action
in the Party, but
the spirit of opposition was crushed
to the point where it
was most difficult to recognize any attempt
to expand or
refine strategy options.
Instead a new makeshift strategy
of simple survival surfaced and now seems
securely entrenched

within Party circles.

The PRD has become noticeably silent

and disorganized with no real plan for responding
to the

attacks of the government or for reconstructing a viable

opposition posture.
The failure of the Caamano Deno invasion and the

repressive measures meted out against the PRD not only

vividly point out the dilemmas of opposition party politics
in the

'democracy" of Joaquin Balaguer, but also express the

See El Caribe for the period from February 4, 1973
1973 when Bosch came out of hiding and "unofficially" ended the invasion controversy.
to May ,
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inappropriateness of Anglo-American
models for political
behavior
From a strictly American or
British point of view
it may seem very easy to
criticise the historical
development
of PRD opposition strategy
as ineffectual, overly
ideological
and simple wishful thinking.
To the PRD, however,
opposition
based on the Bosch thesis is
the only course the Party
feels
it can take. To oppose the
Balaguer regime on its terms by
participating in the legislature and
in elections would only
leave the Party open to government
harassment, intimidation
and probably embarrassment.
Moreover, by its participation
in the Balaguer political system
the PRD would
.

seem to be

giving legitimacy to all the corrupted
and anti-democratic
aspects of that system. In the mind of
the PRD its only
recourse is to make the Party and the
Dominican people as
best prepared as possible for what the
leadership hopes will
be another opportunity to revolutionize
the national political system.
The Party is in effect banking on the basic

instability of Dominican politics to bring it back
into
power.

There is no question that the PRD is living with a

dream of eventual victory, but to the Party leadership
opposition that is only geared to the present reality of Dominican politics seems fruitless and counter-productive.

Oppo-

sition of necessity must be future oriented and aimed at
creating a new democratic political system for the Dominican
people.

The predicament of the PRD is not an enviable one
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and can be viewed as
perhaps a hopeless one.
Candidly there
13 re3lly
littlS the P
can do to extricate
itself
from the stifling atmosphere
of present day
Dominican politics.
Whatever strategy it does
develop

^y

is fraughfc

danger and the promise of
Party dissension.

^

CHAPTER

IV

THE TACTICS OF Prd OPPOSITION
In the preceding chapter
we have seen the various
phases of opposition strategy
that the PRD passed through
as it sought to resist the
policies and actions of the
laguer regime.
In this chapter we will
examine the PRD

opposition more thoroughly by viewing
the wide array of
tactics employed by the Party in
order to implement the
Party s strategy decisions and to
respond to the numerous
campaigns of repression either initiated,
sponsored or
condoned by the Balaguer regime.
The tactics employed by a political
organization,

whether it be in political power or in
the opposition,
often times take a back seat to the overall
strategy decisions enunciated by individual leaders or
leadership groups
The theory and polemic of the strategy
pronouncements, like

Bosch's thesis, make more interesting reading and
contro-

versial discussion than an examination of the party's
tactical responses to government policy and action.
in the case of the PRD,

But

the tactics used by the Party to

register displeasure (and in some cases horror) with the

Balaguer government cannot be brushed aside.

The PRD

opposition tactics were not only the immediate challenges
133
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to governmental policies
and actions, but more
importantly,

they covered a wide range of
maneuvers which were designed
to achieve maximum protest,
nationwide education of the
citizenry and a curtailment, or at
least a compromise, of
adverse government policy-making.
A study of political
party opposition thus would indeed
be lacking if an examination of opposition strategy was not
complemented by an
indepth investigation of opposition
tactics. As we will
see, effective political opposition
in the Dominican Republic
boils down not so much to strategic decisions,
but
to the

choice of tactics and their implementation.

A party like

the PRD can designate a strategic framework
for opposition

and praise its vision and inventiveness, but
if it is going
to be successful in the role of opposition,

the party must

develop a gallery of aggressive tactical responses and
deploy them with determination and courage.
The opposition tactics used by the PRD early in the

post-1966 election period matched closely the spirit of
"loyal opposition" that "Oposicion Creadora" sought to

achieve.

Instead of badgering the Balaguer regime with a

continuous barrage of criticism and hostility, the PRD was

content to point out in a gentlemanly manner the course that
the newly elected president should take.

Juan Bosch met at

least four times with President Balaguer to present his

views on how the country should be guided after the 1965
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civil war. 1

Newspaper reports characterized
the meetings
as friendiy and intimated
that a loyal, cooperative
relationship was developing between
the two major political
leaders in the country.
In the legislature a guardedly
hopeful spirit was
also present as PRD Congressional
leaders were content to

introduce legislation and suggest
changes rather than to
criticize the President or his Reformista
legislative
majority. Only on matters of economic
policy such as wages
and benefits for the urban workers
did the PRD show early
signs of being angered by the policies of
the government.
Balaguer's austerity program, although an
economic necessity, hit hard at the urban workers.

But despite the PRD warnings over the austerity
program, the plight of the urban worker went
unrecognized
as the government pushed through its controls
on wages and

benefits.

^

The early refusal of the government to bend to

See the article by Georgie Anne Geyer reprinted
from the Miami Herald in Listin Diario (Santo Domingo)
June 13, 1966. Sacha Volman, a close friend of Bosch with
connections in the Balaguer camp and the United States
Embassy, was instrumental in arranging these meetings.
2

El Caribe July 6, 1966. The other crucial issue
over which the PRD was at odds with the Balaguer regime was
the reorganization efforts of the government in the sugar
industry.
The PRD opposition wanted the government to
diversify and move away from dependence on the one-crop sugar
industry. Balaguer for his part was interested in consolidating his power to control the sugar industry and to get as
much out of sugar as possible, even if that meant the development of a symbiotic relationship with the United States.
,
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the PRD demands on the
economic issues alerted
the Party
leadershxp and its legislative
bloc to the fruitlessness
of
conducting relations with a
government that was not
interested in consultation and
compromise.

The honeymoon between both
major political forces,
as shown above, ended
quite soon after President
Balaguer’
took office. Although the
uncooperative and undemocratic
practices of the government only
strengthened the belief of
the PRD that the Balaguer
regime was indeed
corrupt, the

attempted fire-bomb assassination
of the PRD Senator Juan
Pablo Casimiro Castro in a downtown
Santo Domingo street
severely shook the Party leadership
and forced it out of its
lethargy. 3 casimiro Castro, at
the time of the assassination attempt, was perhaps the second
most popular
figure in

the Party and certainly one of the
finest examples of a

responsible legislator that Dominican
democracy will ever
see.
Casimiro Castro had become unofficial
spokesman of the
PRD
the Dominican Congress and had worked
hard to introduce legislation that would provide for the
desperately poor
of the country.
In fact Casimiro Castro was one of the few
Congressmen to listen to the wishes and perform services

m

for

his constituents.

Thus because of his stature in the PRD

3

Casimiro Castro was riding in a cab on a Santo
Domingo street when an unidentified assassin threw a phosphorous bomb in the car
Two other persons in the cab were
killed, while Casimiro was burned on the right side of his
.

body.
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and i„ the Dominican
Congress, the attack on
Casimiro was
viewed as an attack not
only on the Party, but
on Dominican
democracy itself. The PRD
felt it had to register
some kind
Of protest.

The PRD decided on the
tactic of the legislative
walk-out as the most visible
means of showing the Dominican
people and Balaguer the
seriousness of the attack. 4
The
legislative walk-out came as
somewhat of a blow to the Balaguer regime as the government
was interested at this early
date in creating a semblance
of democratic procedure and
legitimacy. On a number of occasions
the President urged
the PRD legislative bloc to
return to the Congress and resume
its duties. 5 For its part, the
PRD held out until guarantees
were made that the terror against
the Party would
cease.

After a series of meetings between the
PRD leaders
and the President, the Party leaders
seemed satisfied that
they had made their point and that
attacks against
Party

activists would be curtailed.

As a result, the PRD delega-

tion returned to the Congress on May 26th
after over two
weeks of protest.
It is interesting to note that the PRD

legislative delegation was not in full agreement over
the
Party's return to the Congress. The majority consensus
at

m

The legislative walk— out received extensive coverage
the Dominican press.
See El Nacional May 9, 1967.
,

5 See

El Nacional

,

May

8

and 16, 1967.
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thxs early date was that
the Party could accomplish
more by
being present in the Senate
and the Chamber of Deputies.
PRD legislative dissidents
expressed skepticism over Balaguer s ability to control
the terrorist forces in
the
country and the overall wisdom
of lending legitimacy to
the
present political system. 6 The
PRD legislative dissidents
revealed perhaps the first real
questioning within the PRD
of the participation strategy
to which the Party was

adhering
The opposition tactic of the
legislative walk-out

was used a number of times after
the Casimiro Castro incident to express PRD displeasure over
the internal political
situation in the Dominican Republic. The
PRD left the
Congress to register complaints about
general government

harassment of Party activists, the closing of
the Party
radio station, and the irresponsibility of
the Reformista
majority in the legislature. The most serious of
the walkouts,

though, occurred in April, 1969 when again the PRD

retired from the legislature because of the increased
level
of violence that was present in the country.
to the 1967 walk— out,

7

As opposed

the PRD in 1969 was at the end of its

rope due to seemingly endless attacks on Party activists.
^

E1 Nacional May 26, 1967.
Deputy Luis Vargas
from Puerto Plata surfaced as the spokesman of the dissident group.
,

7 E1

Nacional

,

April 15, 1969.
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The Rxght-wing violence
reached such an intensity
during
thxs period that the
PRD threatened to
remain out of the
legislature permanently.
P reslden t Balaguer
again made his
cursory promises of security
and shifted a few
National
Police officials. The
PM,. however, could
accept
gestures as genuine or
sufficient.

^

^

Rather than remain an
inactive legislative delegation during the walk-out,
the PRD congressmen
formed educational •'car pools" that
traveled all over the
countryside
informing the residents of
the terror being meted
out against
the PRD opposition. 8
Casimiro Castro, (now healthy,
but
scarred for life) Pena Gomez,
Senator Gil Morales, Deputy
Emmanuel Espinal and other
Congressmen drove to as many towns
and hamlets as possible in a
show of force and courage.
The
PRD delegation eventually did
return to the Dominican Congress for the final session before
the 1970 elections,
although some legislators refused
to finish up their required
term.

As the 1970 elections neared the
PRD legislative bloc
no longer harbored any hopes that
the Party could function
effectively and safely in the Dominican
Republic. The legislators had done everything possible in
their term to perform
as responsible Senators and Deputies.

When obstacles were

placed in their way, the Congressmen responded
as beat they
could through the walk-outs and various
propaganda efforts.
8 E1

Nacional

,

October

2,

1969.
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Despite these efforts
the PRD legislators
realized that
there was really nothing
they could do from
within the
system to counteract the
policies of the Balaguer
regime.
The plight of the PRD
legislators was but a microcosm of the dilemma the
Party was in as a whole.
The PRD
was faced with a governing
regime that would not recognize
the rights and responsibilities
of the opposition

party.
The problem for the PRD
thus became how best to
respond to
this glaring neglect of
democratic procedure. Obviously
the legislature was not the
proper arena to challenge the
Balaguer regime. A new tactic
would have to be implemented
that would stir up the public
to recognize the illegitimacy
Of Balaguer' s political system.

The new major opposition tactic
that came to the
forefront of attention within the PRD
was electoral abstention.
Fueled by the disparaging views of Juan
Bosch toward
democracy in the Dominican Republic, the
PRD leadership saw
abstention as the only viable means of registering
dissent.
Electoral abstention seemed just the right
tactic for exposing the illegality of the Balaguer regime
and for showing
the world the shallowness of its support.

Through electoral

abstention the PRD felt that it could move on the
offensive
and pressure Balaguer to respect the influence of the
Party
in the Dominican Republic.

With the large numbers of PRD

supporters in the nation, and what was termed a large mass

of "latent" support,
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the Party leadership
was optimistic
hat the tactic of
electoral abstention
would succeed in
establishing a strong
bargaining position for
the Party.
The desire, first, to
abstain from the 1968 municipal election was a
critical one for the Party.
Many pro
moderates felt the Party
would lose whatever influence
it
held in the political
arena by relinquishing its
electoral
role. 9 But despite these
warnings of the potentially
serious consequences of abstention,
the followers of Bosch's
position prevailed. The
majority of PRD leaders were
not
about to lend support to the
Balaguer regime by participating in an election that was
tinged with such great violence and illegality. Even if
the PRD did participate and
did win sizeable majorities.
Party leaders reasoned that an

electoral victory would be worthless
since the Balaguer
government was not about to permit
the mayors and the city
councils to function effectively.

When the May municipal elections
were held, the
proponents of the abstention policy claimed
victory.
The
official election results showed that
some 415,573 Dominicans abstained from the voting, the bulk
of that figure
9

Casimiro Castro termed the abstention policy
to curtail the
movement toward electoral boycott.
„

.

mcapaz" and led the fight within the PRD
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coming from a reported
27% abstention rate in
the interior
of the country. 10

Although the PRD could claim a
moral victory as a
result of the abstention rate,
it must be
stated that the

determination of abstention is a
point of conflict in the
Dominican Republic. A truly
scientific count of the electoral abstention is extremely
difficult to achieve due to
the problems of separating an
indifferent
from an inten-

tional boycott, accurately accounting
for newly enfranchised
voters, determining the extent
that votes for other minor
parties were cast as a form of protest
against the Balaguer
government, and finally clearly deciphering
whether those
who boycotted the vote would have actually
cast their ballot
for the PRD, if the Party did participate.
To compound the difficulties with determining
the

rate of electoral abstention in 1968, some
officials of the
PRD stated that abstention was in reality
in the neighborhood
of 750,000 votes. 11

The reasoning behind this claim was that

there are between 1.5 million to
in the Dominican Republic.

was tabulated

2

million eligible voters

When the total vote cast in 1968

approximately 957,480

— it

was not unreasonable

to speculate that perhaps more than the 415,573 figure
stated
10 Ahora

,

May 27, 1968, pp. 4-6.

11 E1 Caribe
May 19,
,

1968.
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by the Central Election
Board abstained from
the
elections. 12 Unfortunately
for the PRD position,
no Party
spokesman mentioned the
fact that 1968 was an
off-year, nonpresidential election in which
normally a lower voter
turnout
is expected.
Yet despite such a disclaimer,
there is evidence that the Party was
justified in holding its
ground on
the extent of abstention.

One crucial aspect of
Dominican electoral politics
that may bolster the PRD's
claim of extensive abstention
in
1968 is the fact that voting
is formally a national duty
and
informally an act that, if
neglected, can have profound
implications for the Dominican citizen.
Dominican law states
specifically that citizens eighteen
or married are eligible
to vote.
Failure to vote is punishable by a
fine of one to
two hundred pesos.
Only those seventy years of age,
those
living more than one hundred kilometers
from the nearest
polling place, and those who are physically
unable to vote
are exempt.

But besides these legal requirements, most
Dominicans feel social pressure to vote.

On voting day all citi-

zens are asked to dip their finger in ink
and have their

forehand shaved as a sign that they participated
in the
electoral process.
12 The
.

believe
PRD.

They are thus visibly marked as not only

argument simply boils down to who do you
Balaguer's electoral committee or Bosch and the
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voting, but as legitimising
the shape of Dominican
democracy.
To abstain from such a process
can mean criticism from their

peer group and, worse yet,
trouble from the police and the
13
military.
Thus for some 400,000 Dominicans
officially to

abstain in 1968 seems to show that
a sizeable number of
citizens were willing to place aside
national duty, social
ostracism and possible police harassment
in order to register
objection with the Balaguer regime.

Because of the great controversy over the
success of
the abstention in 1968, the extent of
the boycott can also
be seen from other perspectives.
In 16 out of 26 provinces
in the nation the abstention rate was
such that Balaguer
Partido Ref ormista actually lost considerable
electoral
'

su PP or t,

even though the party was victorious overall.

To

show the probable extent of electoral abstention, the
popular vote from ten of the Dominican Republic's largest
urban

centers is listed below by political party.

As a means of

better understanding the rate with which Dominicans stayed

away from the polls, the 1968 figures are compared with the
1966 voter turnout both by individual party and in total. 14
13 Car

registration forms and emigration visas are
also connected with participation in the electoral process.
14

These figures are from tabulations reported in
El Caribe May 16, 1968.
,

,
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TABLE

1

COMPARISON OF VOTER TURNOUT
IN THE
1968 AND 1966 ELECTIONS

District and Party
1.

PRSC
Total

165,623

91,128

248,528

10, 313

165, 623

101,441

4,047

14,971

PRD- -147,087
17, 086

23,161

19,558

22,011

32,808

42,372

15,895

20, 785

13,039
"17,086

9,946
6,783
2,829
19,558

8,260

18,847
13,961
32,808

30,807
1,240
32,047

8,945
6, 950

10,903

Moca

Reformista
PRSC
Total
5

100,118
44,314
8,432
8,316
4,443

Barahona
Reformista
Independente

4

Total Vote
1968
1966

Higuey
Reformista
Frente Indp.
Higueyano
Total

3

1966

National
Santo Domingo and
vicinity

Reformista
PRSC
MODACAPI*
MPR**
MIPCM***
Total
2.

Year
1968

Nagua

Reformista
Movimiento Indp.
Total

IS7W5
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Table l--Continued

District and Party
6.

Year
1968

25,467

32, 246

37,081

52,527

27,581

33,189

83,358

95,303

39,686

59,426

22,530

29,141
7,940
37,081

33,427
1,154
34,581

21, 794

22,952

San Juan Maquana

Reformista
PRSC
Total
9.

1966

San Cristobal

Reformista
PRSC
Total
8.

Total Vote
1968

Puerto Plata
Reformista
17,693
Mov. Engrandeciento
Popular
4,889
Union Puerto Platena 1,743
PRSC
1,142
Total
25,467

7.

1966

5,787
27,581

Santiago
Reformista
Mov. Todo por
Santiago
Mov. Candidatura
Conciliatoria
PRSC
Total

39,881

60,206

18,564
22,793
2,120
83,358

10. La Vega

Reformista
Agrupacion Indp.
Vegano
PRSC
Total

20,396

33,363

16, 578

2,712
39,686

*Movimiento de Accion Capitalena Indp.
**Movimiento Republica Dominicana.
***Movimiento Independente
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As these election figures
graphically point out, in
eight of the ten cities the
Reformista vote

was less in 1968
than in 1966 (the National
District and Barahona being the
exceptions). 15 what happened in
five of the eight cities
where the Reformistas lost support
is that independent
political parties sprung up in an
attempt to stymie a PR
landslide. Although the independent
party movement was
successful in only one of the ten cities,
these makeshift
organizations were able to take a considerable
amount of
voter support away from the Reformistas.
It is not known
exactly how much PRD support was registered
through these
independent parties, but political analysts
feel that there
was some shifting of PRD allegiance to the
small parties. 16

Perhaps the most significant figures from the
ten cities is
the total vote returns. What these figures
point to is a

quite considerable drop in voter turnout ranging from
82,805
in the National District to 11,940 in Santiago, the
second

largest city to 19,750 in La Vega, the third largest city.
~*One can indeed state that the 1968 election was an
off-year contest and thus did not attract voters, but the
PRD clings strongly to the belief that the low turnout was
due to massive abstentions by Dominican voters.
In fact in
conversations with Emmanuel Espinal at the time of my visit,
the PRD press secretary tried to support his case by stating
that United States Embassy officials who were watching the
polls during these elections told him (Espinal) that abstention was definitely a factor.
1 fi

Reuben Suro told me that there was large PRD
support in these independent parties.
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Again it is extremely difficult
to confidently describe
these losses as abstentions,
but they certainly do point
to
a lack of interest in
voting and a significant
loss of
Reformists support. When a
governing political party loses
159,112 votes from its 1966 total
national vote total
(759,887 in 1966 to 600,775 in
1968) and over 400,000 are
officially designated as political
abstainers, then the only
conclusion that can be arrived at
is that the Partido Reformists of President Balaguer could
not be characterized as a
party with a secure hold in Dominican
politics.
In fact the
1968 elections raised grave doubts
about Balaguer' s aspirations in 1970 and fired the minds of
the pro-abstentionist
PRD activists.

Even though the abstention figures were
impressive,
and the PRD seemed to have made a vivid
comment on the questionable popularity of the Balaguer regime,
the tactic of

boycotting the municipal election was not without
its drawbacks.
The abstention did indeed make a point about support
for Balaguer'

s

"democracy" in the Dominican Republic, but the

fact remained that the Reformistas took over 54 of
the country

s

city and town governments and all the patronage power

that went with those governmental positions.

The PRD, which

once held a strong position in many of the municipalities of
the Dominican Republic, was relegated to an outsider's role

without any power or patronage.

The PRD reveled in its
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boycott victory by running
a two-page advertisement
stating
eople have won.
Although the advertisement
suggests
that the people had registered
a political protest
of massive
proportions, the PRD moved one
step closer to a final
rejection of the Dominican
political system.
Despite the evident drawbacks
that an abstention
policy can bring to an opposition
political

party, the prd

continued to implement this policy
in 1970. Again this decision brought anguished cries
from PRD stalwarts like Casimiro
Castro.
In 1970, as in 1968, the voices
of Juan Bosch and
Peha Gomez carried more weight
than that of Casimiro
Castro.

As Bosch stated,

"to go to the polls is betrayal."

The silent protest that

achieved

m

Bosch was seeking was again

the 1970 presidential elections,
although the

PRD was expecting a much broader
response than it actually
did receive. Where the 1968 elections
revealed a definite
and widespread decline in Refomista support,
the 1970

figures showed Balaguer regaining some of the
support he
lost in 1968, while other opposition parties

like the MIDA,

MCN, and the PQD made significant inroads into
the total

anti-Balaguer vote.

Using 1966 as the base year for voting

turnout comparisons, the 1970 turnout was 1,159,841 as com-

pared to the 1966 figure of 1,345,404.

Balaguer himself

received 152,170 votes less than in his first term victory.
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As on 1968, precise
analysis of voter abstention
is difficult,
but again the PRD placed
the figure around
whxle Balaguer made a
statement that abstention in
19 70 was
much less than he expected.
In order to again make
a cursory
judgement on the extent of
abstention, the draining of
Balaguer 's popularity, and the
steadfastness of the PRD

^

support,
the following table compares
the vote totals for the
major
parties in the same ten cities
for the years 1966, 1968 and
17
1970.

The electoral figures of 1966,
1968 and 1970 in Table
2 point out that President
Balaguer regained a solid portion
of the popular support that
did not surface in 1968. Only
Moca was the 1970 vote total for
the Reformista ticket
lower than in 1968.
In all the other nine cities the
Balaguer forces made significant advances over
their performance
in 1968.
Also in the plus category for the Balaguer
sup-

m

porters was the increasing rate of citizen
participation in
the voting process.
After the dismal showing of their party
in 1968,

the Reformistas were anxious to determine the
depth

of their support.
17 The

May 18, 1970.

figures in Table

2

are from Listin Diario
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The final political party
vote totals for the 1970
presidential election, according
to official government
figures , are as follows:

Partido
Partido
Partido
Partido
Partido
Partido
Total

Reformista
Movimiento de Int. Democratica
Quisqueyano Democratica
Revolucionario Social Cristiano
Movimiento de Cone. Nacional
Movimiento Macional de la Juventud
1,

607,717
240,557
153,591
58,949
51,039
47,988
159 841
,

To best understand the extent of
voter participation
in the 1970 elections, it is
beneficial to make a comparison
with the 1966 totals.
In each of the ten cities tested
the
voter turnout for 1970, in most instances,
matched quite
closely the 1966 total. There is no
question that by comparing the 1966 and 1970 voter turnout
figures one can
safely speculate that abstention was still
an integral part
of Dominican electoral behavior. 18

But at the same time, by

using official election results, it appears that
electoral

participation in 1970 showed signs of returning to previous
levels of citizen voting.

PRD leaders would surely quarrel

with such a conclusion and have told me that abstention was
heavy in 1970 and greatly underestimated by political
18 For a
good account of this controversy over the

1970 abstention rate see James Nelson Goodsell's article
"Dominican Election Hardens Political Polarity" in The
Christian Science Monitor May 25, 1970.
,
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analysts.

The official record,
however, is the only
guide
to electoral participation
in 1970 and it points
to a
decrease in the Dominican
citizens' desire to boycott
national elections. 20

Whether the published figures
were correct or the
electoral analysis erroneous,
the PRD again took pride
in
its base of citizen support,
despite the government's campaign of repression. The PRD
reasoned that the high abstention rate in 1968 and 1970
acted as a reminder to Balaguer
of his tenuous position in
Dominican politics and society.
Yet in the face of this optimism,
the PRD could not ignore
the fact that the Party was no
longer represented in any

polxtrcally powerful offices in the
country.

The abstention

of 1970 finalized the break with
the Dominican political
system.
The PRD was truly in opposition.

With the PRD out of elective office
and the Party
leadership increasingly opposed to
participation in a representative democracy the PRD turned to other
opposition
,

As in 1968 the PRD placed observers at the
numerous electoral "mesas" in the country in an
verify their claim of widespread abstention. Theattempt to
Party
also sought to legitimize its claim by stating
again that
independent observers (unidentified United States foreiqn
service officers) verified the fact that abstention was
indeed widespread. Unfortunately, none of these claims
were
ever substantiated.
20 For

an overall view of the 1970 election and the
problems of abstention and voting in the Dominican Republic
see Howard Wiarda's "Dominican Republic:
The Fuse Still
Sputters," unpublished paper, 1970.
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tactics to register protest
against the Balaguer regime.
Juan Bosch, upon his return
to the Dominican Republic
in
1970, sought to bait Balaguer
through his nationally famous
radio broadcasts. Bosch had
always been adept at rousing
the Dominican people with his
noontime radio speeches, but
as a result of the three-year
absence of the PRD leader,
the Party lost its most potent
and effective opposition
weapon. When Bosch came back to
the Dominican Republic for
the 1970 elections, the country
once again could turn on
their radios and hear the political
haranges of perhaps
their nation's greatest charismatic
leader.
Bosch is a

master of political attack as his broadcasts
never fail to
recite the evils of the Balaguer regime,
the sad state of

the Dominican economy, and the glories
of the PRD.

From

1970 onward the Bosch radio programs were
one of the main

opposition channels used by the PRD to attack the
Balaguer
government.
The radio haranges of Bosch, although many times

merely Party rhetoric, were most effective in forcing the
government to answer the charges made by the PRD or to
speed up action on a particular proposal that the Party saw
as urgent.

President Balaguer often felt that it was neces-

sary to answer the charges of Bosch, a gesture which only

pointed to the importance of the broadcasts and their
expected impact on the Dominican citizenry.

The use of
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radio polemics may seem a
weak opposition tactic in
face of
the overpowering political
machine that President Balaguer
has at his command, but
in the Dominican Republic
these
shows serve as one of the
best means of attacking the
govern
ment and also spotlighting the
PRD's real strength— Juan
Bosch. As proof of the radio
speeches importance to Dominican society and to the PRD, one
need only watch the number
of Dominicans who turn their
radios on at noontime
to hear

the words of Juan Bosch. 21

where legislative participation

failed and electoral abstention struck
deep at the Party's
political power, the noontime radio speeches
of Juan Bosch
kept the Party visible, retained citizen
interest in the
PRD and its policies, and, most important
of all, forced

Balaguer to answer his accusers.
In conjunction with the stress placed on the
radio

attacks of Juan Bosch, the PRD, especially after
1970,

attempted to focus world opinion on the extreme terror
and
harassment of the Balaguer regime by staging parades,
threatening strikes and organizing vigilante groups.

Ever

since the 1966 presidential elections, the PRD had been the

target of governmental sponsored or governmental condoned
repression.

But in 1970 and 1971 the terror increased to

such an extent that the PRD felt drastic measures had to be
2i It is
interesting to note that on occasion Bosch's
radio show has been sponsored by Coca-Cola, one of those

imperialistic economic concerns that the PRD constantly
attacks
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taken if the Party was to
survive.

Roving bands of youth

lied La Banda (ex-MPD thugs
who were bought off or pardoned by the National Police
and conservative businessmen
111 exohan< e f or
3
violent services) were responsible
for
numerous attacks on PRD activists
and the destruction of
Party property. Even associations
supportive of the PRD r
such as the taxi and dock workers
unions, were subject to
terrorist attacks. As usual the
9,000 men National Police
force seemed unable to control the
youths.
The PRD did not wait for the Balaguer
government to
curtail the terror, but instead took
the initiative with a
number of tactics designed to either stop
the violence or

make the Dominican citizenry and the world
conscious of what
was going on in the country. The PRD,
under the leadership
of Pena Gomez, staged a number of
parades in the Dominican
Republic and in the United States (New York and
Washington,
D.C.)

as one means of forcing Balaguer to crack down
on the

perpetrators of terror. 22

Although on a number of occasions

the Balaguer government frequently refused to allow
the Party
to have a parade permit,

the PRD persisted in its demand for

a show of force and usually won the right to parade.

The

"manif estaciones" of the PRD were quite successful as the

Party was often able to interest large numbers of people in
22 For more about the
Washington,
Nacional , August 25, 1971.

D.C. parade see El
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marching against the Balaguer
regime. One such parade
in
1970 was estimated at
10,000 people with some 2,000
cars
blocking the streets of Santo
Domingo. 2 !
The PRD also made some effort
to conduct one day
general strikes in the country
as another means of focusing
attention on the internal condition
in the country.
This
call for a general strike,
although supported
by the Party,

never really was stressed by
the PRD leadership. The strike
effort thus received only minimum
attention and interest
from the Party. There were
incidents of general strikes in
Santo Domingo, San Cristobal, and
Las Minas, but the PRD did
not appear to be the central motivating
force behind these
efforts. 24
As the terror in the country increased
and Dominican

Leftists became daily victims of La Banda
violence, the PRD
leadership decided to become more forceful in
its opposition
tactics.
The PRD, at one point, threatened to start neigh-

borhood vigilante committees as a means of protecting
PRD
supporters from Right-wing terrorism.

Arrasada

The policy of "Tierra

or "Clean Earth" was proclaimed by the PRD as its

answer to La Banda

.

The vigilante committees were to be

^

23 Bosch termed the
demonstration a "march of
silence." See El Nacional , March 15, 1970.
24 E1

Nacional

,

December

25 Ibid., November
16,

9

and 15, 1970.

1969.
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organized through the local
PRD barrio headquarters
and
would be responsible to the
Party hierarchy. Th e
policy of
"Tierra Arrasada" was not clear
on the matter of how the
vigilante groups would protect
themselves or how they would
attempt to quell terrorist activity.
But the importance
of

"Tierra Arrasada" was not so
much in its implementation,
since there is no real evidence of
the movement actually
getting off the ground. Rather the
importance of the vigi
lante groups can be found in the
unwillingness of the PRD
to sit idly by and merely criticize
the Balaguer government
for its lack of protection,
with the development of the

"Tierra Arrasada" plan opposition to
government supported
terror took on militant perspective.

As evidence of the PRD

'

s

increased militancy toward

the terror in Dominican society, the Party
complemented its

outward demonstrations against repression with a determined
effort to stir up world opinion. ^6

Juan Bosch claimed that

the PRD had amicable relations with some seventy-six
polit—
ical parties throughout Europe and the developing countries.

Using these parties as public opinion springboards, the PRD

hoped to focus the attention of powerful governments, especia lly the United States,
2 fi

(since Balaguer depended heavily on

As an example of this propaganda policy see the
article on Dominican violence in Boletin Internacional
Socialista November -Dec ember, 1971, p. 83.
,

^^ffcd States
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£lid

and the sugar
quota,

on the violence
and
repression in the Dominican
27
Republic.
The public relations
efforts of the prd
appeared to
ave contributed
somewhat to the decline
of political violence and the arrest
of sizeable numbers
of the La Banda
group,
united states newspapers
became aware of the
internal
situation in the Dominican
Republic and sent reporters
to
check out the allegations.
„ ajor United Stat£s
the N^or^imes, the
and the Miami
Herald published scathing
attacks on the Balaguer
regime's
inability to control the
rampant violence. 2 8 within

^

days Qf

these exposes,

Luanda

activity was curtailed as
Balaguer 's
new chief of the National
Police, Gen. Neit Nivar
Seijas,
made a determined effort to
jail the terrorists and
red out
their supporters within the
military ranks, prd leaders
felt
that where Party pressure
had failed, the ploy of
arousing
world opinion had forced Balaguer
to get his military supporters
line so as not to jeopardize
U.S .-Dominican

m

^ osc k

n his travels to Europe spoke at
9reS eS in Sweden and had conferences
with
Socialist l °H r ^ n
manY: It iS alleged
some
orjhe PRD thftb the PRD
pRD receives ,financial aid from observers
the
Fod ? dabi °n, an organization connected
with
tne
the Social Democratic
Dem^
Party
Germany.
n

•

^-

•

i.

C C

1

m

28

See A. Kent MacDougall's expose in
the Wall Strppt
Journal, September 7, 1971 as an
example of the uSTted State s
la 9 u r s "democracy" that surfaced
altel Bosch
?
decidedd fc ° Seek
OUt orld opinion on the internal situation
Y
in
Pho n m n Can Republ:LC
xt is no secret now that the United
States n, p P re |sure on Balaguer to
tone down the repression
dul^nn the La Banda period.
during

f

'

-

-
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relations.

Terrorist activity against
the PRD and members
of Left-leaning organizations
continues in the Dominican
Republic, but the public
relations activities of the
Party
have proven to be a useful
tool in forcing the Balaguer
regime to recognize the economic
and international ramifications of government supported
violence.
The PRD's arsenal of opposition
tactics, despite the
Party's quite visible increase in
militancy, has never
included violent revolutionary action.
Party leaders stress
the fact that the PRD is a revolutionary
organization that
will come to power not by guerrilla
campaigns, but by widespread recruiting and educational efforts,
intelligent use
of opposition resources, and a firm
belief that the opportunity to regain power will be afforded the
Party.
Furthermore, the PRD leadership has realistically
appraised the

internal situation within the country and has seen
that the
basic ingredients for effective guerrilla activity
are not

present in the Dominican Republic.
In the first place, the Dominican armed forces and

National Police are well trained and equipped.

Military aid

and training from the United States and a huge budget (30%)
has made the armed forces a formidable adversary for any

guerrilla group.

Secondly, the Dominican Republic is small

enough that guerrilla activities on the scale of Cuba or

Bolivia would not benefit from large uninhabited regions.

T e Dominican shore
line is well protected
as army

^
164

^

unrts are stationed
throughout the country.
A number of
invasions against the
Trujillo regime and the
recent Caamaho
Deflo invasion near
San Cristobal failed
because the guerrillas were easily spotted
and defeated. 29 Finally
the
,
internal climate is. such in
the Dominican Republic
that popular support for a guerrilla
invasion would be questionable
The "era of Balaguer" has
brought the Dominican
people a
reasonable amount of peace and
prosperity. There
is thus no

reason to believe that these
gains would be placed in
danger
by efforts once again to
gather arms and renew the
revolutionary effort. As far as
traditional PRD thinking is concerned, the route of guerrilla
activity to attain political
power is not recognized as a
viable alternative
to the

present course of preparing the
nation for the Dictatorship
with Popular Support. The Party
may acknowledge the example
of Castro or Guevarra and praise
the successes of Cuba's
revolution, but the PRD does not seem
to be interested in
paying the price for violent revolutionary
change.

This view of non-violent revolution
within the

leadership ranks of the PRD may have to be
further analyzed
29

The Caamano guerrillas felt that they had stronq
support from the PRD and its leadership and thus
were led to
1:L Ve
once
the Dominican Republic they could begin
!??
n
the second revolution." Both Bosch and Pena
Gomez deny such
a tacit understanding and the fact that
the rebels received
no popular support once in the country seems
to substantiate
the view that the invasion was an exercise in
delusion.
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in light of the 1973
invasion and its
aftermath.

The

Balaguer government claimed
that the invasion
was planned
and conducted under
the leadership of Juan
Bosch and Peha
Gomez, 30 an<3 was
movement Qf aggression
legitimate government" of
the Dominican Republic.
Because
of such a view, the
.government sought out Bosch
and Peha
Gomez as the criminal
perpetrators of the plot.
Both Bosch
and Pena G6mez denied the
charges of Balaguer stating

^

that
ey had no hand in the
planning or execution of the
guerrilla landing. Despite
these denials some observers
suggest
that there were contacts
between the PRD and the
guerrillas,
especially through Peha G6mez.31
After the landingj even
Bosch seemed to move beyond the
traditional PRD position
toward overt revolutionary activity
by stating the Party,
"has thousands of members who
have had military instruction
and experience since they took
part in the revolution of
April, 1965." Bosch further solidified
his position as a

newfound proponent of revolutionary
activity by claiming the
PRD was prepared to continue
clandestine struggle against
the Balaguer regime. 32 The a i leged
activities of Peha Gomez
See the Times of the Americas , April
31 There
^ eas ^

1973.

4,

is some evidence available which suggests

Gomez might have had sporadic contact
with the Caamano Deno group, but not enough
to set up a full
VOlUtl0nary situation
See Latin America February
i n??
1973.

32

-

See the Times of the Americas

,

,

February 21, 1973.
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nd the increasingly
belligerent comments of
Juan Bosch
should not be interpreted
as meaning the PHD
has decided
on violence as the
only means left for
achieving national
political power. But what
these words and actions
do point
out is that as the hold
of the Balaguer
regime grows more
secure, the PRO finds
itself assuming the role
of ..outlaw"
opposition and continually
being bached into a
corner, with
this condition intensifying
rather than abating, it
should
not be surprising to see
the Party, or at least
elements in
the Party, begin to accept
the option of violent
revolution.
The strategies that the PRD
developed to guide its
opposition and the tactics that
it employed to register
its
opposition have, as we have seen,
been dictated by the shape
and tenor of politics in
Balaguer" s Dominican Republic.
The
necessity for restructuring the
Party's strategy positions
with respect to the Balaguer
regime and the intensification
of its tactical responses
point to the quandry that the PRD
IS
as the major opposition force
in Dominican politics.
As the Party views its position
in contemporary Dominican
society, there is really not much
more the leadership can do
short of advocating revolution to
create the atmosphere it
believes is necessary for a new Dominican
society.
It is not
the PRD that will have to change, it
is rather the "rules of
politics" as played in the Dominican Republic
that will have

m

to readjust so that
modernization can be brought
to all

societal groups and legitimate
dissent can be registered
without fear of retribution.

CHAPTER

v

INTERNAL PARTY POLITICS
in THE PRD; THE
PROBLEMS
OF DISSENSION,
FACTIONALISM AND SEPARATION
Political parties in power,
despite their external
appearance of strength and
self-assurance, are in
reaUty
highly fragile organisations.
Parties in positions of
national dominance are deeply
influenced by a complexity
of
political circumstances,
ideological positions and
personal
interactions which force them
to constantly reevaluate
and

readjust their status vis-a-vis
the groups that are in
opposition. Dominant political
parties thus often function
in a state of flux as the
element of power politics
places
them into conflict situations
that many

times threaten their

unity and continued hold on
the reins of national government.

When the discussion of parties,
however, shifts to
the internal condition of the
opposition organization,
the

above view does not change, but
rather is amplified. Opposition parties also seek to exude the
sense of confidence
and dynamism that attracts voters
and intimidates the

governing regime.

But behind this facade of unity and

vigor, opposition parties often times
reveal deep inner
conflicts that create disruptive factionalism
and threaten
the eventual destruction of the party
structure.
168
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Because of the inherent
dangers
angers thatthat can arise once
a po ltical party
is in a secondary
power position, this
chapter will be concerned
with investigating
the history of
internal politics within
the PRD leadership
structure.
Th e
maj ° r emPhaSiS ° f tWS
*iU
on examining two
crucial areas of party,
activity:
an examination of
( 1
the
ideological and tactical
disputes that caused
divisions i„
the PRD since 19 66, and
(2) a general analysis
of the PRD
organization touching especially
on the questions of
factionalism, discipline and
cohesiveness, and the relationship
.

.

^

,

developed between members of
the leadership cadre.
Internal Party Disputes
The critical problems within
the PRD leadership did
not develop until Juan Bosch
left for Europe to write his
controversial thesis on Dictatorship
with Popular Support.
Prior to Bosch's departure the
Party was mainly concerned
with analyzing the June electoral
loss to Balaguer and
reviewing its newly acquired
opposition status in the Dominican political system. By
October, though, with the convening of the Congress (in which
the PRD was for the first
time a minority) and the drafting
of the new Balaguer constitution, activity within the Party
increased. In its
national convention the PRD took the first
steps toward

revitalizing the Party apparatus by naming a
new executive

^

committee and pledging
. massive
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in the convention
Juan Bosch, as a
prelu<Je tQ his
ecision to leave the
country, stepped down
f rom his posi .
-n as president of the Party
and left the control
of the
-sanitation in the hands of
Peha Gdmez.

Bosch did accept

e title of "asesor"
end stated that the
Prd was in a SQlid

position as an opposition
force and not rife
with dissension
and Left-wing fanaticism
as some
,e journalist*
.
journalistic interpretations
had suggested. 2 The
PRD, on the eve of
Bosch's exit from the
Dominican political scene,
thus tried to give off
the appearance that it was on the
road to recovery and
filled with
organizational enthusiasm.
The external observations
of
disorder and conflict in
the Party, according to
official
PRD statements, were
merely the signs of change
•

and increas-

ing strength.

The prd was a dynamic
party in a period of
introspection and reformation.

Despite Bosch's positive view
of party organization,
long standing personal
antagonisms and disagreements
over
ideology and policy were
brought out into the open.
Conservative PRD leaders such as
Martinez Francisco and Jose Brea
Pena sharply criticized what
they felt was a visible shifting
tOWard Leftist ideology under
the tutelage of
Pefia

••See

1966

.

El Nacional

,

Gdmez.

October 24th through October 29th,

2
C
tated that the PRD was not in the
throes of
factional
?^ but
H, f was
ctionalism
engaging in a new form of organizing.
.
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Martinez and Brea claimed
that the PRD membership
was
predominantly moderate and
completely against the
leadership
course taken by Pena
Gomez
The two dissident
leaders
stated further that if
the PRD continued
to advocate a "hardline” toward the Balaguer
regime, they had no
choice but to
form their own "ortodox"
prd as a means of
preserving the
Party s traditional
democratic values.
•

Martinez and Brea did offer
the radical PRD leadership some room with which
to bargain by pledging
to curtail
their efforts at creating
another party if the PRD
sought
the resignation of such
prominent leaders as Jottin
Cury
and Rafa Gamundi (and if
possible Pena Gomez as well).

With these men out of the
picture, the "ortodoxos" (as
they
came to be called) hoped to
keep the PRD within the
boundaries of its "Oposicion Creadora”
strategy, instead of moving
oward radical political opposition
as suggested
by Bosch

and Pena Gomez.

It must be emphasized that
both Martinez

and Brea were strong advocates
of the cooperative approach
toward opposition and went so far
as to accept positions in

Nacional , November 3, 1966 and December 2 i q ce
UallY C ailne that the PRD was bein infil9
trated
t?ated by
bv the
the^Communists
i
a had
and
to be purified.
Martinez'
laim is not far-fetched as there has
long been knowledge
of Communist infiltration of the PRD
labor sector.
?

e

'

C

-

4

Ahora, January 23, 1967. The so-called
deal was
made at a meeting between the "ortodoxos"
and the Party
regulars set up by Manuel Fernandez Marmol,
the
officer of the PRD at that time and a supporter political
of a moderate opposition stance.
Needless to say the request of the
ortodoxos was never recognized.
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the Balaguer cabinet
while still members of
the pRD 5
Martinez and Brea were
not alone in their
crusade
for party refer, along
moderate, if not blatantly
collaborationist, lines,
influential PRD leaders like
Jose Molina
Urena, Enriquillo del Rosario
Caballos, Jaime Acosta
Torres
and Juan Casanovas Garrido-all
PRD leaders from its
early
days in 1962-expressed doubt
over the "emotionalism"
of
the new leadership and its
inability to face the "reality"
of politics in the Dominican
Republic. Molina Urena, who
was Speaker of the House during
Bosch's presidency, (and
who eventually accepted a
position as the Dominican representative to the United Nations)
candidly criticized the
_

radical drift in the PRD.

Molina stated the Party should

be more realistic in its opposition
stance and hinted that
some form of collaboration with
the Balaguer regime was
sound policy.
It was not surprising that the PRD
leadership looked

with great disfavor on the actions and
statements of men
like Martinez, Brea and Molina. The
discipline committee
of the PRD, upon hearing of this movement
to create a rival

Martinez Francisco was appointed Secretary of
Finance and Brea Pena was named Secretary of Industry
and
Commerce. Both Martinez Francisco and Brea Pena have
long
been considered the closest contacts of the PRD in the
United States Embassy.
£
°

El Nacional

,

January

7,

1967.

^
^

^
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party and reacting
against
collaboration Qf
" lth thS BalagUer
9-errunent, promptly
expelled the "ortodoxos" from their ranks.
expulsions
^
O an Others that
participation in efforts
to change the
Party's opposition
policies would meet with
a quick exit
from the membership,
ranks. 7

^

_

^

Although the "ortodoxos"
could point to what
seemed
to be substantial high
level support

among old line P RD fig .

ures, the effort to
redirect the Party away
from its radical
stance was orchestrated by
Martinez and Brea. Both
worked

tirelessly to make their
position known within the
Party.
Their main objective was
to call an "ortodox"
convention
which would serve as the arena
for their charges that
the
leadership of Pena Gomez was
ruining the political future
of the PRD. Needless to
say both dissident leaders
ran into
considerable difficulty in their
efforts at forming an
"ortodox" convention. There were
recorded instances of
fights breaking out between local
PRD barrio organizers and
representatives of the Martinez-Brea
group. 8 Despite these
obstacles, Martinez and Brea continued
their organization
7
E 1 Caribe , February 3, 1967.
Both Molina Urena
and. Rosario Caballos were expelled
from the Party, while
orres Acosta was suspended for a year.
At an earlier
e ln
M? rtinez Francisco was expelled and Brea
y
Peha
auit the
th» Party
p
?
quit
support of his friend.

m

8

E1 Nacional

,

October 15, 1967.

and educational
campaign to hri.n as
g
many moderate prd
activists into their
ranks as possible.
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in order to achieve
their goal of setting
up a

national, convention
and eventually a
rival PRD, Martinet
and
rea hoped to entice
the PRD

C—

,

leader of Santiago,
Antonio
a former cabinet
minister in the Bosch

^

1963 and a would-be
compromise candidate for
president during
1965 rSVOlUti0n ' int
°
~nks. Guzman was a
powerful
figure
the Party and could be
influential in switching
the
Power base of the PRD away
from the radical element
in Santo

“

^

m

Domingo
The work of Martinez and
Brea to secure Guzman's
support went to naught as
the Santiago leader refused
to
associate himself with the
dissident movement. Undaunted,
however, by this serious
setback, the reform convention
was
held on December 3, 1967 in
Santiago. 9 Martinez and Brea
played up the meeting as a
significant challenge to the
regular PRD organization, but
in reality the attempt to
set
up a counter structure failed
dismally. The PRD organization held firm behind Pena Gomez
and saw the conservative9 Ibid.,

November 30, 1967. Martinez boasted at the
th
nt challenge that had been directed
a r?he
e Regular
regular PRD,
pro but
but°th
there was never any doubt that th^
V n 10n W S a weak Response to
the course that the Party
had t v
Un a
a
6mSZ
Many PRD
took pleasure
?
in t£e def
f
° f Majftinez since he had been a
hated
figure
?
in the D
31 " 00 hi ® all< ed collaboration with
?9
the
conservative military
mT^t
elements in the 1965 civil war
a

fVr

-

,
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collaborationist policies of
the "ortodoxos" as
selfdefeating and a oakery
of all the Party stood
for in Dominican society.

Although the "ortodox"
movement was never able
to
get off the ground, the
efforts of Martinez and

Brea to turn
the PRD away from its
radical stance were not
totally in
varn.
In August of 1967 the PRD
added three moderate
members
to an expanded Executive
1
Committee.
Virgilio Maynardi
Reina, Manuel Emilio Ledesma
Perez and Jacobo Majluta,
all
with some inclination toward
the "ortodox" position,
assumed
')

influential positions within the
PRD hierarchy. The official rationale offered by the
Party was that the PRD, in

order to remain a cohesive and
active opposition force, had
to "modify" some of its
views. But published reports
point
to the fact that moderates
within the PRD leadership
pres-

sured Pena GSmez to accept the
three new members as the only
acceptable alternative to save the Party
from disastrous
factional disputes. 11
Pena Gomez, for his part, reluctantly
agreed to the
new additions stating that it was necessary
to include three

moderates in the Executive Committee "who do not
frighten
the oligarchy.

"

Probably the best analysis of the Pena

*

Gomez decision comes from the Dominican Communist
Party
10
1:L

Ahora, August
Ibid.

7,

1967.

(PCD)

which speculated that
the PRD leader was
forced to
make the Executive
Committee additions because
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middle-class
Supporters of the Party were
threatening to hold back
financial aid if the Party did
not modify its ideological
positrons.
The moderate changes
agreed to by Pena Gomez
revealed that the PRD was
in the midst of a
serious internal
dispute that questioned the
authority of the leadership
and
the opposition strategies
of the Party. The
efforts
of

Martinez and Brea to challenge
the PRD may have failed,
but
their movement for moderation
refused
to die.

The initial

compromise with the moderate-conservative
elements was but
the beginning of a long
struggle for control of the
Party
and the guidance of its
opposition capabilities and strategies
The news of the change in the
PRD Executive Com-

mittee greatly angered Juan Bosch.

From his home in Spain

Bosch promptly rejected the title
of "asesor" and expressed
disgust that the PRD had bowed to
conservative pressure. 13
Bosch s vehement criticism of the new
developments in the
PRD sent Pena Gomez on an emergency
trip to Europe to meet
with Bosch and analyze the deteriorating
situation within
12

E 1 Na cional
June 16, 1967. Obviously the
PCD recognized at an early date that the
PRD was
pressure from moderate middle class contributors receiving
to tone
down its radical rhetoric.
,

13

Ibid., August

irrevocable

.

3,

1967.

Bosch termed his decision

the leadership
cadre of the Party
ry
.

„

r:

6

leadSrS

Party

^

diStinCt

orming.

*

—
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^

The ta
t lks
between the

^

evident

of two groups

Where the Party
hierarchy
unconcerned attitude
toward the efforts of
the
° SCh an<3 PSna G°meZ
Seemed iuereasingly
disturbed by the
growing sentiment for
moderation in the Party's
opposition
approach.
The Bosch-Pena Gomez
talks proved vitally
important
to the future of the
P RD
Juan Bosch , realizing
Pressure that Peha Somez
was under from moderate
elements in
the Party, came to the
aid of the young leader
and used his
considerable influence in
the Party to sway the
membership
toward radical opposition.
But besides Bosch's
pledge of
increased involvement in
everyday party affairs, the
task of
radicalizing the PRD rank and
file was made much easier
by
the mounting repression
against party activists and
the
obvious failure of democratic
institutions, with the normal
avenues of opposition politics
being increasingly closed to
the Party through repression
and terror, radical alternatives
registering political dissent
were given more and more of
a hearing within the PRD.
.

^

The primary radical alternative
that Bosch and Pena
Gomez worked tirelessly to
implement was electoral abstention.
Both Party leaders felt that where
legislative action.
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legal procedure and
cooperation with the
governs had
faiied to curb the excesses
of the Balaguer
regime, a sizeable drop i„ voter turnout
in the 1963 municipal
elections
would embarrass the government
and reveal the true
strength
of the PRD.
The call for electoral
abstention was not an
easy step to take since
much more was at stake for
the PRD
than merely making a point
about the popularity of
Balaguer.
The boycott held serious
implications for the future of
the
Party and its role as an
opposition force in Dominican
politics.
The plea for the electoral
boycott by Bosch and PeSa
G6mez was designed to go beyond
its stated goal of showing
Balaguer' s lack of public support,
abstention was seen as
laying the groundwork for divorcing
the PRD from participation in the Dominican political
system.
The two radical
leaders felt that if they could be
successful in convincing
the PRD membership to accept the
abstention policy, the
first step would have been taken towards
redirecting the
Party away from tacit acceptance of the
Balaguer regime to

revolutionary opposition which aimed at ridding
Dominican
society of his government.
Because of the long range implications of the
abstention policy favored by Bosch and Pena Gomez,
the PRD
became embroiled in its most serious internal
confrontation
as an opposition party.

m

The tension that had been building

the Party since the days of the "ortodox" movement came
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faCe and be9an
Separatin 9 the membership
into two
s
camps
The main battleground
for deciding
the
merits of the abstention
policy and for viewing
the formation and conflict of
the opposing groups
in the

: ;::r

^

.

1968 and 19 70 party
conventions.

pro „ as in

In both these
Party

meetings the question of
abstention and the more
general
problem of Bosch's desire
to ..cleanse" the
PRD of its Anglo _
American democratic
ideological baggage and
allegiance
received extensive airings.
In the 1968 convention
the
opposition to the abstention
policy centered around
Pernando
Silie Gaton and Casimiro
Castro. 14 silie Gat6n
quesUoned
the openness of the
convention charging that the
abstention
policy was being pushed through
the meeting without

taking
into consideration the wide
opposition to the policy in
the
ranks of the PRD. He called
for a new convention,
preferably outside of Santo Domingo,
so that the pro-Bosch
forces
centered in the capital city
could not influence the proceedings.^ Casimiro Castro
supported Silie Gatin's move
by citing the f act that although
the pro-abstention group
14 E1

Caribe

March

,

2,

1968.

A
i
ern iS emer in 3 in which the moderP
ate forces
rces within the
^L
pp^ recognize 9
PRD
that one of the kev wave
J?
r Ct the Party ±S tD have the
base
P°wer
mSv^from°sfn?o Domingo
n
to Santiago, a smaller, more conTerlttUrTnil
e
lft
cities supposedly would have
f^
created
eated a differdifferent climate
for making Party decisions.
-

+-
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claimed to have two
hundred Party tenders
in favor of the
electors boycott, the
anti-abstention group
also claimed
°
3 Smilar nm" ber °
f su PP ort ers.

^

In the end, how-

e efforts of Silie
and

Casimiro were fruitless
as
the pressure piaced
by Bosch and Pena
Gomes was forceful
enough to convince
a ma jo rity of the Party
over tQ
the side of abstention.
The forces of electoral
participation may have lost, but
they took consolation
in the fact
that abstention was not
voted on unanimously and
that Bosch'
power was being questioned
on a more frequent basis.
The conflict between
the supporters of active
participation in the present
political system in the
Dominican
Republic and the followers of
Bosch’s

*****

popular dictatorship

alternative was by no means
resolved in the 1968 convention.
The disputed abstention
level in the municipal
elections
(anywhere from 400,000 to
750,000) coupled with the moderate
view in the PRD that the Party
had missed a golden opportunity to establish a firm
foothold in Dominican politics
caused serious disruptions within
the leadership
ranks.

In
the two years between the
1968 elections and the Party's
1970 convention the two opposing
groups fired verbal salvos

each other

s

position.

On a number of occasions Casimiro

Castro decried the political ramifications
of an electoral
boycott. He stated that further
abstention would mean the

"death of the Party
ty. " l6
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ak 0
.
Abstention
+.

4

to Casimiro
might

function effectively as
a statement of
puoiic
public disgust
dis
, with
_ _
Balaguer regime, but
from the standpoint
of pol i tics
and party organisation,
abstention could only
ham per the
internal strength of the
PHD and weaken its
position and
popularity in Dominican
society.
.

.

,

Bosch and Peha Gomes,
for their part,
constantly
chided the naivete of
the proponents of
democratic participation. Participation in
a Dominican

election, in their
opinion, would only support
the farce of democracy
that
Balaguer had created and,
worse yet, make PRD
candidates
and workers welcome targets
for Right-wing gunmen.
To Bosch
and Pena Gomes the boycott
was the only avenue of
opposition
open to the Party; any
system supporting alternatives
would
severely compromise the status
of the Party as an enemy
of
the Balaguer regime and a
model of revolutionary change.

Although the supporters of
abstention were led by
the PRD's two major leaders,
the moderate wing of the Party
was not without strong spokesmen
and considerable backing
from the rank and file.
Casimiro Castro
emerged after the

1968 convention as the definitive
spokesman of the pro-

democratic forces in the PRD.

Casimiro, unlike Martinez

Francisco and Brea Pena, was a figure
of some influence in
the country and certainly in the
Party.
He had been the
16Ahora

,

July 15, 1968.
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only dominant politic*
figure to come out
Qf
pQor
Pedernales reg lon In the
Dominican Southwest
oubt one of the most
respected figures In
the country.
The key, though, to
Casimiro's influence was
his position
as the number three
man in the PRO hierarchy
behind Bosch
and Pena G 6mez.l7 The
supporters Qf
participatiQn
P ° litiCal SySte “ Were thus not
led by second or third
level members of the Party
whose power in PRO
leadership
circles was limited.
Rather those party members
who felt it
necessary to participate in
Dominican electoral politics
were led by a figure of
national importance and
substantial
political standing who spoke
convincingly and courageously
in favor of moderation.

^
^^

“

^

^

Casimiro was joined in his battle
with the advocates
of abstention by other high
PRD officials. Washington
de
Pena,

the head of the Party
organization in Santo Domingo

and a former president of the
Party in 1962, the legislators
Luis Vargas, Lovat6n Pittaluga
and Gil Morales, and the onetime political officer of the
Party, Fernandez Marmol, to
name but a few, all expressed
allegiance to the view that
As will be discussed later the Party
leaders are
extremely reluctant to place a "power
value" on individual
members.
Theoretically every member of the PRD hierarchy
is
supposed to be equal, yet Party leaders
state emphatically
m r °- UP t0 at 1SaSt 1971 Was the thir ^
most
imDorSni
important ^
decision-maker
the PRD behind Bosch and Pena
,

m

'

e PRD should not
move away from its
traditionally
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democratic mold.

With the ranhs of the
anti-abstention
advocates gaming increasing
influential support,
Bosch
and Pena Gomez recognized

that their drive to
radicalize
the PRO WO uid be
difficult and might
possibly cause permanent divisions in the
Party.
Sensing the potential
power
°f the Casimiro Castro
group, Bosch and Peiia
Gomez sought
to convince the
moderates that their
opposition to abstention was harmful to the
Party. Their please
for unity fell
on deaf ears.
The PRO showed distinct
signs of a polarized
leadership structure.

Despite the dangers inherent
in challenging the
policy decisions of Bosch and
Peha Gomez, the moderates
con
tinned their campaign of
hostility toward abstention
and
What they perceived as its
wider ramifications for
future
PRD opposition. In at least
two instances in 1968 and
1969
Washington de Pena openly called
for the expulsion of Bosch
from the PRD. 8 De Pena felt
that not only was Bosch's
popular dictatorship stance
detrimental to the success of
the PRD as a viable opposition,
but that his absence from
the Dominican Republic was having
a deleterious effect on
18 E1 Nacional,
December 15, 1968 and May 12, 1969
S
96 al
that B sch had interfered in the poli?
tics of base committees, which
.

n

probably means that he was
usiL
hHs considerable influence
using his
to sway the membership
P
into accepting the abstention policy.

arty morale.

De Pena begged Bosch

fcQ

^^^^
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the pro which he saw
as revealing a „
ramshackle qual ty _„ 19
The expulsion moves
of Washington de Pen
a cannot be
considered .die threats that
only sought to scare
Bosch. There
xs ample evidence that
numerous members of the
PRD were also
contemplating sacking Bosch
and electing a new
leader.20
Fortunately for Bosch these
expulsion efforts were
not successful, yet they did point
out that elements with
the PRD
.

organization seriously questioned
the radical policies
of
the present leadership.
The challenges to Bosch's
authority did not stop
with the overt moves to drop
him from the leadership
ranks.
As it became clear that the
PRD and Juan Bosch would
most
probably not participate in the
1970 presidential elections,
influential members of the moderate
group in the Party
pushed for what became known as
"hybrid" candidates to carry
the PRD banner in place of Bosch.
Three primary "hybridcandidates surfaced before the election.
Rafael Bonnelly
(former member of the six-man junta
which ran the Dominican
Republic in 1961-62) Hector Garcia-Godoy
(the provisional
,

s interesting to note that De
Pena's election
to be the chief PRD leader in the
National District was
hotly contested. De Pena eventually won
over his opponent
®
ma gin but his victory was certainly no
consolaf and
j
tion to Bosch
Pena Gomez. See El Nacional. August 2R.
1967 and September 2, 1967.
-*-

.

20 El Nacional

,

January

2

,

1970
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ot

“•

*««,
u<5 ci ,
and Julio Castafios
Espaillat (former
rector of the
Autonomous University
of Santo Domingo)

u

_^^^

certain prd moderates
to assume the Party's
candidacy 21
"hybrid" candidacy of
Bonnelly was the most
fluently
iscussed since his campaign
manager, Manolo Bordas,
worked
vigorously to gather
moderate PRD support for
his man.
The
Deputy Luis Vargas and
Casimiro Castro maneuvered
guietly
behind the scenes for
Garcla-Godoy and Castahos
Espaillat,

respectively, in an attempt
to see just how much
support
there was for such an
open challenge to the
leadership of
duan Bosch. 22 The whole „
hybrid „

^^^

publicity that it generated,
never really posed a
threat to
the leadership of Juan
Bosch.
The substitution

of proxy
candidates for Juan Bosch did
reveal the level of
antagonism
toward his policies and the
extent of opposition that
the
moderate group would employ
to register its displeasure
with
the strategic a nd tactical
route the PRD was

following.

21SeS
1969.

^

efforts
and°

artioles

March

3,

1969 and October 13,

ST"

Dominican peopie as a possible PRD
candidate
for president
Promptly called off his participation in the'trfp
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The extent of power
that the moderate
group could
generate was perhaps best
seen at the crucial
1 970 P arty
convention. Held in February,
1970, the fifth national
meeting of the Party brought
together 306 delegates
from
98 municipalities plus
New York and Caracas.
The importance
of the convention
centered in the attempt by
Bosch and Pena
Gomez to once again gain
Party acceptance of the
abstention
Policy.
1970, however, Bosch and Peha
G6mez also sought
to gain official recognition
of the controversial
"Dictatorship with Popular support"
thesis which, if passe d,
would
totally reorder the policies
and goals of

m

the PRD.

In a stormy convention the
moderates led by Casi-

miro Castro were not able to
withstand the continuing
pressure for electoral abstention
within the rank and file
membership. But in a stunning blow
to Bosch his prize
thesis received only token acceptance
by the Party membership and was not given official
status as the
central ideo

logical position of the PRD.

For the record, the final

decision of the thesis was put aside for
six months to a
year as Casimiro's forces were able to
gather upwards of
100 delegates who were opposed to the
radical concept of

popular dictatorship 23

Pena Gomez expressed displeasure

.

with the decision but felt confident that the
thesis would

receive official recognition.
23 Ahora
March
be unanimous to pass.
,

9,

1970.

The Bosch thesis did

The vote would have had to
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rm ma

servers the center of discussion
when
9rty

'

S

fUt

e 15 raiSed

><ta ^

the topic of
the

NSVerthele -- opposition
to the
concept of "Dictatorship
with Popular Support"
“pport has remained
vigorous as moderates
refuse tn
ho assoclat
t0 be
ed with any for™
„
of dictatorship.
"
’

7

.

The 1970 national
convention marked the
high point
Of dissension within
the ranks of the PRD
Afte r the February me eti„ g the
controversies that had
been so do™inant
ln PartY ° irCleS
SUbSided ** to two
central factors.
In
the first place, the
level of violence against
opposition
activists increased
substantially.
The daily terror tactics
of the L^Banda groups
and the National Police
strengthened
Bosch's claim that the
moderate, system-supporting
position
taken by individuals like
Casimiro Castro was wishful
thinking and a hollow response
to the oppression that
was slowly
destroying the Party organisation
from without. As the arm
of government-supported
violence touched larger numbers
of
PRD workers, the Party
leadership was able to convince
more
and more of its membership
that active, radical resistance
outside of the present political
system was the only possible opposition route for the
Party.
.

Secondly, Bosch and Pena Gomez
launched the previously discussed reorganization
campaign of 1971. The
primary aim of this effort was to
strengthen the PRD's

^

opposition status by creating
a totally new
eternal party structure.
The most interesting
facet of
the organizational
campaign, though, was
not so much the
formation of a rejuvenated
PRD, but the
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subtle shifts of

power that it caused within
the Party hierarchy,
under the
gurse of vitalizing the
fledging PRD organizational

structure, Bosch and Pena Gomez
were able to sift out or
demote
some of their harshest
critics.

Probably one of the more visible
signs of the BoschPeha Gomez desire to silence
internal Party dissent through
the vehicle of reorganization
was the demotion of both
Casimiro Castro and Washington de
Peha.
l n the case of CasimirO' he rained a voting
member in the newly structured
Executive Committee that was formed
in 19 71 and was often
seen working actively at Party
headquarters and
in the

cam£o.

But with the Party shake-up gaining
more momentum,
Casimiro was called upon less frequently
to formulate
policy.

4

His cautious political pragmatism
was no longer

Afte
19 ?° elections Casimiro's stock both
Dnlifin
an
5 flnan( iall
1
and
y declined.
Politically Casimiro
r
nn
on at ?least one occasion
stormed out of a Party meetinq in
lsgust over the direction that opposition
strategy had
taken.
Casimiro still spends time in the Party
headquarters
r
a U
a popular figure, but many sources
questioned
tu l he
u
?° loi? ger is the third most important figure in
the Party
Financially Casimiro has run into difficulty.
Most people agree he has no income, except
what he makes
tutoring students.
I once saw him teaching a class in a
downtown Santo Domingo bar. Casimiro still maintains
that
jovial attitude and deep concern for his Party and
his
country, but he seems to have left the mainstream
of power.

^

.

9

"^
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Viable

-

«" repression that the
pRD was experiencing
almost daily. Washington
de Pena met
even a worse late as
a result of the
reorganisation.
De
Pena was taken out of
his position as head
of the prd in
the National District
and replaced by Pedro
Franco Badie,
a less vigorous
opponent of Bosch and the
"new" look in Ihe
Party.
So complete was the
censure of de Pe£a that
the onetrme critic of the
radical wing was not
even included as a
member of the National
Executive Committee.
While men like Casimiro
Castro and Washington
de
Peha were being dropped
from positions of power,
Juan Bosch
and Pena Gomez were
solidifying their own power
base in the
newly designed Permanent
(Standing) Commission which
they
ormed as the major decision-making
body in the PRD organizational structure. The
Commission, until recently,
was
headed by both Bosch and Pe£a
G6mez and included either new
supporters of the radical opposition
approach like Rafael
Alburquerque Castro (secretary of
organization) and Rafael
Antonio Luna (labor organizer) or
individuals like Castahos
Espaillat, Jose Joaquin Bido Medina
and Antonio Abreu Flores
whose formidable position in Dominican
society gave the
Party a sense of middle class
legitimacy.
It should be emphasized at this
point that the Party
leaders are very reluctant to place
a "power value" on certain members of the Standing Commission.
The PRD tries to

^
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create the impression
that power g held
democratic basis amo„
g aix .embers, and that
no one individual is a dominant
force. 25 Ne vertheiess,
it is conmon
nowledge both in and
out of PRD circles
that the reorganization efforts
strengthened Bosch's hold
on the Party and
increased the number, of
radical supporters in
positions of
importance. P RD leaders
~
like Casta os
Medina and Abreu Flores
may be seen frequently
in the newspapers, and thus appear
as key policy-makers
in the Party.
The Party role, however,
of these men is largely
public
relations (recruiting new
members and opening up new
Party
headquarters, and is not as
important as that of Bosch
and
Pena Gomez and the two
radicals added to the CommissionAlburquerque and Luna. 26
.

^^

^

In the thirty-two man/woman
National Executive Committee structure as of July,
1972, (see the following list)
it is still possible to find
the names of the moderate
25
In

an interview in Santo Domingo,
July 9 197?
1
PRD PrSSS secLtary
the
of my
to th
y ™sit t
th^D
b C
i
n h
Pi
do^
Sde thH^iSonf?"
e' P
\^t\o n
,
U
“
t
PRD ±S 9 maSS P^ty w^h"
no reafpowe?
„; f L

'-^

a

or^^

L

^

LS

tL
“

'

s?ructur^

26

n

*

SP1 a alS<? intimated in his conversations
with me that
th^? although
^+-H
? ^
Castanos Espaillat was on the Standina
Commission and an important figure in
the
recognized voice of authority in the Party Party he was not a
and did not know
Y UC ab ° Ut lntarnal Part Y politics. Although
he did not
sav it M nnY
characterizing Castanos as a middle class
egitimizer of the PRD and not a hard and
fast activist. He
rty late and was never in
ch
the

iit^:rpoiitics?

-

Juan Bosch
Jose PranciBco Peba
Dr. Rafael Abinader G6mez
Dr. Antonio Abreu
Flores

President
Secretary General
Member

Fliif A^r^rqae 6

II

II

Castro

Dr!

Ba " tista Alcantara
qUln Bid6 “edina
Ofe]f» p'
urelia
Caceres
U
CastaSos Espaillat
Pablo
1 Casirairo Castro
Tir.'
Die.
Hatuey de Camps
Emmanuel Espinal
Manuel A. Fernandez
Marmol
Dr. Mario Garcia
Alvarado
Dr. Secundino Gil
Morales
r Almanzor Gonzalez
Canahuate
Silvestre Antonio Guzman
Dr Juan Lopez
1 0 Bovat6n Pittaluga
RafaJ^aAntonio
?
Rafael
Luna
Jose Mariano Pena
Dr. Gilberto Martinez
Dr. Bienvenido Mejia
Mejia
Dr. Bartolome Moquete y
Andino
Dr. Milagros Ortiz de
Basanta
Dr. Leonor Sanchez
Baret
Dr. Santos Sena Perez
Dr. Aristides Victoria
Jose

II

II

Dr'

II

II

II

RaL^T

II

II

II

II

II

II

II

II

II

.

II

II

II

II

II

II

II

II

II

tf

M EMBERS of the PE RMANENT
(STANDING) COMMISSION
Juan Bosch
President
Jose Francisco Pena G6mez
Secretary
General
Dr. Antonio Abreu Flores
Member
Dr. Rafael Alburquergue
Castro
Dr. Jose Joaquin Bido Medina
Dr. Julio Cesar Castanos
Espaillat
Rafael Antonio Luna

grouping in the Prd
like raciV'
Casuniro, Fernandez
Marmol
Morales and L ovaton
Pittaluga,

—

^^

: r
woe,

d that of the
Nationai

has decreased
markedly.

ri

^

^ ittee

e c0

as

The National
tee is mandated
to meet ever, three
months «the Permat
meetS
« »eeh, and tabes
on primarily
the dutres of a Party
forum for discussion
and a leg itimi26r ° f POUOy deCiSi
° nS
«- s even-man Permanent Commrssion reaches. Rece
ntly, with Bosch and
Peha Gomes underground after the Caamano
Deno invasion, the
National Executive Committee served
as the interim
leadership of the Party
and handled the daily
affairs of organisation.

—

—

Despite these recent signs
of activity and influence, the National
Executive Committee is
basically a democratic "fixture." It has
often been used by Bosch
to show
the openness of the PRD
and its diverse
organisational
Structure.
In reality the committee
has

shown itself to
be a repository for many
old line moderate Party
functionaries who do not share
Bosch's radical ideas of
politics
and Change in present day
Dominican Republic. The real
power, as stated before,
is controlled by a much
smaller
group of individuals in the
Permanent Commission who support
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Bosch and his thesis
of "Diet
3 fnr uDictatorship
with Popular
Support. "27

6 V1S a ' V1S the
Permanent (Standi
^)

Commission set
off the
th most recent and
potentially
P
ntially adangerous
conflict
wit hin the PKO
organization. The
fireworks startefl
osc h made preparations
to come out of
hiding after almost
6 months of alluding
police patrols
the abortive guerrilla
landing of Caamaho
Deho.
It seems
that while Bosch and
Peha Gomez were
underground, the moderate elements in the
Party were active again.
There was
renewed speculation that
the PRO might jo in
other opposition
parties in a "united front"
for the 1974 presidential
elections. Also leading
moderates like Casimiro
Castro were
seen in the company of
other opposition leaders
like the
Trujillo assassin Luis Amiama
Tio, presumably to
discuss
plans for such a "united
front." 28

^

^

^

™“

0
i
ates frequently ^"especially
ee fluc u '
?
now f r^relulf
ult of the Caamano
invasion and the repercussi nnQ
t-hHJ
This listing is correct up
Part ^
?S ju?v
nce that tlme
the PRD added two new
members
list--Diomedes Mercedes
and Eclides Gutierrez Felix
bofh^a
*
h lawyers and both arrested
'
and later relea <Jd ?n Z.®
landin 9Although the membership dSes
shift^mos^of'
™
^
0
f
the
individuals
listed on paqe 191 still ° CCupy
prominent Positions in the
PRD leadership.

^

'

•

28

EiCa£ibg, May 5, 1973.
was merely making a social
call.

Later Casimiro said he

^
^^

It was not long
before Bosch got w
in<J of
man6UVerS an<3 Pr °mPtly
Casimi r o from the
Party
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along with four other
prominent
stated that the official
policy of the PRD
prohibits anyone
m en3a9ing in talkS
With ° th
opposition groups without
J°
he consent of the Party
hierarchy. Bosch also
too* the
opportunity to reaffirm his
abhorence to opposition
unity
saying that no party or
group
y
P of parties is going to
"lead"
29
the PRD

-

.

Along with the expulsion
of Casimiro and the
others
and the reaffirmation by
Bosch of the PRD's
continuation as
an autonomous opposition
to the Balaguer
regime, there was

another development which,
in a sense, revealed
the extent
and depth of internal
maneuvering within the Party
leadership group. Two members
of the National Executive
Committee, Pedro Franco Badie and
Jacobo Majluta, were suspended
by Bosch for allegedly
criticizing the decisions of
the
Permanent Commission. Although
these charges were not amplified by Party spokesmen, it
appears that both men were disturbed by the power that Bosch
had assumed and the dictatorial manner in which he was
directing the Party 30
.

The suspension of Franco Badie and
Jacobo Majluta
opened up the floodgates of controversy
and thrust the PRD
into a serious organizational dispute.
In a surprising and
29 Ibid.

30

Ibid.

shoo ki „ g move

Peria

G6mez resigned from
his position
General Secretary of
the Party statin,
that his decision
was " irrevocable
T he reason for
Pena Gdme, resi
g nation
was twofold. Eirstly,
Peha was disturbed
over the tensive
ousecleanmg that Bosch had
undertaken. P eSa wanted
to
place limits on the.
expulsion and suspension
of Party leaders.
Without mentioning names
he said that the PRD
was
doing too much purging
and as a result was
losing "men of
merlt -"
WaS <3 uite obvious that
the youthful Party
leader was becoming aware
that the PRD could not
retain a
mass based quality if it
was constantly expelling
popular
Party activists.

^

“

But more importantly than
his questioning of the
expulsions and suspensions,
Peha Gomes openly attacked

the

democratic nature of the PRD
hierarchy.
i„ a frank statement to the press PeAa called
the decisions of the Permanent Commission "illegal."
He further commented that the
Permanent Commission was elected
in an "irregular manner"
which negated any chance of making
major decisions openly
and equally as Party statutes
demand. 32 Peha's solution
to this problem was that the
PRD had to expand the powers
of the Executive Committee and make
the Standing Commission
more responsive to the dictates of
Party assemblies.
31 Ibid.
32 El Caribe

,

May 12, 1973.
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*he resignation of
Peha G 6mez held
£ar ranging
xmp .catxons for
the Party and for
the leadership
capabiliJuan Bosch
at the heart ° f
pe£a G6m -'
the organizational
structure of the Pro
was a direct
attach on the increasing
power that duan Bosch
was accumuatl n g - Rath6r than
retain ^e democratic
framework that
the PRO had long adhered
,
tQ/
G mez saw BQsch
the present crisis
situation to assume more
power and
cleanse the Party of major
opponents.
It was as if Bosch
had decided to implement
his "Dictatorship with
Popular
Support" not from a position
of political dominance,
but
from a position of increasing
weakness. The criticism
of
Pena G6mez was perhaps
most important because it
brought to
center stage the question of
how far ideological purity
can
go before the PRD becomes
a Party bereft of
organization
diversity and shifts to one of
total "personalismo. " Bosch
has always disliked those
who oppose his radical
policies
from within the Party. This
recent attempt, however, to
cleanse the Party and bolster his
position heightened the
level of conflict in the PRD and
cast grave doubts on the

^^sm

'

;;;

^

^

quality of leadership in the upper
levels of the organization.

As for Bosch, he minimized the
resignation of Pena
Gomez saying that the Russian revolution
lost Trotsky and
the Chinese revolution lost Lin Piao
and still moved forward
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toward success.

What Bosch unfortunately
failed to
understand in his allusion
to the Russian and
Chinese revoutrons was that the
leaders of those
movements were not
only ideologues, hut
practical proponents of
armed conflict
who left their theories
and desires for purity
behind and
created the revolution.
To the dismay of many
in the PRD the story
of intraParty factionalism does not
end with the resignation
of Pena
Gomez and the power
politics of Juan Bosch.
The conflicts
that arose in May of
1973 continued on into
the year.
Eventually pressure built up
in the Party for the
reinstatement
of Casimiro and the
others who had felt the
wrath of Juan
Bosch.
The reinstatement, unfortunately,
did nothing to
heal the wounds in the PRD.
at the heart of the problem
facing the Party after the
Caamaho Deno fiasco was the
question of the 1974 presidential
elections and the desire by
many moderates in the PRD to
join in the previously mentioned "united front."

As the PRD moved closer in
September and October to
finalizing a coalition agreement
with the PRSC, the pqd and

MIDA (and eight other minor parties)
Juan Bosch and the
radical wing of the PRD became increasingly
opposed to a
united front" approach. Bosch had
earlier

given his reluc-

tant approval to exploratory talks
on the coalition, but as

sentiment built up for this
alternative, he slowly
away.

3

The end result of Bosch's
opposition to the coalition
was his startling decision
to quit the PRD and
form his own
Party. 34 After thirty-five
years of leadership in the
PRD
Bosch founded the Dominican
Liberation Party (pld) in
November, 1973.
The PLD is made up primarily
of Left-wing supporters of Bosch like the former
number three man in
the
PRD, Rafael Alburquerque
and Antonio Luna, the labor
organizer.
Bosch was unable to bring over
some key members of

the PRD like Casimiro Castro,
Maximo Lovat<Sn Pittaluga,

Ambiorex Diaz Estrella (head of the
Party in Santiago)
Fernandez Marmol, Castahos Espaillat

,

and surprisingly, Pena

Gomez. 35

Pena Gomez, in fact, resurfaced
after the break
with Bosch as the so-called "official
voice" of
the PRD.

The position of Pena Gomez as the "official
voice" of the
Party is somewhat of a mystery since he has
traditionally

aligned himself with Bosch and has felt
uncomfortable with
33 See

Times of the Americas

,

April 18, 1973.

34 Bosch

made his announcement on November
For a discussion of the new party see Renovacion, 18, 1973.
November 30, 1973.
o c

Only nine of twenty-four members of the National
Executive Committee followed Bosch to his new political
party which was a severe blow since he had planned to purge
the PRD of its moderates by the formation of the PLD.
The
plan in effect backfired and left Bosch without the broad
societal support that has made the PRD popular in Dominican
politics
/
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of the moderates in
the Part,.
One can on ly speculate
that Pena Gomes has
perhaps placed his love
Qf
pRD and
the desire for its
survival above ideological
considerations.
What is left in the PRD
after the departure
of Juan
Bosch is a moderate,
pro-democratic organisation
with some
old faces (Molina Urena
is back in the fold
along with
Hatuey de Camps, the radical
student leader who had been
out
of the country) and a
distinct willingness to direct
the
Party along more traditional
lines of opposition behavior. 36
The PRD has already established
a commission headed
by

^

Molina Urefia to revise the
Party’s by-laws so that they
are
more in line with the intent
and goals
of the 1963 consti-

tution. 37

There is as yet no discussion
on the fate of the
"Dictatorship with Popular Support"
thesis of Bosch. A
clearer view of the "new" PRD will
most certainly emerge as
the Party holds its national
convention and decides on the
official position toward electoral
politics.
As for Bosch and the PLD it is also
too early to
comment on the party's strength and its
viability as a competitor with the PRD for opposition dominance.
One can even
speculate that the departure of Juan Bosch
represents

another of his temper tantrums that will
eventually subside
36 E1 Caribe
,
37

January

1974.

4,

•

Times of the Americas

,

January

9,

1974.
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recent ° harge that
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P
headquarters to the new
leadership unless
Ilxess the P
Pena Gomez
f
forces reverse their
moderate F
posture
e is but °ne
„
example of
..
e tentative nature
of Bosch's resignation.
Whatever may. happen in
the future to Bosch
and the
PRD, the fact remains
that the Party will
continue tQ be
divided and constantly
open to personal and
factional disputes. But more
importantly, the continued
propensity to
engage in power politics
and personnel purges
has tarnished
the image of the PRO
as a vehicle for
responsible
tive change. With every
self-inflicted wound the PRO
loses
an insurmountable
amount of national prestige.
The popularity and success of the
PRO has traditionally
been founded
not so much on the uniqueness
or revolutionary quality
of
its ideology, but on the
stature of its leadership.
The
series of internal disputes
in the PRD since 1966
has only
hampered the Party's ability
to rally the Dominican
masses
behind the banner of radical
reform. Without strong, unified leadership the PRD can
never expect to rise once again
to national dominance.

^

The "Politicos" a nd the
"Ideologues"

Although the history of intra-party
squabbles in the
PRD chronicles an important
facet of party opposition
in the
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oughly analyzed.
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en ° Ugh t0 see the
historical ebb
„
,
and flow of group and
personal conflicts that
the
.

PRD experienced srnce assu m ing
the opposition role
in i 966
Rather
the divisions that
surfaced within the PRD
can also be
viewed from a number of
other vantage points.
This new
perspective will enable us
to delve more deeply
into internal
party politics and explore
the PRD at close range.
The harmful splits that
arose (and perhaps will
surface again) within the
PRD leadership can be
traced to a
basic disagreement over
the questions of what
should be
attempted and what can be
accomplished in a Balaguer.

controlled political system.

Party leaders like Casimiro

Castro see opposition politics
as a contest for recognition,
influence, and allegiance using
the normal institutional
channels.
These "politicos" (a more precise
title than
moderates) recognize full well
the inequities of the
Dominican political system, but
feel strongly that the PRD
could best achieve some input into
the government only if
the Party continues to participate
in national politics.
The "politicos" further emphasize
that any action which
separates the Party from its traditional
moorings in democratic practice would weaken the hold
that the PRD has had
in Dominican society and lessen
its chances of recruiting
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new members .

To men like Casimiro
an op position party
works outside the existing
political system only
hurts its
image with the Dominican
voter who has become
increasingly
skeptical of radical anti-system
movements. The "politicos"
are thus emphasizing what
they consider smart,
practical
political behavior in which
the PRD works to the
best of
its ability despite an
admittedly harsh, repressive
regime.
The key, though, is that
the PRD continues to keep
active
and visible within the
system and not forfeit whatever

leverage and patronage it may
have or can attain because
of
uncompromising ideological commitments.
On the other side of the
internal conflicts within
the PRD are what might be termed
the "ideologues."
The
"ideologues" hold a much less tolerant
view of the Balaguer
regime and are committed to working
outside the established

boundaries of political behavior.

The "ideologues" like

Bosch, Rafael Alburquerque and, to
a lesser extent, Pena
Gomez consider themselves as realists
who are not blinded
by the scant hope of democratic reform
that the "politicos"
cling to. Contrary to the view of Casimiro
Castro, this

group is convinced that the PRD will be corrupted
and lose
its revolutionary identity if it continues
to seek societal

change through the present institutional structure
con-

structed by Balaguer.

The "ideologues" fully realize that

their radical position of favoring a so-called Dictatorship

Wlth P° PUlar SUPP ° rt C °
n

“
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cts the PRC's long
history of
traditional democratic
participation, but they
feel that to
work within the present
political atmosphere
brings the
Party disgrace rather
than positive gain.
The "ideologues"
thus would remain outside
of the current Dominican
political
system and prepare for a
time when a new type of
democracy
can be implemented.

The dilemma thus within
the ranks of the PRO is
who
has correctly interpreted
the problems and
possibilities of
the present Dominican political
system? In a real sense
there is no simple way to
reconcile the two opposing
positions since the "politicos"
and the "ideologues" not only
view the Balaguer regime differently,
but the role of the
Party as well. The "politicos"
constantly discuss the
merits of their position in terms
that would seem very logical to citizens of an established
Anglo-American democracy.
The "politicos" talk of participation,
patronage, and institutional opposition. From an American
or British point of
view they are the realists, the men who
understand
the

essentials of politics, the purposes of party
activity and
the problems of clinging too closely to
ideology and radical

rhetoric.

On the other hand the "ideologues" speak a dif-

ferent political language.

They see the Party organization

more as a vehicle for the dissemination of ideas and
propaganda, rather than as a political agent that must be adept

at bargaining and comprom
ise.
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As a result the

„

ideologues „

hardly ever discuss
opposition politics in the
present
tense.
They reside in the future
and see no hope of
working
effectively in the present
political system.

A convincing resolution
of this dilemma is of
course
not easily attained. Yet
a way out of this
conflict can be
seen if one recognizes the
PRD's problems as not a
failure
of democratic opposition,
but a continuation of an
authoritarian system that has never
been put to rest. Where the
"politicos" have failed is in their
belief that a liberal
democratic state could be achieved
without ridding the
political system of its dictatorial
heritage. As a result
the "politicos" continue to search
for ways to make
the

system work, despite the fact that the
spectre of 150 years
of authoritarian rule hangs heavily
over the Dominican
Republic.
The "ideologues," despite their often
times

unnecessary and contradictory adherence to
revolutionary
dogma and their unsupported hope of another
chance at

wielding power, realize the limits of traditional
democracy
in the Dominican Republic and therefore
speak of a new

democracy that can only be achieved after the country
has
been cleansed of its past.

The participant approach to

opposition as favored by the "politicos" may still be looked
upon as a legitimate means of opposition, and quite possibly

could be an effective strategy for gaining concessions from

the Bala

r
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regime (aith °- h

- sumption

has yet to be
But it seems more
logical and realistic
to adhere
O a position like
that of the "ideologues"
which states that
Participation in Balaguer's
repressive political
system only
perpetuates his regime and
makes a mockery out
of democratic
opposition. With meaningful
political activity at a
premium
PrSSent D°miniCan
^tem, it appears that
the "ideologues" are
following the only viable
avenue of
opposition open to them.

proven)

“

.

^

Where the "politicos"
reside in the dreams of
the
past, the "ideologues"
look only to the future
and thus
neglect the obvious political
concerns of the present.
Because of the often idiosyncratic
leadership of Juan Bosch,
the "ideologues" position
has left the PRD without any
workable opposition strategy.
Even though the PRD views
itself
as a party of the future,
it still cannot avoid engaging
in
politics. The successful attainment
of power in any society
necessitates that the group in a
minority position recognize
that dogmatic pronouncements of
ideology must be welded with
a keen understanding of
bargaining, compromise, and toleration of criticism, what has happened
in the PRD is that
38

anlG P astrik in an article in Dissent
states
that th*
ppn
th P
*D mast£ a<^?3ust its opposition posture
according
the ?
dominant attitudes of the Dominican people
which
these days are increasingly moving away from
political
concerns toward national economic development
and social mobilization.
See "Bosch and Balaguer:
Dominican Roulette,"
Dissent (November-December 1970):
525.

^L

.
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ideology has overshadowed
all aspects of Party
behavior to
the point where
organisation, discipline,
democratic structure and mass support
are in grave danger.
the PRD is
to regain its dominant
position in the Dominican
political
arena, it must skillfully
mesh the promises and
the enthusiasm that ideology
generates with the respect
for diversity
and moderation that come
with an appreciation of

„

politics.

As the past discussion
suggests, it appears that
the
PRD rs continually in
turmoil and teetering on
the brink of
an open schism within its
leadership structure. But
before
jumping to conclusions and
characterizing the Party

as hope
lessly factionalized and near
death, it is necessary to
examine an often times overlooked
quality of the PRD-the

Party’s unrelenting desire to
maintain discipline, in conversations with Party leaders and
supporters in 1972 it was
made explicit that the Party has
traditionally remained a
strong opposition force in the
repressive Dominican political system because of the unflinching
allegiance
of the

membership to Juan Bosch, the powerful legacy
of the PRD,
and the promise of future societal change.
I was assured
by members of the Party that most dissenters
from the mainstream of the PRD ideology can be counted on
to
support the

leadership in times of crisis.

The Party prides itself on

its tolerance of diverse opinions.

PRD leaders are confi-

dent of the ultimate loyalty of their membership and
the
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willingness of true Prd
+-~
activist
ts to subordinate
individual
preferences for the overall
success
,

of the Party.

It is

only when these dissenters
openly challenge the
leadership
wrth the formation of a
new party or the
acceptance of a
government position that
the pro becomes
less tolerant. 39

Perhaps the best evidence
of this sense of
discipline in the PRD can be
seen in the furor over
the expulsion
of Rafa Gamundr.
Gamundi was sub-secretary
of organization
the Party and also one of
the most radical members
within
the inner leadership
cricle. As the story was
told to me,
Gamundi was so zealous in his
desire to spread the dogma
of
Juan Bosch that he started
his own newsletter which
became
the soundingboard for Communist
rather than PRD propaganda. 40
Gamundi sealed his fate by going
one step further
and forming his own
Communist-oriented youth organization
in the cam£o. The group
distributed the paper and attempted
to radicalize the peasant
population in the name of

m

the PRD.

Hearing of Gamu ndi 's activities,
the PRD leadership promptly
39 ° ne

PRD intimate stated confidently
that no matter
WaS treated
the Party because of his beliefs
ld
1W S stand b ehmd the Party and owe
oniw
-K
ly ?
to 4the
PRD. As for Pena Gomez, he stated allegiance
publicly that
even though he was resigning his post
as Generarsecretarv
he would remain loyal to the PRD.
As matters turned out Pena
way from the pRD **
y?
„

.

,

S
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cracked down on the young
radical and stripped
him and his
supporters of their membership
in the PRD.
Gamundi chal _
lenged the disciplinary
committee's decision and
threatened
to fonn his own party,
but the PRD leadership
stood firm on
its actron and expressed
no concern over
Gamundi' s threat. 41
The PRD likewise came
down hard on Jottin
Cury, the
fiery former leader of
the PRD in the Dominican
legislature.
Cury, long a champion of
radical causes (he was
originally
a conservative UCN
Congressman in 1962 and the
Foreign Minister in the "constitutionalist"
government of CaamaAo Deno,
made a number of critical
comments about the policy
positions of Juan Bosch and the
PRD on a Dominican radio
broadcast.
Later Cury was also interviewed
for a series of newspaper articles in which he
commented on the lack of a radical response to the Balaguer
regime by the PRD leadership.
In that speech Cury praised
the platform and activities of
the Dominican Communist party.
The PRD wasted no time in
censuring Cury and eventually he
resigned. The regular PRD

4lRaf a !ef t the Party stating that
olutionary enough. Again the regular PRDBosch was not
leadership did
not seem troubled by Rafa's rhetoric
or his threat to start
pa ty ' Martlnez Francisco had started
another party
d again
in 1967 and
1968; both failed dismally.
The
tUrne obt to be true
Nothing
more was
?
heard of Rafa s new revolutionary
neard
party.
.

m

-
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leadership never had a
fondness for Cury.42
He was always
considered a detriment to
effective opposition and
a loose—
tongued radical who could
not be depended upon
to loyally
support the positions and
leaders
of the Party.

Party discipline in the most
recent times took a
new turn. Juan Bosch
increasingly assumed much of
the
responsibility for discipline
decisions, a move that caused
much consternation in the
leadership ranks of the Party.
The fear of many PRD activists
was that in the name of ideo
logical purity Bosch was steering
the Party away from its
tradition of democratic organization
and toward personalisticcaudillo leadership. 43 The expulsions
and suspensions,
although generally considered poor
decisions, were nothing
new to the Party since the PRD has
always demanded strict
adherence to Party regulations. But what
was considered a
new departure in Party policy was Bosch's
overt attemtps at
securing a greater control over PRD policy-making.
This
El Nacional, February 7, 1970.
The PRD's charge
was that Cury was trying to discredit Pena Gomez
and the
whole PRD opposition strategy. Meanwhile Cury and
his
friends were preparing to participate in the university PCD
elections. Jottin Cury became rector of the Autonomous
University.
43 See Plastrik,

"Bosch and Balaguer," on the "caudillo" nature of Dominican politics.
Plastrik feels that
both Balaguer and Bosch visualize themselves as caudillo
figures and thus conduct their respective organizations in
a personalistic and authoritarian manner.
The only difference is that Balaguer has real power, the power of the
state, while Bosch only has power in the PRD.
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action caused many longtime
Party functionaries
to wonder
Whether discipline was a
mere smokescreen designed
to hide
a Bosch power play.

The departure of Juan
Bosch from the prd forces
one
to speculate whether the
Party will ever be able
to maintain
a high level of
organizational discipline. The
"revolving
door" status of individuals
like Casimiro Castro and
Peha
Gomez and the temper tantrums
of Juan Bosch cast serious
doubt on the value placed on
intra-party discipline in
present day PRD leadership circles.
Bosch himself once
stated that for everyone of those
who leave the Party there
are many others to take their
place. 44 This position that
a healthy dose of censure is
necessary to maintain
the

ideological spirit of the Party seems
to have permanently
infected the thinking of many PRD leaders,
especially those
who have followed Bosch into his new PLD.
The decline in discipline within the Party
is
beginning to take its toll. Not only has the
Party been
split into two distinct organizations at present,
but it is
a known fact that PRD

membership has been dropping

con"*

sistently from its high mark of 200,000 in the early

^ El

Nacional July 5, 1971. Bosch stated that for
every man or woman expelled from the Party there would be
one hundred more to take their place.
,

211

sixties. 45

This decline can
be traced to a
number of
From an increase
in repression to
a ge neral
decrease
xtizen participation.
One must also consider.
however,
e act that with
every so-called
discipline problem in
6 lea<3er£hip
P RD creates doubt
in

-r

fche

naUon

as to its ability
to, remain the primary
opposition force.
Besides viewing the PRD
as caught in the
throes of
a conflict between
ideology and politics,
it is important
to step away from the
charges and counter-charges
and see
the internal party
disputes as caused also by

generational
rather than ideological
or political considerations.
If one
examines the ranks of the
"politicos"

and the "ideologues,"
xt becomes evident that
not only are two fundamental

approaches to opposition at
odds, but two generations
as
well. The "politicos"
Casimiro Castro, Fernandez
Marmol,
Maximo Lovaton Pittaluga, Gil
Morales-are at the same time
Physically older than the youthful
"ideologues" and also
have much stronger ties to
the PRD organization that
developed in exile a nd matured in
the early days of democratic
0
on Party^headquarter^destroye^the
^ iles .^Whe^I^pressed^
P
b
PRD had^huge mass^support?
however, questions somewhat the
popularity of the PRD
He
considerable drop in membership as^e sign
the Same or<? a nization as it was in
1962-1963
pL at
C nn0t
lve eviden ce of this decline in
?
?
popularity*
lmpression which is vigorously
Y
Refuted by 'the pId

srtLTtK

^
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practice when Juan Bosch
was president (and
perhaps
coincidentally when John P.
Kennedy was in the
White House,
seems to he the case in
problem of the so-called
generatl0n gap ' the ° lder
-politico.- adhere to a
slower, more
moderate approach to
opposition and criticise
the "ideologues" in patronizing
terms suggesting that
the youths will
someday learn the rewards
of moderation and
practical polltics

-

The "ideologues" on the
other hand are all in
their
late twenties or early
thirties and do not have
the attachment to the PRD of old that many
of the "politicos" have.
Most of them came to the PRD
during or after the revolution
of 1965 and have been
nurtured in the climate of
violence
and repression of that period.
The "ideologues" see the
PRD as a party that must change
with the times and look to
the future if it is going to
lead the nation and bring about
radical change. Strangely enough
the "ideologues" are led
by the ageless Juan Bosch who is the
only member of the oldline PRD hierarchy to shift with the
dominant trend in the
Party (if not actually cause the shift)
The "ideologues"
include such youthful Party leaders as
Rafael Alburquerque,
Antonio Luna, Manny Espinal and Pena Gomez— all
socialized
.

m

greater or lesser degree by the radical student
politics

of the 1960’s.

Also gaining prominence within the ranks of

the "ideologues" is the youth arm of the PRD,
the Juventud
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(JM »
the Party,
(FUSD,

the

^

the university
branch of

grent^Oniversi^

Both the JRD and FUSD
are quite active in
organising
and propagandizing efforts
for the Party.
.

The "ideologues" match
closely the rebellion of
all
youth in Latin America.
These young radicals no
longer
accept the traditional
politics of their fathers,
but rather
press insistently for revolutionary
change. When change is
low in coming, as in the
Dominican Republic, the "ideologues" resort to sloganeering
and a staunch refusal to compromise with the status quo.
It is over this problem of
change that the "ideologues" come
in conflict with the
"politicos," and create the internal
disruptions the PRD is
undergoing at the present 46
.

The fact that it is possible to
trace the deepseated divisions in the PRD in part
to the generation gap
IS not meant to minimize the
present difficulties the Party
46 The
u
most cogent example of this generation gap
was
home to me when I visited PRD headquarters
on
Avenida
Independence one day in connection with an interview
with
CaS r
After talking to Casimiro for a while on
the status ofJ J*
the Party, he asked if I would like some
literhrnnrrh-tbrought

v,

ature on the Party. Casimiro ran into some
trouble trying
to convince a young radical worker in
the Party named Tonito
to provide the literature.
Tonito was not only suspicious
of me, but he was also visibly at odds with
Casimiro.
It was
as if the fatherly Casimiro was telling his
young impetuous
son Tonito the correct manner of making friends,
even
though they may be Americans.
I finally got the materials
rom Tonito, but not before I was afforded the opportunity
to
see that the ideological differences in the PRD had
personal
tones of the generation gap influencing it.
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finds itself in.

What it is meant to
show is that the
internal problems of the
Part, are extremely
complex and
derive from a number of
sources
sources.
-io
it is
+.

true that the pri-

source of agitation is still
the unresolved guestion
Of whether the PRD
should emphasize practical
politics or
ideological promises, in its
opposition role. But one
cannot ignore the fact that
beneath this surface dispute
there are other currents of
agitation such as the generational conflict. Also of
importance is the personality
and mannerisms of Juan Bosch
which pervade all aspects of
the Party structure.
Because of his radical impulsiveness
and his dislike of Party moderates,
Bosch has heated up
internal disputes and made amicable
solutions extremely
difficult. There is no telling how
much of the difficulties the PRD finds itself in today
could have been avoided
had its leader been more diplomatic
and less charismatic.

With all the internal problems that the
PRD is
experiencing at present, future predictions

about the shape

of the organization structure are
indeed difficult to make.

The next year will be most important for
the PRD since

President Balaguer has shown no inclination to leave
his
position.

The old battle between the "politicos" and the

"ideologues" seems unavoidable, especially now as a result
of the recent controversy over the expulsion or
resignation
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Of key Party faithful. 47

What course the PRD takes
depends to a large degree
on how it fares without
the leadership of Juan
Bosch and
the activists that he took
with him to the new PLD
From
all visible signs it appears
that Bosch will continue
to
favor a position of uncompromising
radicalism and preparation for that elusive future
opportunity of once again
attaining political power. The
situation,
.

however, has

changed some in that Juan Bosch is
now without the strong
base of support that the Party
organization provided. Bosch
just might have to meet some of
his critics in the PRD half
way and make some concessions with
regard to participation
in the so-called "united front"
opposition, democraticiza-

ti°n of th e Permanent Commission, and
acceptance of a more

moderate opposition stance.

m

Whether Bosch sees his options

a similar manner is pure speculation,

but the fact

remains that the PRD is in serious trouble at
the present
time and requires drastic modification if it is
to survive
as a unified opposition voice.
Bcilaquer has used close associates like his representative to Puerto Rico, Rafael Bonilla Aybar, to leak out
his presidential intentions. Also fervent supporters of
the president have placed signs throughout the countryside
which read--Balaguer 1974-1980. To bolster these sentiments
the Partido Reformista has recently nominated the president
for an unprecedented third term.
Of course, the Dominican
constitution had to be changed in order to make possible
Balaguer's plans of continuismo

CHAPTER

VI

GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES AGAINST
THE PRD OPPOSITION;
DEPOLITICIZATION, SUBVERSION AND
REPRESSION
The PRD

task of providing continuous,
disciplined
and effective political
opposition to the Balaguer
regime,
as previous chapters have
shown, was often marred
not only
by the weaknesses of so-called
democratic institutions, but
also by numerous internal squabbles
over strategies and
tactics
The PRD s problems as a viable
political opposition in the Dominican Republic,
however, included more than
overcoming the deficiencies of Dominican
democracy and the
proper balancing of conflicting leadership
groups. The PRD
from the inception of Balaguer' s first
term as president
faced a three-pronged anti-opposition
strategy that aimed
at totally undermining the Party's popular
base. The
1

s

1

.

strategies designed by the Balaguer regime stressed
the

depoliticization of Dominican society, subversion of PRD
personnel (its affiliated labor and peasant associations,
and its public policy positions)

,

and a massive campaign

of repression against PRD activists and Left-wing
sympa-

thizers of the Party.
The anti-opposition policies of depoliticization,

subversion and repression used by the Balaguer regime were
216
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formulated with two very
important goals in mind.
Firstly,
the newly elected president
was most concerned with
restoring calm and order to his
war-torn nation. The civil
war of
1965 had not only divided the
country politically, but
had
seriously damaged, if not destroyed,
its economic
infra-

structure.

With the fighting ended, the
Dominican Republic
was at a standstill; its export
industry bordered near collapse,

its external debts to foreign
countries and institutions skyrocketed, internal
administration revealed complete

disorganization and, most of all, the spirit
of the people
showed signs of strain and fatigue.
Faced with such dismal
circumstances. President Balaguer shifted
attention away
from the political arena and placed full

emphasis on rebuild-

ing Dominican society.

In order to achieve such a shift,

Balaguer chose to move beyond the common pleas
for a return
to normalcy and introduced a comprehensive
developmental
strategy that would speed modernization, while
controlling
its impact on the large majority of the Dominican
masses.

But beneath this outward concern with rebuilding

Dominican society, Balaguer and his conservative allies
sought mainly to control Dominican politics by weakening
the PRD and their ability to influence Dominican develop-

ment.

With the substantial electoral victory that he gained

in the June, 1966 election and the full support of the

United States government, Balaguer felt that the time was
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rxpe for making a
concerted effort to loosen
the hold of the
PRD on sizeable portions
of the Dominican
electorate,
a
real sense Balaguer needed
the PRD to maintain
his •'democratic" regime, but the
Party would only be
allowed to
exist with minimal influence
and reduced political
capability.

m

In order to attain this
final emasculation of the
PRD, Balaguer utilized
the power and influence
of his office
to push the Party further
away from the center of
politics

in the Dominican Republic.

Through a highly adept handling

of governmental personnel,
police resources, public relations, and the aura of paternalistic
rule, Balaguer sought
to solidify his position as the
new "caudillo figure" whose

commands would remain unchallenged.

The end product of

Balaguer' s intricate and devious
machinations was to dull
the political sensitivities of the
Dominican people with

mammoth economic programs, tantalize them
with lucrative
job offers, new-fangled social institutions
and pie in the
sky promises and, most sinister of all,
terrorize them with
a vicious campaign of political intimidation
and assassi-

nation.

Because of the widespread nature of Balaguer' s antiopposition campaign against the PRD and the effect of these
activities on the life of the Party, we cannot avoid examining the depoliticization, subversion and repression that

219

the PRD has faced in the
Balaguer years,

if we are to
understand the full range
of problem that an
opposition
party meets in an authoritarian
framework, the antiopposition policies of the
Balaguer regime will serve
as
one of the best guides.
But more than just a view
of the
obstacles that were placed in
the path of the PRD, the
actions of the Balaguer
government give a candid glimpse
of the mechanics of Dominican
society and the powers
of

its paternalistic leadership.

The strategies of depoliti-

cization, subversion and repression
mirror the lifestyle
and traditions that are uniquely
Dominican and point squarely
to the extreme difficulties of
fundamental societal change.
Change that the PRD and its leadership
represent.

The Strategy of Depoliticization
The efforts of the Balaguer regime to
depoliticize
Dominican society as a means of upsetting (if
not silencing)
the PRD opposition took many varied forms.
One of the most

obvious tactics of the government was its use of
public

relations techniques in the field of economic
modernization.
President Balaguer, despite his shy unobtrusive demeanor,
is
a deft master in the use of television,

personal appearances

.

the newspapers and

One cannot live in the Dominican

Republic a single day without seeing an active, personable

president opening up a new housing development, presiding
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over the groun breaking
for a new school,
inspecting a dam
project, handing out a
land deed to an
appreciative peasant>
or merely sitting in
his office listening
to the problems of
’ countrymen.
The key to Balaguer s
success and his
ability to defuse the
opposition is the sense of
and progress that he. has
brought to the Dominican
Republic
When the Dominican people
see their president moving
about
the country actively pushing
for the development

of the

nation, it becomes increasingly
difficult for them to heap
criticism upon him, or worse
yet, side with a political
party like the PRD. It should
be noted that all this move-

ment is achieved in a highly
paternalistic fashion, not
through mass mobilization as was
the case with the PRD in
the 1960's.

Much of the movement that is
central to the outward
appearance of the Balaguer regime is
not without some foundation.
In a six-year period from
July,

1966 to July, 1972

the Balaguer government has made
considerable progress in
providing the basic necessities for
the Dominican people.
In this period the Balaguer
administration built:

1,667 primary and secondary schools
55 dining halls
37 bridges
759,925 meters of road
109,870 meters of irrigation canals
11 medical centers
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20 aqueducts
91 community centers

132 housing developments.

1

In total the Balaguer
government has completed
1,906
development projects and is
in the process of
finishing 279
more, all at a cost of
some $105.9 million.
Added to these
figures is an impressive
increase in exports in
1972 (43%)
which has helped increase the
GNP to a phenomenal
yearly
growth rate of 10%, a figure
claimed by the government
to be
one of the largest increases
in the Third World. 2 on
a
number of economic fronts the
government is making quite

noticeable progress whether in the
areas of sugar, nickel
or tobacco production or the
completion of the huge Tavera
Dam complex or the attraction of
foreign development loans
and investments.
In short, the government of
Joaquin Balaguer has brought a quite visible
measure of economic development to the Dominican Republic. Such
development has only
strengthened Balaguer 's position among the
people and caused
them to direct their attention to
nation-building, not politics
The PRD well realizes that Balaguer has made
some
he Dominican daily Ultima Hora (Santo Domingo)
ran

a twenty-two page section on the progress of
the Balaguer
regime since June, 1966. See Ultima Hora August
,
14, 1972.
2

A two-page advertisement in the New York Times of
April 3, 1973 written by Stanley Ross makes this assertion
and also contributes numerous positive growth statistics.
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noticeable advances in
rebuilding the country
after the
orvil war of 1965, and
is skillfully employing
his victories
to solidify his own
position. Nevertheless,
the PRD worked
tirelessly to challenge the
claimed economic modernization
program of the Balaguer
regime. Where the PRD
has been most
successful in counteracting
the depoliticization
efforts of
the government is in
spotlighting the severe inadequacies
of

life in the Dominican Republic
since 1966. Juan Bosch, in
his radio addresses, continuously
points to the massive
unemployment (between 30 and 40% of
the work force) and

underemployment (another 20%) that is
painfully evident in
the poor barrios; the unequal
distribution of farm land in
the campo (1% of farmers own 47.5%
of the land, while 82%
own fewer than 10 acres) ; the high
incidence of malnutrition
and disease (bloated bellies on the
young is commonplace
and

life expectancy is 52 years)

;

the lack of adequate water and

drainage facilities in urban areas (301 of
city dwellers
have bacteriological ly acceptable drinking
3
water).

Besides these so-called bread and butter issues,
the
PRD also criticizes the blatant inequality of
Dominican

society where the rich have accumulated enormous
wealth in
this period, while the barrio dwellers remain in
abject
3

^

artlcle by A. Kent MacDougall for the Wall Street
Journal September 7, 1971 has an excellent array of statistics which are uncomplimentary to the prevailing theory of
progress during the Balaguer years.
,
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Poverty.

Besot correctly points
out that for all
claims of progress, the
Dominican Republic still

Baker's

has one of
the lowest per capita
income rates in Latin
America ( $ 305
which is one half that of
Cuba, and one of the
highest

illiteracy rates (66%)

.

Added to these dismal

£ igures
g
that fact that national
studies show that half of
the rural
dwellings in the country are
categorized as uninhabitable.
With poverty and inequality
so prevalent it is no
wonder
that over 200,000 Dominicans
have emigrated to the United
States in search of a better
life. 4
,

Although the picture of widespread
economic progress
painted by President Balaguer is
a matter of
opinion and

social position, the important
point is that Balaguer has
been able to use whatever economic
advance achieved by the
government to strengthen his hold on
the Dominican people.
By creating the appearance of great
internal change and
movement, Balaguer has stripped from the
Dominican consciousness any real and permanent interest
in alternative
political parties or programs. By placing
emphasis on
4 The

newsletter Latin America cites these emigration
figures along with other statistics that raise
additional
questions about the so-called boom in the Dominican
See Latin America, May 15, 1970, pp. 153-54. It is economy.
esting to note that although these 200,000 Dominicansinterleave
their country, they do not leave behind their politics. A
New York Times story of November 9, 1970 shows that a
number
of Dominicans in New York have formed a PRD
nucleus which
continues the process of education and organization.
.
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socioeconomic concerns and
the overail modernization
of the
nation, Balaguer has
shifted public attention
away from the
fundamental question of who
has power and how this
power is
to be utilized.
With the stress placed on
increased sugar
production, the construction
of economic infrastructure,
the attraction of foreign
investment, and an occasional
social change, Balaguer has
at once given the people
a
brief glimpse of economic
prosperity, while also laying
the
groundwork for the destruction of
politics.

Besides the emphasis placed on
movement and economic
progress as a method of depoliticizing
the internal political situation, the Balaguer
regime, frequently, went beyond
the subtleties of its public
relations campaign by refusing
to provide the Party with a
parade permit or by closing its
radio station for alleged "inflammatory"
statements. Every
year on April 28th, (the anniversary
of the 1965 civil war)
and July 5th, (the date when PRD
organizers returned to the
Dominican Republic after thirty years in
exile) the Party
stages memorial parades. The government
has seen fit to

either refuse permits for these gatherings
or to block the
path of the marchers. The official position is
that the

PRD marchers may endanger the public safety.

Behind this

statement, however, is a conscious desire to rid the
nation
of all overt political activity.

Similar tactics have been

used against the Party radio station. Radio Commercial.

On
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at least two occasions,
the most recent one
during the 1973
invasion of Caamano Deno,
the government closed
the station
down.
in both instances the
radio station was allowed
to
once again operate and
engage in political
discussion, but
only after extensive bargaining
in which the Balaguer
regime
stressed that the government
would not hesitate to
intervene
the future if circumstances
warranted it. 5

m

The heavy reliance of Balaguer
on the tactics of
economic movement and occasional
police suppression of
political activity was in a real
sense secondary to the
president's main tool of depoliticization-a
keen realization of the importance that the
traditions of paternalism,
caudilloism and continuismo have in
Dominican
society.

President Balaguer, who worked closely
with the dictator
Trujillo, knew well the influence that
the patron-type figure
held in the Dominican Republic. As a
result, Balaguer, from

the inception of his rule, sought to
build up his image as
5T e Bala 9 uer legislature has also
recently passed
?
law which prohibits party activity for
the May 16, 1974 presidential election
before the first of
January.
_

nni

i

-I--:

Before that date parties must receive a permit
from the National Police. Balaguer has also
recently sought
the passage of a press and radio censorship
bill which would
have the government examine the kind of material
that is
broadcast or printed in the Dominican Republic.

statesman, peacemaker, and
benevolent father of the
Dominican people 6
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.

Because of the historical
precedent for successful
paternalistic rule, Balaguer
went to work immediately
to
reap the benefits of the
Dominican peoples' age -old
respect
for the £atron. Balaguer
constantly set up the dichotomy
of the trouble-making
Juan Bosch and his PRD as
opposed to

the peacemaking and modernizing
leadership that he could
offer. Where Bosch had only
given the Dominicans bloodshed
and confusion, Balaguer would
stabilize the country and give
the people a sense of continuity
that they had not seen
since the death of Trujillo. Where
Bosch and his party were
squabbling over the correct form of
democratic participation
and government, Balaguer would
reinstitute and intensify the
familiar relationship between patron and
client, caudillo
and loyal subject.
In order to establish himself as the
new Dominican

patron, Balaguer formed his presidency in the
image of a
kindly, concerned and, in many instances,
generous national
leader.

Every noontime when the President returned home for

lunch and every evening when he was not at a state
function.
6 Some

PRD activists see a great similarity between
the style of President Balaguer and Richard Nixon. Both are
basically shy, introspective, unassuming individuals who are
master politicians and have had to function in an atmosphere
of hostile and competing opposition groups.
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long lines of peasants
and ghetto dwellers
would wait to see
their patron and beg for
a new wheelchair or
sewing machine
or plow or in many cases
a mere handout.
The Dominican
people remembered well the
generosity of the President
during the waning Trujillo
years and knew that the
surest
route to having their plea
heard was through the
direct
approach. Of course Balaguer,
being an astute politician,
'
recognized that his image as the
new patron in Dominican

society greatly solidified his
power base. Balaguer thus
did nothing to weaken his
relationship with the people but
rather intensified his benevolence.
As a result wherever
the President travels in the Dominican
Republic he carries
sizeable amounts of money which he hands
out to the people 7
When a peasant receives title to new land
or a community gets
a new bridge or irrigation canal,
the name of Joaquin Balaguer is constantly emphasized as the sole
source of
.

the gift.

Balaguer has developed his image as the new,
benevolent

patron to such an extent that even his sister has
formed
her own agency called Cruzada de Amer which makes
handouts
in the name of the President.

In short, Balaguer has

employed every tactic of the traditional paternalistic leader
n

It is perhaps interesting to note that whenver Balaguer shakes hands with a peasant on his many excursions into
the campo the president has an aid hand him a handkerchief
so that he can clean himself off.
,
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in his attempt to extend his
control over the Dominican
populace and speed the process of
depoliticization.

A precise determination of the
success that Balaguer
has had with his comprehensive
depoliticization strategy
against the popular base of PRD support
is indeed difficult
to measure, especially since the
public opinion apparatus
in the Dominican Republic is not
equipped to correctly gauge
public support for the government in
relation to the PRD.

Nevertheless, some knowledgeable sources in
the country feel
strongly that the Balaguer administration
has been most

effective in chipping away at marginal PRD
support, particularly in regions outside the Santo Domingo areaJ
Balaguer s person alismo his public relations campaigns,
and
,

his strong connections with the chief rural
socializes
the military and the Catholic Church

— have

—

strengthened his

popularity considerably.
The fruits of these efforts can be seen frequently
in the country's newspapers.

Almost every week one can

open up a Santo Domingo daily and find a full-page
8 These opinions
were gained from interviews with
key political officials in the United States Embassy during
the summer of 197 2. A word of caution must be entered here
in that observers in the United States Embassy are merely
one source of opinion and cannot be recognized as definitive
analysts of internal Dominican politics.
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advertisement purchased by a
small town or village.
9
the
advertisement lavish praise is
heaped on the President as
the people thank him for a
civic improvement. The
statement
of thanks is relatively
short due to the desire of
the officials to have as many signatures
as possible printed

m

on the
Page, but there is no question
that the people recognize
Balaguer as their benefactor.
After seeing a number of
these advertisements, the large
crowds that turn out for his
personal appearances, and the quiet
respect the Dominicans
evince toward their president, it
is most difficult to come
to a conclusion that sees
Balaguer as a leader without solid
citizen support.
Indeed, some Dominicans go so far
as to
state that support for the President
is nearing the 70%
level

This figure can certainly be questioned
considering
the lingering discontent in the country
over jobs and per-

sonal income.

Yet the fact remains that the PRD's inability

to register a solid abstention front in the
1970 election

coupled with the mounting signs of public acceptance
of the
Balaguer regime point to at least a changed mood in
the

^For an example of such a popular outpouring of
support for Balaguer and the prosperity he has brought,
see El Caribe June 27, 1972.
,

l^The figures, which are by no means scientific,
come from conversations held by United States Embassy officials with numerous Dominican businessmen.
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Dominican Republic.

The mood is not quite
that of undying
allegiance to the Balaguer regime,
but there is a visible
tendency in the country to
support his leadership and put
aside, for the time, the radical
alternatives raised by the
PRD.

This is not to say that Dominican
society has been
effectively depoliticized
What has happened is that President Balaguer has given the Dominican
people a brief respite
from the years of democratic revolution
in the 1960's.
Bala
guer has returned the Dominicans to a
more secure and familiar social, economic and political
environment. The Dominican people, since the death of Trujillo,
were in a state
of confusion. Without effective leadership
and forced to
.

evolve new institutions and procedures, the
Dominican people
were seeking a stabilizing political influence.
With the
end of the war and the election of Balaguer, the
Dominican

people seemed anxious for a return to normalcy.

Such nor-

malcy meant a return to a societal framework based on
paternalism, a passive obedience to the caudillo, and a

decreasing concern for opposition politics.

The rhetoric

of Juan Bosch and the new ideology of the PRD may have held

the promise of much needed change, but the majority of

Dominican people seemed much more willing to sacrifice the
changes proposed by the opposition in favor of the stability,

security, and glimpse of prosperity that came with
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supporting Joaquin Baiaguer.
As stated earlier
,
support
for Baiaguer does not
mean that the Dominican
people are
thoroughly ecstatic over
their new patron or that
the figure
of Juan Bosch does not
excite their interest in
change. But
when faced with the alternatives
of a probable renewal
of
civil war and incremental
social and economic development,
the choice becomes obvious.

^

The Str ategy of Subversion

Where the depoliticization strategy
of the Baiaguer
regime was designed primarily
to shift attention away from
the major social and policital
concerns stressed by the PRD
the efforts by the government
to subvert party
clientele,

associations, and issue areas were a
more direct and pernicious attempt to loosen the hold of
the PRD on Dominican
society. The term "subversion" of
the PRD is used here
because the strategy utilized by the
Baiaguer government
can best be described as middle range
in that
it was not

employed with as much subtlety or finesse
as the depoliticization efforts, but nonetheless was short
of the violence
and intimidation also used against the Party.
Although
this Strategy of subversion falls midway
between depolit-

icization and repression, it must be emphasized that
the

Baiaguer forces saw the subversive activities as central
to
their overall plan for emasculating the PRD opposition.
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Subversion was used to
create disorder and
dissension in
the Party by enticing
activists away from their
allegiance
with lucrative government
positions, by creating
competing
social and political
associations, and by
introducing programs and policy positions
that had long been the
ideological "baggage" of the
PRD.

Probably the most direct
form that government
subversion of the PRD took was
a constant effort by
the Balaguer forces to lure high
party officials away from
the

organization.

The practice of enticing
opposition party
activists over to the side of
the government is not an
uncommon occurrence in Latin
America.
But in the Dominican Republic the desire of
the administration to
"co-opt"
the highly disciplined PRD
leadership posed a severe challenge to the cohesiveness of
the Party.

U

The subversive strategy of
buying off prd officials
started with the initiatives of
the President after the
elections.
Using the play of a unity government,
Balaguer hoped to break up the PRD
leadership by incorporating
a

number of key activists in his administration.

In some

respects he was successful as the
aforementioned Martinez
Francisco, Brea Pena, Molina Urena and
others assumed positions of some importance.

^See Bo Anderson and James Cockroft, "Control
Cooptation in Mexican Politics " Journal of Comparative and
Sociology (March 1966)
11-28
r

:

233

The reasons behind the shift
in allegiance of
so-called PRD stalwarts is quite
varied, but there are a
few common strains of motivation
that link them together.
First of all these men had grown
tired of the political
conflicts that rendered their country
virtually helpless
since the death of Trujillo.
Because of their deep-seated
patriotism, men like Molina Urena felt
it necessary to place
partisan politics aside and serve the
country in an administrative or consultative capacity.
Secondly, it is safe to
state that these "co-opted" PRD
officials realized at an
early date the increasing popularity and
power that Presi-

dent Balaguer was accumulating.

Although he did not have

the charismatic qualities of Juan Bosch,
Balaguer did have
the support of the key groups in Dominican
society, and of

course the United States.

In effect,

those men who switched

allegiance early in the first Balaguer administration
wanted
to follow a winner and were not willing to
become frequent

targets of government repression.

Lastly, these former PRD

activists, from a simple economic point of view, saw the

benefits of joining the Balaguer team.

To reject the

government's job offers meant that they would no longer be
a t the center of decision-making in their country, and would

have to return to private life and face years of political

ostracism, financial ruin
and profcable

^
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Although Balaguer was
reasonably successful
early i„
his administration in
bringing key prd leaders

^

into the

governmental fold, hi s overall
effort to create a
government and neutralize the
PRD failed. The PRD
organization held firm in its refusal
to connect itself with
Balaguer and disciplined those
Party members who accepted
cabinet
level positions.
The cohesiveness of the PRD

organization,
though, did not stop the
government from continuing to
approach Party officials about
the possibility of joining
the Balaguer administration.
In certain isolated cases
the
government was successful in convincing
a Party organizer
in the cameo to switch
allegiances. Nevertheless, these
incidents of allegiance switching
were few and far between
and, more importantly, these
switchers were individuals
described by PRD leaders as having
questionable credentials
as Party activists.
In fact one PRD official told me
that
the Party did not view these switchers
with great alarm, but
rather saw their moving out of the Party
as an effortless

interesting to note that the
members who first set foot on Dominican soil three PRD party
after some
nty y ear s
exile have all broken from the Party and
assumed various positions within the Balaguer
regime. Angel
Miolan is now Minister of Tourism, Ramon Castillos
and Ramon
Silfa both occupied important positions in the Balaguer
net and in thG consular cor P s
See El Caribe July 6,
.

,

m

-

1972

,
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means of rooting out
undesirable and uncooperative
functionaries.

Despite Party claims that
"co-optation" efforts were
not effecting the proper
functioning of the PRD, Juan
Bosch
did feel it was necessary
to make a radio speech
directed

at
the government’s moves to
buy off Party leaders and
conduct
politics based on economic gain.
Bosch castigated Balaguer
for his efforts to strengthen
his popularity through
patronage jobs and lucrative contracts.
Bosch further emphasized
that the PRD never felt it proper
to create political support by luring Dominican leaders
with the promise of financial and personal security. The
PRD leader did admit,
however, that although Balaguer was
able to buy off "three
or four" Party leaders in the post-1970
election period, he
did state that the small number of
switchers was proof of
the Party's discipline and its high
regard for honesty and

integrity in government

.

4

In recent years the Balaguer government
has seen

fit to supplement its use of patronage and
paternalism as

means of subverting PRD clientele by entering into
competition with the Party for the support of various
associational groups.

Balaguer seems unwilling in his second term

13 Interview

July

9,

1972.

with Emmanuel Espinal, Santo Dominqo,
*

14 Speech by
Juan Bosch, El Nacional , July 6,

1972.
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to rely on his office
or his Partido Reformists
or his close
ties with the military
as the channels for
societal control.
What is happening presently
is that numerous
peasant, labor

and middle class groups
are forming with government
sanction
and considerable financial
aid.
The express goal of these
groups is to expand the base
of Balaguer's support,
challenge the PRD in its traditional
sanctuaries of power, and
continue the campaign to loosen
the hold of the Boschistas
in Dominican politics.

Probably the most visible of these
new organizations
is Ac cion Constitutional (AC)
AC is predominantly a peasant
association with a number of sub-groups
that have been organizing and propagandizing since
1971 in the rich Cibao Valley
regions. An agronomist, Luis Estrella,
surfaced early
.

as

the spokesman of the AC and hit hard
at the unfulfilled

promises of the Bosch administration as
opposed to the steady
progress achieved during the Balaguer years.
Reports from

sources in the Cibao region show that the AC
movement is
quite active with pro-government agricultural
experts working

diligently and most effectively to sway peasant
support
toward the Balaguer administration.

The work of the AC has

definitely angered and worried the PRD.

The Party leader-

ship has recently come out against the organizing campaign
of AC and has sent numerous Party representatives
to the
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area rn hopes of
revitaU zing „ aning PRD
support>15
in the labor field
the governs seems
content to
stay out of the business
of forming rival
associations and
instead has encouraged
independent business concerns,
especially American owned
firms, to form so-called
•'company
unions"
place of exclusively prd
controlled labor groups.
Balaguer has wisely
recognised the intensity of
support that
urban and rural workers
have for the PRD, and
has thus
Placed the government squarely
behind company actions to
break strikes,, fire labor
organizers, and, wherever
possible, crush the burgeoning
movement to create a national
labor confederation.

m

The "company union" technique
has been put to exten
Sive use in the La Romano
sugar central owned by a subsidiary of Gulf and Western
Company, and in the Falconbridge
mining concern in Bonao owned by
a Toronto based group.
In
each instance the company has
sought to destroy the strong
PRD labor ties of the workers
through lockouts,
firings,

intimidation and murder.

In order to appear as kindly

Sa «tiago daily El Sol of June
20, 1972 for
a
1
denunciations of the AC movement by the
*: h
local
ppn ^
PRD
organization. See also El Nacional for Jnlv 15
S Esbrella states that the
new agrarian reform law
Zatp°" f the campesino h the AC
win render
?
?
the PRD and Juan Bosch
powerless.
In my conversation with
n Ur
tr ° n lY stated that Balaguer 's connections
f
with th c a 5?
H
tholic
Church
and the military in the campo
^
atly aid his increasingly popularity as
g
the Church and
the armed forces are the two major
socializers and controllers of the population.

recortm^h^

.

^

^T

nm

patrons," the C° mpa

—
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have built modern
towns complete
th social,
economic and health
centers. To create
this
new union atmosphere,
however
W6Ver the =°">Panies
have had to
fight the PRD all the
way.
,

.

'

In La Romana,

especially. Gulf and
Western
western, in unison
police and military units,
y units has
ha* worked
„
methodicaliy and brutally to
loosen the hold of the
PRd on the
sugar workers.
Party leaders tell many
frightening stories
workers who supported
the PRD being taken
from their homes
at night and killed.
The most publicised act
of terror
against union activity in
La Romana was the
disappearance of
journalist Guido Gil in 1967.
Gil worked openly and
vigorously for the PRD workers
and incurred the wrath
of the central owners and the National
Police head Lt. Col. Tadeo
Guerrero. Gil disappeared
one night and was never
seen alive
again, a reminder to the
workers and the PRO that
independent
labor organizing is risky
business. 16

m

..,
W1
,
With
the local
•

1

•

Presently the PRD in La Romana
and Bonao still commands broad support from the
workers. Yet Gulf and Western
and Falconbridge have spent
huge amounts of money to

sway the

political opinions of the workers
and have succeeded in
achieving a level of disinterest
in labor organizing and
anti-company ac tivities. Thus despite
the appearance of
1

problem*
ems
P

mf^
La
-

a PreSented an excellent
article on the labor
p
Romana
its

m

.

February

5,

1968 edition.
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governmental concern for
the working
class, it
* * was
9 class
made quite
Obvious to the workers
„hich side the government
ln9 '
The POSiti ° n ° f 016
Bala 9 uer regime was
solidly behind
the private companies,
thus adding one more
reason for the
workers to put aside the
thought of establishing
an independent labor force.

_

^

Supplementing the 'company union"
technique employed
by the major industrial
concerns, the government
has also
supported all efforts to destroy
in its infancy the
Central
Gen eral de Trabaio (CGT)
The CGT is a relatively
recent
attempt by labor, in conjunction
with PRD and Christian
.

Democratic leaders, to create a
general confederation to
better challenge the Balaguer
administration. 17 Both Felix
Alburquerque and Juan Antonio Luna,
high PRD leaders, are
working vigorously to convince
independent labor unions to
join the confederation. At this
stage the
CGT is still

groping for its identity and some
semblance of national
unity. Numerous organizational
meetings have been held,
but as yet the CGT cannot claim to
be a strong and vital
See a two-page advertisement in the April
25,
1972 edition of El Nacional which lists
the demands of the
new central and the labor unions which
have joined the
.

movement
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opposition force within the
labor field. 18
The primary reasons
for

the slow and agonizing

growth of the CGT is that
Balaguer has pledged his
support
to industrial oonoerns
in their battle to
break up the
confederation movement. The
PRD in its monthly
bulletin
has acknowledged the
difficulty of organizing a
confederation like the CGT in the
face of governmental
opposition
3nd intimiaation. 19 i\ievertneless,
Neverthplpqc the labor
i
u
organizers have
pledged to fight the government's
efforts to curtail
the

confederation movement.

As for Balaguer, he recognizes

that if the CGT ever becomes
a reality, it could severely
hamper the Dominican economy and
the political position of
his regime. By effective use
of labor slowdowns, general
strikes, and sizeable demands at
the bargaining table, the
government could one day face a serious
challenge to its
dominance. As a result of this fear
of the potential power
that the CGT can accumulate, Balaguer
has acted quickly and

forcefully to curb the confederation movement.
As to the middle class and the creation
of rival

groups, President Balaguer has achieved
perhaps his greatest
a
Cle n E1 Nacional of July 8, 1972 points
to tho d f faculties of
i
t0
getting the movement off the ground
J
ando the decision
by the CGT leadership to propose a

fH

minimum program."

19 The
To
PRD Boletin Informativo cites the difficulties
of organizing the CGT at a textile mill in Las
Minas. See
the Boletin Informative #1, p. 11 .
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success,

with the steady economic
growth of the Dominican
Republic since 1966, Balaguer
has had no real trouble
in
attracting middle class voters
to his regime.
The middle
class in the Dominican Republic
has always sought to achieve
some semblance of security and
stability in an otherwise
chaotic internal situation. With
Balaguer the middle class
has attained its goals and has
introduced a new degree
of

conservatism to Dominican society.
But Balaguer being the deft
politician that he is
has not been content to have this
support languish and
remain unorganized. What the Dominican
president has done
is to foster a series of political
parties or, perhaps more
correctly, political clubs which seek to
attract middle

class and professional support for the
continuation of the
Balaguer regime. Dominican politics since

1970 has seen the

rise of groups like the Movimiento Nacional
Juventud (MNJ)
led by Foreign Minister Gomes Berges, the
Frente de Apovo

Re-electionista, the Movimiento Nacional de Pueblo and
others. 20

Groups like the MNJ envision their role as solidifying Balaguer

'

s

hold on a traditionally weak and vacil-

lating middle class, and thereby give the president a

cushion against future disruptions from the peasant and
20 Bosch talks about these various
middle class
organizations in a speech printed in El Nacional, July 10,

1972.

labor sectors.
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On occasion there have
been rifts between

the regulars in the
Partido^eformista and these new
••clubs”
lake the „ NJ over territory
and influence. Balaguer,
however, has been able to
assert his dominance over
the groups
and use them as effective
vehicles of social organisational
Wxth the 1974 presidential
elections nearing and
opposition
forces binding together to
unseat Balaguer, these ”clubs”
will be a vital force in
reminding the middle class
of their

responsibilities to maintain stability
and conservative
economic growth.

Although Balaguer has been thoroughly
successful in
subverting the PRD hold on certain
societal groups

through
his development or sanction
of rival associations and
political groups, the Dominican
president has yet to break the
hold of the PRD and the Left at
the Autonomous

University

of Santo Domingo (UASD)

.

UASD remains the stronghold of

anti-Balaguer (and sometimes anti-Bosch)
activity. The PRD
through its student affiliate the Frente
Universitario
Socialista Democratica (FUSD) has traditionally
been the
most popular student group and has won many of
the major
For a further discussion of the rifts in the
Reformista as a result of these other competing
reelection organs, see Ahora May 5, 1969.
,

P artido

,

elections for student
government offices. 22
however, PRO support fell
off
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^

Durlng 19?2

in the universifcy

^

Leftrsts groups took hold
of the student
governing body, the
(FED,

.

The PRD leadership

at one time during this
period even disassociated
itself

from the FUSD and abstained
from supporting student
electrons.
Most recently, the PRD and
FUSD have gotten back
together and have won the
election for the FED, once
again
placing the Party in a commanding
position with Dominican
university students. As for
Balaguer, his efforts at the
UASD have been minimal. There
have been attempts to organize students, but these have
generally failed. Balaguer
has rather relied on the National
Police and the stark
realities of achieving middle class
status in the Dominican
Republic as the primary curbs on
student radicalism. 24
22

Hatuey de Camps,
ltl0 " ally been the
o? ,Rh
Xe U Ve Corran;Lttee
Sfnt
nn? of? the country to
W£
2 Rt
out
u

.

S

r

^

^

a distant relative of Juan Rn^nh
leader of the FUSD and a member

until he resigned both posts and
study.

23

PR leade rship during this period was simply
P
with the
disorganization and the mindless protest
shown by the FUSD and the other student
groups. Nevertheless the United States Embassy estimates
that
trols about 75% of the students at the UASD. the PRD con-

!
disgusted
,

,

’ s iroportant to stress that the
economic and
social demands of Dominican society necessitate
that many
students play the game and reject radical politics.
The
asic reason for this is that the largest employer
in the
nation is the government. Thus if you want to work,
it is
important to have a clean record or at least be
repentant
for your past "transgressions."
.
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One of the primary
strengths of the Balaguer
administration in its campaign
of subversion against
the
PRD has been a keen
grasp of national and
international
issues and an uncanny
ability to exploit those
issue areas
to its benefit.
It has long been
recognised that a president's greatest resource
when dealing with the
opposition
is his control over
the issue base,
any national leader
who commands a great deal
of power and respect
can choose
the issues that the nation
will focus its attention
on and
lead the public in a
direction favorable to his
position.
President Balaguer, from the
inception of his administration, has been a master
at subverting the PRD's
catalogue
of issues by either ignoring
those areas that the Party

thought important or by creating
the impression that the
government was promoting an issue
with even greater intensi ty than the opposition.
The best example of Balaguer'

s

refusal to recognize

vital issue area was with respect
to the sustained level
of political violence that has
marked his administration.
In the area of political violence
Balaguer many times took
a position of "benign neglect,"
and professed ignorance of
police supported repression against PRD
operatives. 25
a

It

25 As an example
of this naivete. see El Nacional
May 12, 1971 in which Balaguer professes
ignorance of the
La Banda activity.
,
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VaS not u ^til the
government received
vea extensive
extend
pressure
from European leaders
anQ
and United States
<24--,+.
newspapers that
Balaguer "came to realize"
the extent that violence
had
grxpped the Dominican
Republic. Although
Balaguer did order
a crackdown on groups
like Luanda and the
general reign of
terror that they created
in 1971, the President
take a low profile approach
toward the frequent
incidents of
political intimidation and
assassination.
In many respects
terror against opposition
parties like the PRD should
be in
the forefront of concerns
facing the nation, yet
Balaguer
and the leaders of Dominican
government and society refuse
to acknowledge the
importance of the problem and
the serious
implications that it hold<?
j
noids forfor the steady
governance of the
country.

^

4.

Where President Balaguer showed

a

marked insensi-

tivity toward the pressing
national issue of political
repression, he evinced a remarkable
ability to capture key
issue areas away from the Party
and use them to his own
benefit. One such issue "coup"
was in the area of agrarian
reform.
In February, 1972 President
Balaguer made his annual
address to the Dominican legislature
in which he promised a
massive reform program in the campo
that would supposedly
break up previously large holdings of
the rich and resettle
thousands of Dominican peasants into new
farms. The speech
by Balaguer was a distinct departure
from his usually
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conservative foot-dragging
approach to chang i„ the
g
social
and economic environment
in the agricultural
sector.
The Balaguer speech
received wide attention
both in
the Dominican Republic
and the United States
as many analysts
felt the President had
finally broken out of his
status quo
mold and decided to
establish a place for himself
in Dominican history as a great
reformer.26 But besides

^

a

brilliant public relations
effort, the speech by
Balaguer
was designed to quash PRD
criticism of the government's
nearly non-existent land reform
programs and revitalise the
atmosphere of movement that had
so effectively handcuffed
the opposition in the past.

The agrarian reform speech
before the Dominican
legislature created a momentary
atmosphere of revolutionary
Change that unfortunately soon
died as the Dominican peasantry has had to face the harsh
realities of landowning
intransigence, bureaucratic inefficiency
and governmental
favoritism. The Balaguer agrarian
reform speech did cause
some degree of change within the
agricultural sector
(an

26

See a New Yo rk Times article of
which the correspondent, Richard Severo, April 26. 1972 in
sees the reforms as
Balaguer s attempt to secure a place in
Dominican
history as
a reformer.
Over 80,000 acres of land was initially
seized
by the government, but Balaguer made sure
that he did not
landowner s. A week after his speech Balaguer traveled to Santiago to explain the
controversial
agrarian reform package.
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increase in the distribution
of land titles and
a more
vigorous attempt by the
government to better utilize
previously unused land,,
but the importance of
the speech can
be viewed in another
light.
By speaking out for
agrarian
reform at a time when
the PRD was languishing
and losing
popular support, Balaguer
further secured a place
in the
minds and hearts of many
Dominican peasants as a
dedicated
reformer and administrator.
All the PRD could do was
to
react to the speech and
term it a public relations

girtnick.

The damage was done,
though, as Balaguer again
grabbed hold
of a controversial issue
area and forced the
opposition PRD
into the background.
The ability of Balaguer to
enhance his own popularity at the expense of the
PRD can also be found in
the
ingeneous handling of United
States assistance. In the
early days of the first
Balaguer administration the
United
States Agency for International
Development (AID) was prepared to grant a $5 million loan
to the city of Santo Domingo
for public works projects.
The important concern here is
not the loan, but the manner in
which Balaguer used the loan
to lessen the influence and
effectiveness of the PRD in the
capital city.
At the time of the loan proposal the
municipal
government was controlled by the PRD.
Although many of the
PRD administrators were able and
sincerely interested in
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the welfare of the
city-dwellers
weuers, -t-ho
y
the governing structure

was without sufficient
funds to tackle the enormous
problems
of redevelopment after
the civil war. The $5
million loan
was designed to ease the
burden of this redevelopment
by
creating numerous projects
which not only cleaned up
the
city, but offered a large
segment of the unemployed a
chance
to earn a living wage.

President Balaguer actively encouraged
the AID
assistance and led United States
officials to believe that
it would be used to clean up
Santo Domingo.

When the loan

was approved, however, Balaguer
shifted the monies to the
ministry of Public Works for general
use.
The shift of the
$5 million loan not only deprived
the city of Santo Domingo
of much needed funds for public
works, but more to the point

it made the PRD administrators who
ran the city look incom-

petent and uncaring.

Without the United States loan and

also the cooperation of the Balaguer
government, PRD city
officials were forced to tell the residents of
Santo Domingo
that jobs, housing, garbage collection and other
services

were not attainable in the near future.
President Balaguer' s astute handling of the AID loan
thus gained for his administration an additional
$5 million
to be used as he desired and also created an atmosphere
of

hostility toward the PRD city leaders for not producing the
jobs and services desperately needed in war-torn Santo

Domingo.

As David Fairchild,
AID officer during
this
period, states:

cers
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all to
°“i
tthe loan
gSLrLeni^to° happen.
h®
The
l

to the municipal
U.S. probed him reJItriT'!
d rlng the course
of the pro jeer!f

"Oh sure we ne4d public
U? "
torks^^Bufth
doesn't say who does it
«,®"£ th ? fc
were outfoxed by Balaqu4r'
tAID1
^nd
an
^ ?
'
1 think this
was one of the
- ne mam
ma i n reasons
the Prd lost
ln<5
ln
the municipal elections
a Jo
f
68
because
they
couldn't win without the
f?
go Y® rnment
giving them any support
intact*

f

^ey

1

.

+-

.

'

Throughout his tenure in office
Balaguer has also
shown a marked ability to
cope with PRD criticism
over his
Close ties with the United
States. Although there
is no
question about the extent of
United States involvement in
Dominican politics and economics,
Balaguer has

not been
willing to link himself
inextricably to the "colossus
of
the North."
In a number of public speeches
Balaguer has
pronounced his independence from
the United States and frequently made a point of showing
his nationalistic sentiment.
As Howard Wiarda recalls one
such instance:

At th ® opening of Santo Domingo's
impressive
r
,

al eX ^° Sltion ' he ( Ba luguer)
delivered
i
^
speech,
designed to lure foreign capital and
reassure Dominican entrepreneurs, in
which he
a

=^

^David Fairchild, "AID

an Inside View,

In the Dominican Republic November 1970, p. 8.

NACLA Newsletter

,

3
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that the United
—
1
permit a second Cuba or
0t
oastro-like
?
£
revolution in the r 3 r-ikk^anothS^cLtro
„
is not whether this
6
statement is^rue^iiTi
•

•,

•

1
SU ^'
^
tS^'pibUciy^^^S^ft"
^atement
!
embarrassed
the U.S.

a

Embassy- it ,1
PRP: "ho fear
tLt^'thL^IeS'is^s

mentai restructuring^
tits

'

^

coun^AT^

As United States economic
involvement in the Dominican Republic increases,
Balaguer has come under
sharp
attack from the PRD, especially
over the dominance of
Gulf
and Western. Yet Balaguer
has soft-peddled the foreign
business concerns to the Dominican
people and reminded them
that economic development
cannot come without the cooperation of united States financing
and technology. Up to the
present the disenchantment with
foreign involvement in the
economy has been minimal. Should
criticism increase,
sources
Santo Domingo feel that Balaguer
is a smart
enough politician that he would
readily jump on the nationalization bandwagon in order to solidify
his position. Based
on Balaguer* s past performance as
a keen opportunist, this

m

prediction seems wholly feasible.

If Balaguer feels the

necessity of moving with the tide toward
nationalization and
increased independence from the United States,
the PRD would
again lose another issue area of opposition.
2Q

Nation

,

From Howard Wiarda's "The Dominican Fuse," The
February 19, 1968, p. 239.
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A proper summation of
the success that the
government's subversion campaign

against the prd has

achieved is mixed.

The PRD can point to the
fact that
only a few of its key leaders
went over to the other side
or that its associations!
groups are still strong or
that
its ideological platform
retains its revolutionary
uniqueness.
But what must also be stated
is that day by day
Balaguer s subversion of the PRD
continues and makes visible
headway.
There is no doubt within many
knowledgeable
'

circles in Dominican society that
Balaguer is on the offensive in the battle for public
support. The strategy of
subversion employs an extremely slow
and methodical approach
to the weakening of the PRD,
which is why definitive statements about its success must be guarded.
Nevertheless,
there is no question that the PRD of
June, 1966 is not the
same party of 1973. The PRD has certainly
been set back by
the subversive activities of the Balaguer
regime. The only
question is how far back?

Repression
The PRD is by no means a stranger to repression.

From its early days in exile to the devastatingly
cruel
civil war period, the Party has seen hundreds, if not thousands, of its leaders and rank and file supporters fall

victim to government sponsored military, police and
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paramilitary violence.

But since the PRD
assumed opposition
status xn June, 1966,
the Party has fallen
prey to perhaps
the most systematic
and widespread program
of political
repression in modern day
Latin America. Under
the governmental leadership of
President Balaguer, the PRD
has had to
face constant harassment
in its attempt to
exercise political opposition and frequent
bodily i njur y and murder
of ±tactivists.
The problem of governmental
repression against the
PRD opposition can be
approached in a number of ways
since
the Party has been effected
not only in an overt sense
by
a considerable loss of
personnel and property, but in
a

more subtle manner through a
growing umbrella of fear,
intimidation and waning spirits.
From a purely statistical
point of view the evidence on
repression is shocking.

Although sources differ with respect
to the exact number of
PRD deaths due to assassination,
estimates of the number of
murders range from 500 to 1,000 since
1966. 29 The overwhelming majority of these murders have
been Dominicans with
either direct party or associational
ties
to the PRD, or

they have been outspoken supporters
of the Party's ideological position.
29 El Nacional
places the death rate of Left-winq
activists since 1966 at around 1,000. See El
Nacional,
September 17, 1971.
a

.
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Overall since 1966 the
murder rate of political
activists has averaged one
person every four days.
But at
the height of the
repression during certain
periods in 1970,
one Dominican was
assassinated every thirty-four
hours; in
the summer and fall of
1971 the rate increased
to one person
every twenty-four hours.
Added to these substantial
murder
figures are the over five
hundred political prisoners
confined to the infamous La
Victoria prison, many times
without
proper respect for due process
of law and basic human rights.
While the toll in human life has
been considerable,
the PRD has also had to endure
a number of attacks on
its
national headquarters, barrio
offices, and affiliated association meeting places. 30 As a
result Qf numercms police
invasions of their national headquarters,
the PRD main office
on Avenida Independencia is a bare
skeleton with little or
no storage of important files and
documents. Most of the
paper work of the Party is held by
individual leaders in
their homes or private offices.
The tiny barrio offices that the PRD runs
in each
of its twenty-two organizational areas in
Santo Domingo have

also been under attack.

Police units or paramilitary groups

sanctioned by the police frequently harass PRD operatives
and on occasion break into the office to destory
typewriters.
30()ne example among many is the bombing of the PRD
headquarters building on April 25, 1971. See El Nacional
for the story on this date.

Pr;n tlng machines and
filing cabinets
°
1C6S are
03365

^

“

Because these

_

is ° la ted areas of
the city

they are often easy
targets for
Id offices

^
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intimation

m

or destruction.

remote parts of the
country have also
not been spared the
attacks of police or
paid ruffians.
The spectre of repression
is not only directed
at
the central PRD
organisation. Two of the
Party's staunchest
labor allies, the taxi-drivers'
union (UNCHOSIN) and
the
dockworkers' union (POTOSI,
have been under constant
harassment and attack by government
agents and provocateurs.
Since the taxi-drivers and
the dockworkers are
vital to the
country's internal and external
trade and transportation,

their allegiance to the PRD
has made them a prime target
of
the Balaguer regime.
Numerous leaders of UNCHOSIN
and POTOSI
have been subjected to police
interrogation and beatings,
while the headquarters of both
unions have been raided and
ransacked. Spokesmen for UNCHOSIN
claim that police attacks
have destroyed up to eighty
percent of their headquarters. 31
But while the repression has hurt
the PRD from a
purely physical point of view, perhaps
the most devastating
effect of the killings, incarcerations,
beatings and harassment has been psychological and "spiritual."
The seven
1 Taken

from a working paper entitled "La Banda Terr ° r " Organizing Packet on the Dominican
:
Reouhm ~ Ecumenica
p
3 Program f or Inter-American ComSSKi^ation an d Action Washington. D.C!.
iQ 7 i
o.
p'
.

.

^
de

f

,

f

J

years of opposition
politics have definitely
taken their
toll on the PRO leadership.
The fear and intimidation
constant police harassment
brings is evident
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^

in the faces

and movements of PRD
activists,

when a Party leader squirms
in his chair at the
sound of footsteps in the
hall or
installs a huge iron gate to
supplement his German shepherd
dog or has to secretly
evade a police search, it
becomes
immediately obvious that the
PRD is being subjected to
another more treacherous type
of repression which seeks
to
effect the mind and the spirit. ^2
It must be emphasized that
not for one moment is

the impression sought that PRD
leaders are holed up in their
homes constantly fearful of the
police. Such a description
would be blatantly false. The PRD
leaders I saw or heard
about are extremely courageous individuals
who have met
the governmental repression bravely
and with honor. But
the fact remains that after years of
constant terror and
harassment, the PRD is slowly but surely
showing the effects
of the repression.
The PRD is more and more becoming the

"hunted" party, the "enemy of the State" and
no longer commands even the barest minimum of respect from
the government.
32

merely walking into the PRD headquarters on
Avenida Independencia I was viewed with extreme apprehension
and a quite evident uneasiness.
It was not until I met
Casimiro that I was given a tour of the facilities—
pharmacy, a school (subject English), a small library, a
printing room and small offices.
.

—
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The source of much
of the repression
P ssion against the PRD
organization and its
supporters has
and es P eciall y in
the National Police.
Both institution!
are heavii y staffed
with former Tr Uj illo
of£icers and
trained enlistees who
view their role aore as
legitimized
pursuers of radical
political figures rather
than protectors
of constitutional
guarantees. Using their
dominant position
mican societ y both groups
have empl oy ed every form
Of oppression against
the PRD.

^

^^

^

,

The primary military and
National Police leadership
behind this terror is difficult
to pinpoint since most
off!
cers are violently
anti-communist and lifelong
enemies of
the PRD.
The most visible figure
that is usually cited by
Party leaders is General
Enrique Perez y Perez, the
former
head of the National Police
during the most violent era
of
political repression in 1970 and
1971.
General Perez often
made no attempt to hide his
hatred of Left-wing political
leaders and on occasion let it
be known that he personally
was out "to get" certain PRD
leaders. 33

General Perez expanded his connection
with antiradical, anti -PRD violence by
fostering the most brutal

Gasimiro Castro related to me that Perez
y Perez
° f thr
tS ° n hiS life in
to
quiet
dora
Sis ool
,
activity.
The fear that pervades many PRD
h°me
my. interviews with Casimiro
who was definitely^
Y ° n U d f ° r sus P icious noises and movements in th hallway
h n
? his
u^ house or
of
outside.
Interview,
i
Santo Domingo,
July 17, 1972.

r

-i

^T “

“
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group of political
assassins in recent
Dominican history
In the S
and fal1 0f 1971
Dominican society witnessed
„
reign of terror" against
Left-wing groups initiated
by a
small band of ex-MPD
toughs who called
themselves the AntiCommunist and Anti-Terrorist
Front of Reformist
Youth-or
simply La__Banda. Dominican
politics had experienced
terror
from other youth groups
like the so-called
"Uncontrollable
Forces and La Mano," but
La Banda was by far the
best
organized, best supplied and
most infamous government
sanctioned paramilitary force.
The number of youths in La
Banda
at any one time was no more
than 4 00, but their small
numbers did not hinder them from
instilling fear with professed
anti-Balaguer dissidents.

The La__Banda toughs were granted
their freedom from
jail or police harassment and
promised protection and financial gain in return for their
services against Left-wing
radicals, primarily the PRD.
The alternative was La Victoria
prison and certain death, with the
possibility of obtaining
freedom. La Banda, under the leadership
of Ramon Perez Martinez, proceeded to move into PRD barrios,
local high schools,
and selected union headquarters to assault,
harass, destroy.
and often times kill. Their alleged goal
in these vicious

attacks was, in the words of the La Banda
leadership, "to

collaborate with the police authorities in the fight
against
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communism and against the
delinquents who hide in
parties
professing that doctrine. "34

— Banda W3S

quite successful in achieving
these
goals.
in a period from April
to September 1971 they
were
personally responsible for some
forty-five political murders,
countless beatings, and property
damage.
The police,
-

for

their part, seemed unable to
contain the La Banda terrorism,
despite Perez's statements that
the National Police were
doing everything possible to bring
calm to the nation. As
one PRD leader told me, it is
incomprehensible why a thirty
thousand man military and police
force could not stop a
band of 400 hundred terrorists,
unless they did not want to
The reason why the National Police
could not stop La Banda
was that Perez's main bodyguard,
Lt. Oscar Nunez, acted as
the liaison between the terrorists
and the police. On
several occasions a police headquarters
jeep could be seen

surrounded by the La Banda group with Nunez
or his aides
coordinating the next terrorist activity. 35
The turning point for La Banda came when the
mili-

tary head in the city of San Cristobal cracked
down on the

group and detained some of the youth as menaces to
the
public safety.

With a precedent set and the United States

"^"La Banda

-

35 Ibid.,

5.

p.

An Episode of Terror," p.

2.

and foreign press
criticizing Balaguer's
failure to curtail
the violence, it was not
long before over 250
of the La
Banda group were rounded
up and placed in custody.
To show
his desire to control
Luanda Balaguer pushed Perez Perez
y
out of his position and
appointed General Neit Nivar
Siejas
who promptly brought. the
violent situation under
control and
promised to restore calm to the
obvious relief of the Dominican populace. 36

Since the 1971 "reign of terror"
political repression
of the La_ Banda type has
decreased markedly. There are
still
periodic reports of Party functionaries
being beaten up or
detained, but these incidences are
not on the scale of 1971
Although Balaguer appeared to be swayed
by foreign diplomatic
and journalistic pressure concerning
anti-PRD and Left-wing
repression, this does not mean that the
government has cur.

tailed its long-standing goal of emasculating
the PRD infrastructure. A case in point is the most recent
attacks on the
Party by the government over the alleged
coordination and

participation of the PRD, and especially Juan Bosch,
in the
Caamaho Deho invasion. The Party's representative
in Washington stated that between fourteen hundred and fifteen
hun-

dred activists in the PRD had been rounded up and detained
36 See Neit
Nivar' s discussion of his plan to curtail
the violence in El Nacional , October 14, 1971.

•
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oitimican prisons,

including two high Party
officials. 37
As to the future of
political repression
against the
PRD, it is hard to
predict the course of
action that the
Balaguer government will
take.
With the successful
defeat
of the Caamano Deho
invasion and the PRD finding
it increasingly more difficult to
function as a unified,
effective and
Popular opposition force, the
Balaguer government may
feel
satisfied that seven years of
attacks on the Party have
completed the task of weakening
PRD influence in Dominican
politics.
What is important to stress
is that President Balaguer
has reached a stage in the
development of his political
power
where he appears to be making
the decisions on how and
when
to utilize the repressive
machinery of the state, rather
than military. National Police
or paramilitary forces. As
one source states:
In the early days of his
(Balaguer* s) postrun lllo occupation of the presidency,
he used
o maintain that he could not
control the 'wild
elements
the armed forces.
But this is now
a
y ^^-° nV1 Cing in the lj-9 ht of his skilltnf
fui «i
Shuffling of2 senior military posts,
and his
expioitation of bitter rivalries to his
own
advantage, demonstrated over the past
few years.
There is no doubt that Balaguer knows
exactly
who is using terrorism, and that he could
put a
stop to it whenver he wished.
It may, however,
be true that terrorism is an unavoidable
part of
the neo-trujillista social and political
order,
at the pinnacle of which stands Balaguer. 28

m

3

107 ,
1^73,
p. 237.

reported in F acts on File
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On the other hand it
seems foolhardy to
think that
e PRO has reached
the stage where it
will be impotent to
unctron in the Dominican
political arena. Wh at
appears to
e the most knowledgeable
estimate of future
possibility
for political repression
is that Dominican
society win
ntmue to witness its major
opposition party struggling
to
retain a viable position
in the political system,
while its
governmental leaders work
diligently to weaken the
leadership cadres of the party.
The government's efforts
seem
directed not toward the
complete destruction of the
PRD,

for that would leave
Balaguer without one of the
major prerequisites of "democracy" a
strong opposition party.
Instead the government seems
willing to wage this constant
war against the PRD and merely
emasculate it, so that the
regime can lay claim to being
a democracy, while actually

functioning in a "neo-trujillista"
manner.

CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS;
THE FUTURE OF PRD
OPPOSITION IN THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC
The view of the PRD
opposition that has been
presented in the previous
discussion is certainly
not a
very encouraging one.
if any conclusions
can be made about
the Party's seven-year
period in opposition to
the Balaguer
regime, they would have
to be heavily tinged
with pessimism.
since Balaguer s electoral
victory
'

in June, 1966,

has had to struggle
against enormous odds as the
government has diligently and
effectively curbed meaningful party opposition. As
a result of this anti-PRD
campaign, the primary, if not
only, goal of the Party
during
this opposition period has
been survival . The record
shows
and I am sure many PRD leaders
would admit, that the "success" of the Party since 1966
can best be measured in terms
of retaining organizational
unity, introducing new ideological dogma and expanding somewhat
its potential for
mass education. It is virtually
impossible, though, to

view the PRD from the standpoint of
a smoothly functioning
democratic opposition or as a co-partner
in the Dominican
legislative process or as an effective foil
to the power

base of President Balaguer.

The PRD has simply been
262
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impotent in those areas
of public policy
formation in which
lied Western opposition
parties have traditionally
shown a great deal of
involvement and some degree
of influence.
defense of PRD opposition,
however, one can state
Party has, by its status
in Dominican society,
pushed Balaguer into making
some needed changes or
forced
him to control his
repression.

m

When faced with a problem
that contradicts its ideological position or directly
effects the livelihood
of its

constituency, the PRD has been
able to muster a loud but
generally hollow response.
Once the PRD has articulated

its

viewpoint, usually through Juan
Bosch, the Party has found
it extremely difficult
to magnify the problem into
a national
issue and steer it toward an
equitable political solution.
The result is a growing sense
of frustration and alienation
among Party leaders and grass
roots sympathizers as the PRD
is pushed further and further
away from the decision-making
or decision-influencing arena.
The avenues of attack and influence
that are left
for the PRD in this atmosphere of
opposition degeneration
center primarily on the intensive
utilization of propaganda
and citizen education.
In a real sense that is why Juan
Bosch is such an important figure in the
PRD and in the
nation as a whole. Bosch possesses the one
quality that is
so necessary for maintaining a viable
opposition stance in

the Dominican Republic
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charismatic ability to
rally
sizeable portions of the
electorate around his
stinging
criticisms of the Balaguer
regime. Although Bosch
is
maligned by many critics
for his behavior and
tactics, he
has provided the prd
and the Dominican
political system
with the only form of.
opposition that it can
tolerate
without serious disruptions.
His vitriolic denunciations
of Balaguer and the
United States on the radio,
his

unfounded boasts about the
political strength of the PRD,
and his curious thesis of
popular dictatorship all
combine
to provide Dominican
society, and especially
those who dislike the present administration,
with a faint glimmer of
tangible opposition.
There is no question that the
statements of the
PRD against the government
are for the most part ineffective, yet there is little else
the Party can do under the
circumstances. There are other
alternative routes to
opposition open to the PRD which will
be discussed shortly,
but these options require a radical
reorienting of current
Party ideology. At present, though,
the Party feels that
reacting through the media to the
positions and policies
of the Balaguer government is the
only positive, offensive
posture an opposition party can take in
present day Dominican politics. All other channels for
opposition have been
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blocked off either through
deft depoliticization
and
subversion by Balaguer or
brutal repression by the
military and National Police.

Faced with such intense
obstacles to effective opposition, the PRD has presently
settled
into a "wait and see"

position.

Party leaders have decided
that it is useless to
seek reform in the current
Dominican political system,
and
now seem willing to depend
upon forces outside the
political
arena (i.e., the armed forces)
to restructure the rules
of
the game so that the PRD can
once again rise to a position
of political dominance in
the country. There are of
course
no guarantees that the armed
forces will turn full circle
and openly call upon the PRD to
lead the nation, in fact
most observers feel it is a ridiculous
and unsubstantiated
assumption. Nevertheless, the PRD
leadership takes the
position that, at present, time is on their
side, and because
of the unstable nature of Dominican
politics, it is not only
wise but practical to wait for the internal
situation to

change

m

their favor.

Meanwhile, the Party is content to

make preparations that bolster citizen participation
and
enlighten national consciousness.
The decision by the PRD to wait patiently, but
actively, for the internal political situation to change
in
its favor has profound implications for the future
of the

Party and the nation.

The biggest debate within the PRD is

the extent of the P
arty
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participation in Dominican
Polrtxcs. As the
situation stands now
Juan Bosch still
retains considerable
support for his policy
of abstention
rom any participation
in Dominican
government as it is
currently structured.
Yet this opposition
posture is
g increasingly suspect
within many key Party
circles.
In the face of monumental
roadblocks to effective
opposition
and diminishing
possibilities for a restructuring
of internal
politics, PRD leaders are
legitimately asking the
question
whether some form of
involvement in the political
process
might be more advantageous
for the Party than the
present
position of abstention.
After all, these moderate
leaders
state, the rejection of
the Dominican political
system by
the Party cannot be seen
as gaining any real
benefits for
the Party and its constituency,
except perhaps propaganda
value.
In fact, a good case can
be posited that such antisystem behavior has made the
PRD more of an outlaw opposition
the minds of governmental
leaders and thus subject to
increasing oppression.

m

Of course for the PRD to shift
gears now and reenter

the Dominican political process,
or at least tone down its
opposition, would be most difficult
and demand a great deal
Of persuasion on the part of
Party moderates. The PRD is a
proud party and has spent its lifetime
in fighting the policies of dictatorial regimes. Accepting
the present rules
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of the game and
tacitly legitimizing
the Balaguer regime
is

veterans of seven years
of opposition
frustration. Yet the
PRD cannot ignore
the failures of its
past opposition
strategies. Opposition
from outside the
political system
has ]ust not produced
the results that the
Party leaders
had hoped it would.
Reentering the political
process, though, is fraught
wrth danger for the PRD.
if Party leaders
cipate in future elections,
they not only tacitly
support
the present system of
government, but more importantly
they
once again begin the
formation of two enemy camps
as in
1965, each desirous to control
the destiny of the country.
The PRD leaders well realize
the importance of the
electoral
process.
If the Party participates
in an election, it runs
the risk of recharging the
hatreds that led

^

to the 1965

civil war.

Furthermore, if the PRD should win
the election,
the crisis situation is expanded
tremendously as the Party
must once again seek to govern
the nation in the face of
conservative intransigence. The
possibility that PRD leaders
fear most about future elections
is if they do decide to run
and lose by a substantial margin.
Most feel that this would
be the death knell of the PRD. 1
Th
on May l6

1974

eSldentlal elections were scheduled to be held

268

The question thus
seems to be what course
should the
PHD follow in the
present political situation?
For his part
JUan B° SCh cont inuously
has counseled his now
former party
to continue the verbal
attack on the Balaguer
regime, while
bolstering the Party
organisation so that everything
is in
readiness when the Balaguer
regime falls (probably
because
of economic stagnation,
and a nationalist military
junta
takes power in conjunction
with the Party. Although
such
talk seems foolhardy,
especially in the current
boom era of
the Dominican economy,
Bosch strongly believes
that the days
of Balaguer and extravagant
United States support are
shortening.
one interview Bosch asserted
in answer to a question on the possibility of a
future "liberation"

m

of the

Dominican Republic;
What they (the United States,
cannot prevent in
0U
lke ° UrS that iS rea11
^ dependent
?he U.S.
the
U
economy is the effect that a crisis on
in
33 ° n the l0Cal oli 3 ar chy and
its
apparatns°nf
apparatus
of power
.
I believe that the
crisis has already begun in the
United States.
elieve that we are two or three
from a global crisis for the United years away
States which
make lt ® el f felt here as the depression
of
Tq?q
1929 was felt throughout Latin America.

TV

.

.

Because of such thinking, Bosch maintains
that, for the
moment, the PRD cannot afford participatory
or cooperative
ventures with the Balaguer regime. The accent
is on shaping
2 Taken

(New York:

~

from an interview with Juan Bosch in Carlos
D °minican Republic:
Rebellion and Repress ion
Monthly Review Press, 1972) p . 100
.

,
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and refining the Party's
ideological and organizational
base, while relentlessly
attacking every decision
that the
government makes or fails to
make. The key to future
PRD
success, according to Bosch,
is the ability to wait
for the
internal situation to change.
As Bosch stated later in the
same interview;

must tell you that the Dominican
Republic todav
ry WlthOUt a
solution
in^the^
instiSt?o 1 sense. And also lnetituticDn*
no matter what
S
rate SeCt ° rS may SaY " with
no P° ssi "
bilitv
H
f Producing
y of
an armed movement, a coup
H etat might occur;
d
in Latin America that is
Y
bilityUt eVen a COUp d etat
very
difficu?t
u
ficult,
y
given
the
control exercised by
fh - Pentagon
D
the
over the military forces of the
ry
institutio * of the dictatorship
with
onnn?
pular backing will be determined
p
by the develf
ominican situation, which at the
?
presont°
present
.is
paralyzed. And which, in my
judgement, will stay paralyzed for
one or two
years until the U.S. crisis is reflected
in the
power centers of this country.
I

i

,^

'

^
^

\

I

.

But to prophesy now in every detail
what is going
° happen
two years is ridiculous.
it would be
establishing a scheme which reality would
inevitabl y break down. When the equilibrium
sustained
here by the dominant forces collapses,
then we
will go into action. The problem is to
seize power;
the route to be followed is not important.
The
electoral route, of course, is out of the question
in the Dominican Republic.

m

In contrast to this "wait and see" posture,
there
was, at least through 1973, more discussion
of the PRD chal-

lenging Balaguer in the 1974 election, but in a formal
3 Ibid.,

pp. 113-114.
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opposition coalition, rather
than as a single political
Party. Bosch's fregue nt
statements against participation
such a "united front" not
withstanding, the option of
an
opposition coalition could
no longer be ignored

-

by the PRD.

The PRD has consistently
been opposed to a coalition
with
the four other major "out"
parties simply because of the
diversity of ideologies that
would have to be incorporated
into the front, along with
the distinct possibility
that PRD
leaders could be easily camouflaged
amidst the dearth of
personalities in the political union.
Also the PRD has been
reluctant to enter such a coalition
because they fear a
decision that makes the Party a
part of a larger whole will
prove the decline of the PRD in
Dominican politics and
enhance the Balaguer campaign of
opposition destruction.
Despite the obvious drawbacks to an
opposition
coalrtion, the PRD will eventually be
forced to view the
union in terms of its goal to defeat the
Balaguer regime
and begin the task of initiating radical
societal
change.

A so-called "united front" would not only
combine a sizeable
amount of Dominican voters and organizational
machinery, but
more so, it would lend the opposition movement a
greater
sense of confidence as Balaguer would have to face
the whole

spectrum of dissatisfied Dominican citizenry.

in the fall

of 1973 the chances for this opposition coalition
became

brighter as the PRD leadership, for the first time, assented
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tion forces into a
"united front."
Negotiations conxnued in an atte.pt
to fi n ali ze the
agreement, but the prd
stiii maintained a
cautious and aioof
position toward the
coalition.
The Party perhaps
realized the necessity
of
Doming in an opposition
union, yet was reluctant
to mate
a number of central
sacrifices. As a result
the „ united
front” concept remains
in doubt.
The PRD, in desperation,
s attracted to it,
but very slow to make
the final jump.
There is no doubt that
the formation of a
"united
for future presidential
elections would be a difficult political structure
to organize and develop,
and would
require the PRD to compromise,
for the time being,
some of
its independence and
ideological positions. But
it is the

opinion of many in and out
of the PRD that the
formation of
such an opposition union is
not impossible and is
furthermore the only feasible
alternative open to those who
find
themselves at odds with the Balaguer
government. Spokesmen
for the "united front" in
the PRD point out that the
Party
could use the coalition to its
ultimate benefit. The PRD
most certainly would be the largest
party in
the coalition,

which automatically gives it
certain prerogatives with
regard to candi date selection,
platform formation and campaign
.

.

lon

.

ai
ar ffcD- e °n the problems of opposition
?
coaliuilding in
Times o f the Americas October 17,
1973, p.
.

,

3

.

strategy,

of course with the
recent split in the PRD,
a
decision on the "united
front" has been held
in abeyance
as the Party concerns
itself with organisational
matters.
Nevertheless, the coalition
option still remains viable,
and with Balaguer desirous
to remain in political
power,
talk of uniting the
opposition forces will most
certainly
continue and intensify.

Although from

a

practical viewpoint the
opposition
coalition option might best
serve the long run interests
of
the PRD, there is another
option which Juan Bosch and
the
PRD have consistently
avoided throughout their years
of
opposition. As shown earlier,
the PRD has always claimed
to be a revolutionary
political party, yet it has
oautiously
avoided linking up the organization
with those proponents of
massive civil disobedience and
violent urban guerrilla warfare.
The PRD's reluctance to engage
in truly radical opposition has met with extensive
criticism from other Left-wing
groups and leaders who cannot fathom
the Party's insistence
on using ideology and a faint hope
of future developments as
its primary opposition philosophy 5
For their part, the PRD
.

5j an Jim ® nez Grullon,
a onetime advocate of repre^
sentative democracy
now turned Marxist-Leninist, castigates
the position of Juan Bosch in an
interview also with
JuaeT ez Grullon states, "... the PRD
}
has been
declining, especially
since Bosch's return, because the
policy developed by its leader is opposed
to the fundamental
1-
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points to the dangers
of openly
P
chall^n 9 1 ng the
Y challen
government
with strikes and auerri
guerrilla= warfare and
remind their detrac-

tors of 1965.

There is no doubt that
the PRD position
against mass
° 1VX1 dlS ° bedienCe
d urban guerrilla
warfare is supported
history. But in these
days of increasing
repression
against the Party and
massive convulsions in
the leadership
cadre, it is becoming
distinctly possible that
groups in the
PRD or in Bosch's newly
formed PLD might move
closer to a
more militant opposition
posture. After years of
frustrating attempts to curb
the Balaguer regime,
it is understandable that radicals in the
Party might find the
"wait and
see" and "united front"
positions as counterproductive

“

^

to

the revolutionary ends of
their movement.

As of yet pressure has not
built up in the PRD for
massive general strikes as a
prelude to
open hostility

against the government.

Some would even question
whether

the Party has the support of
the Dominican masses for such
a wide scale economic
shutdown, should the Party decide
on
that course of action. But
the PRD does realize that general strikes and urban guerrilla
warfare are options untried
by the Party, options that have
proved effective in other
" 38363

hS

princi P al aspiration of the
ploplfirto^ndhth
e terror
d th ®, rei 9 n of
... And so far, Bosch
hasabstfirL ?
d Lr ® ct attacks on the
1

'

government.
he has attacked
attaokod'Tv!
the Left, especially the MPD." See
Gutierrez, p. 65.
i

Instead
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Latin American nations.

The key, however,
to the successful
use of these tactics
is timing ani public
support, two
variables that are difficultXt t0 gauge
the Dominican Repub1C ' and Can ° aUSe
POUtioal disaster if
misinterpreted.
Because of the gamble
involved, the PRD has
heretofore
refrarned from these
options. The important
point to stress
wrth regard to the
so-called violence option
is not so much
the gamble involved,
but the fact that the
PRD now has its
back to the wall and
circumstances may well force
the Party
to take action which
will answer government
repression and
rally the Dominican people
around its standard.

The question thus becomes,
what route is the PRD
gorng to take as an
opposition party? There seems
to be
three basic alternatives
before the Party: participation
either singular or coalitional,
civil disobedience with its
potential for violence, or a
continuation and expansion of
the "wait and see" posture.
As to which position the PRD
should take xn the future, it
is not my desire to use this
drscussion as a forum for advising
the Party on strategy
and tactics, what is important
is that the PRD develop a
strategy and corailary tactics
that fit the reality of
Dominican politics. The decision that
is made will most
certainly effect the future of opposition
politics
in the

country and the status of the PRD as
the major dissenting
voxce rn the political system, what
will be attempted here
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l3Y d ° Wn

activity that

f ° Ur

sidelines or standards of
political

believe the PRD must
remember, presumptuous
though that may be, as the
Party looks to the future
and the
decisions that will have to
be made in ocder to
challenge
the Balaguer government.
(1)

I

The PRD must always remember
that it is

pol itical party

a

ideology and ideological
concerns are one
aspect of party behavior, but
should not be the totality of
party activity. The primary
concern of any party must be to
engage in politics. Granted that
the Dominican political
system rs closed and repressive,
but if the PRD wants to
once again establish itself as an
influential force in the
nation, it will have to seek some
sort of accommodation with
the Balaguer government that does
not strip the Party of its
independence and integrity. If anything
borders on certainty in the Dominican Republic, it is
that the elements of
the conservative status quo will
maintain their hold on the
body politic. This means that the PRD
must seriously question its wait and see policy and its
frequent concern with

ideology.

.

The PRD cannot long afford to act as if the Bala-

guer regime is temporary.

After all, the PRD had to wait

over thirty years for the last Dominican dictator to
fall
from power.

The Party leaders must now ask themselves

whether they are willing to wait perhaps another thirty years
for a change in the political system or will take some
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steps to bolster
their position.

Accommodation of
course is a reprehensible
term to many PRD
leaders>
wor, should not be
interprets, as "sell-out."
Accommodation
SenSS Si" Ply »*““ 3
realisation that a
politicai
Party b y nature behaves
quite differently than
a political
!H°ve!nent.
A political party must
constantly remember
xts objective is
achieved not through a
heavy reliance on
ideology but through
tough bargaining and
adept concise.
A political movement
can be a very powerful
vehicle for the
attainment of national
governmental dominance, but
in the
current Dominican political
environment, a moment which
relies on a charismatic ipaHpr
leader, an esoteric
doctrine, and
a rejection of
accommodation seems woefully
out of place.
At present the so-called
"united front" option does
appear to be the most beneficial
manner of accommodation

^^

"

"

^

.

with the present Dominican
political system. It places the
Party back in politics, attracts
a broader base of support,
and gives the PRD allies with
similar motives. The "united
front," however, is definitely
fraught with danger and difficulty as this loose union of parties
has many barriers to
hurdle before it meets the biggest
hurdle— the entrenched
regime of Joaquin Balaguer.

Besides reexamining its behavior as a
political
party, the PRD must continue and
intensify what it does

best

educate and recruit the mass of Dominican
society.
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The abortive guerrilla
landing and the
upheavals in the
Party have sharply
curtailed what in the
sunder of 1972
was a vigorous,
countrywide campaign to
extend the base
of PRD support.
The Party must now
regroup and once again
show the Balaguer
government and the Dominican
people that
xt remains a viable
and legitimate force
in national politics.
The PRD cannot sit idly
while the Balaguer regime
further builds up its support
through effective use of
patronage and paternalism.

The opposition battle of
the PRD is a long and
arduone with very few victories
and many setbacks. But
for
the PRD to be successful,
it must remember that its
goal is
political power and not just the
introduction
of dogma.

With this in mind the PRD should
move forward and choose
opposition strategies and tactics
that best
achieve this

goal.

Positive results will certainly
be elusive, but at
least the PRD will be acting in a
manner that seeks power
ra ther than talks about power.
(2)

The second recommendation relates
to the Party's

leadership hierarchy.

As the PRD is organized presently

with Bosch gone (perhaps temporarily)
and moderates in
charge of the Party, there is a serious
problem of credi-

bility that demands a quick solution.

The PRD cannot hope

to ever regain power in the Dominican
Republic, much less

the support of the people, if it gives off
the appearance
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of internal chao S and
leaderless administration.

What the PRD must direct
its attention to now is
a
vigorous regrouping effort
around the moderates, it is
vitally important at this stage
in FED party history that
the leaders squelch any
potential for personal vendettas
or
further factional disputes. A
continuation of such conflict
would surely spell destruction
for the remaining PRD organizational structure. At present,
the Party can ill afford
ideological, strategic, and tactical
disputes over elections
the Balaguer regime, and the future
success of
the Party.

Compromise must be the order of the day
or else the Party
will continue to disband and grow
impotent.
It is also important for the PRD
at this time to

make some overtures to Juan Bosch and his
PLD supporters in
order to see what common ground lies between
the two rival

camps.

Although such overtures might seem fruitless ventures due to the vast gulf that separates the
Bosch radicals
and the current moderate leadership, it is
important

for the

future of opposition politics in the Dominican Republic
that
the PRD and the PLD again become one political party.

As

most PRD leaders would admit, the primary reason the PRD
has remained an ongoing, cohesive political unit, despite
countless governmental attacks, is that Bosch still retains
a firm grip on a solid portion of the Dominican citizenry.
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Juan Bosch is the accepted
antithesis to President
Balaguer
and thus is seen by many
as tte only figure
Qf
stature that could hold
the reins of government.
Because
Bosch commands such respect
in the nation, many
Party
leaders should be extremely
reluctant to steer

the PRD
along paths that ignore
the prominent place in
Dominican
politics that he still holds.
Juan Bosch continues to
be
the epitome of the PRO and
the only recognisable
alternative
to President Balaguer.

But besides regrouping behind
the moderate leadership
and attempting to work out
the differences with Bosch,
the
PRD must also come to grips
with the problem of balancing
personal is tic leadership with
democratic decision-making.
Although some PRD activists would
deny it, there has been a
gradual but nonetheless steady movement
of the Party toward
centralized rule. The PRD has traditionally
been prominent
Latin American politics as one of
the more democratically
organized parties. But with the Bosch
presidency

m

of 1963,

and more particularly since the
beginning of its opposition
role in 1966, the PRD has slipped away
from its original

guidelines of open discussion and group
decision-making.
It is indeed difficult for Dominican parties
and

party leaders, set in a political system that looks
to personalistic, caudillo-type leadership, to reject the
traditional relationships of authority and organization,
and move

Anglo-American framework
of decision-making
and
administration
if the PRD is to
rise tQ a
Qf
Party unity and cooperation,
it must
t take some measures
to
insure a wider distribution
of power.
This is not to suggest
that whoever ascends
to the leadership of
the Party should be
stripped of their authoritv
^
Y
docs seem necessary at
this time is that if
the PRD is to survive,
it must take
steps to remedy the
constant struggles that
have beset the
Party; struggles that
were not merely over
strategy

^

.

^

*

and
tactics, but over the shape
and form of decision-making
in
a democratic opposition.

The PRD has for too long
straddled both sides of the
fence and hoped that internal
power struggles would be
secondary to the demands of
survival in the "democracy"
of Joaquin
Balaguer.
It is only recently that
the Party has
seen the

dangers of trying to function
with structural guidelines of
Anglo-American nature, while real
power moves to one individual whose view is that the Party
must be organised along
the lines of a personalist ic
political movement , in

the
future then, the PRD must place
emphasis on a careful
blending of personalistic rule and
democratic procedure.
It cannot reject its democratic
organizational heritage, but
it cannot ignore the demands of a
unified opposition leadership in a rigid, repressive, and
paternalistic atmosphere.
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such blending will he i
p to avoid the often tim£s
and purely personal
expulsions and suspensions
that were
evident during recent times,
while maintaining a leadership
structure that is familiar to
the Dominican people and
powerful enough to continue the
opposition against the Balaguer government.
In the end,

the solution to this crisis
lies with

Juan Bosch.

He can either return to the
Party and attempt
to work out a commonly agreed
to ideological and operational
framework or he can continue to stay
in the PLD in the name
of revolutionary fervor and cause
further hardship to an
already degenerating opposition movement.
What the PRD can
hope for is that Bosch, or whoever leads
the Party, will
begin to designate new spokesmen as a means
of showing the

government and the Dominican people the vitality
and diversity of its leadership cadre.

Some have even suggested that

the most amicable solution to the Party's problems
with Bosch

would be to permit the aging leader to assume the position of

intellectual elder

and leave the major decision-making to

younger, more politically adroit activists.^

But whatever

the PRD does about its leadership problems, the Party should

^This process of kicking Bosch upstairs is a mild
way of saying to the proud caudillo that his services to the
Party may be more negative than positive. Some Party members
have also suggested that the PRD might be better off without
Bosch in any capacity.
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always be guided by the
fact that a political
organization
does not maintain its
strength and cohesivenes s
only through
personalized rule as a political
movement does. A political
party must share power
and seek the cooperation
of many
individuals, even though there
may be disagreements over
strategy and tactics.. To
neglect such sharing and cooperation will render a strongly
democratic party like the PRD
weak and divided.
Although the continued survival
of the PRD
depends to a large extent on how
the Party and its leaders
understand the importance of
political rather than ideological responses to the current
internal situation, the future
status of the PRD in Dominican
society depends a great deal
on the political inclination and
personalities in the armed
forces.
If conservative intransigence is
the cardinal rule
of Dominican politics, then acute
military involvement
(3)

in

the political process is its corollary.

The armed forces,

because of their pivotal position in Dominican
society,

recognize that they hold the balance of power and
thus view
themselves as the guardians of stability. There
are enough
instances in Dominican history which point to the
inability
of the military to accept a political or
economic situation

that was not to their liking or was opposed to their interests.

With a military that is powerful, restless, and not

afraid to control the political situation, Dominican politics
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"

alWaYS tentative and
national leaders expendable.
But beneath this
appearance of control, one
can
never be exactly sure
of the extent that
President Balaguer
actually runs the Dominican
political system, it has
never
been determined precisely
what the relationship is
between
Balaguer and his generals.
From first glance it is
distinctly possible to think
that the mild mannered
president
is a mere slave of the
military, as some have
suggested,
because of Balaguer 's weak
approach to the La Banda crisis.
But it also must be stressed
that every one of the promotions or demotions that the
president has engineered have
been accepted without question
or rumblings from the barracks.
The recent demotion of the
popular and powerful Neit
Nivar Seijas from Chief of the
National Police to Secretary
to the President caused hardly an
uproar, although many
believed that Neit actively sought to
ease Balaguer out of
office 7

Probably the fairest statement that can be
made with
regard to government-military relations is
that Balaguer is
a popular president and a masterful
coordinator of personnel.
Balaguer utilizes his strong position in Dominican
government
to effectively control the behind-the-scenes
machinations of
7

0ne PRD source told me that Neit Nivar was developing his own paternalistic system with the Dominican
peasants
coming to his office in National Police headquarters
rather
than to Balaguer' s.

the armed forces.
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As one authoritative
Dominican weekly

stated recently;

the^lifforcerthr^y

“

° f the P ° llce
'

thiS

or^ot^h"
^pa^t'decade.^

mOSt Stable

^ernm^of

The increasing power of
President Balaguer does not
mean that the military has
been effectively weakened or
even
depoliticized as the PRD. The
military remains a power in
its own right with a huge
budget, numerous privileges,
and
most of all the realization that
it can use its position and
influence to guide Dominican policy,
what this means for
President Balaguer is that he has to
be extremely skillful
in his handling of the military
and the public policy that
the military has shown an interest
in.
So far Balaguer has
been most successful in playing this
dangerous game, probably because of the recent economic boom
in the nation.
But
Balaguer' s position remains questionable.
A period of economic stagnation or a too vigorous attack
on entrenched

interests or a poor handling of United States
business

activity could very well weaken the authority that
the President has over his generals. This is of course exactly
what
the PRD is waiting for and is confident will happen.

In

defense of the current PRD thinking, such a view of

government— military relations is not far-fetched, especially
8 See

Ahora for the week of January

21,

1973.

“

Lat
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“

toeriCa ' and P-ticularly
in the Dominican
Republic
Given the powerful and
unpredictable nature of the
Dominican military and the
somewhat tenuous position
that
President Balaguer maintains
in government, the prd
would
be wise to complement
its organizational and
educational
efforts in the country with
a concerted drive to
develop
closer ties with sympathetic
elements in the armed

forces.
It is no secret in the
Dominican Republic that the PRD
is
anathema to a majority of high
ranking

military officers.

Yet the Party cannot afford
to write the military off
as a
permanent enemy, especially when
that enemy has the potential for changing the current
status quo.

There are a few signs already
that the PRD recognizes the importance of making new
alignments within the
armed forces.
Party leaders like Casimiro Castro
and Pena
Gomez have been known to meet on
occasion with high military
leaders like Neit Nivar in an effort to
determine what
common ground lies between the PRD and the
armed forces 9
Most of these meetings, however, have
been preliminary in
nature and with middle level officers who
have expressed
some dissatisfaction with the Balaguer
regime.
.

The major issue that the Party hopes will bring
the
PRD and the military closer together is the
question of
9

It is interesting to note that in a political
system that has repressed the major opposition party both
Casimiro Castro and Pena Gomez have been known to meet with
Neit Nivar on occasion and seem to have some limited access
to his office.
.
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foreign economic
involvement and the need
for speedy
nationalization. The Party
is attempting
radrtronally nationalistic
tendencies within the
military
first step in convincing
fence-straddlers of the need
for new leadership.
The PRD has so far
followed a low hey
approach with respect to
the question of
nationalization in
the military.
But the Party remains
hopeful that the problem
Of foreign economic
involvement
ent in the
+-h« Dominican
n
Republic is
the key to pushing
the
ne
military into
y
infn action
against the Balaguer regime.

^^^

^

m

•

•

The PRD seems to be
continuing its contacts with
the
military on a highly selective
basis and many times in
secret.
Party leaders are very
honest about the possibility
of success within the
ranks of the military. They
see the
chances for significant influence
as minimal.
The important
concern for the Party, though,
is that they add the military
to their areas of propaganda
and education and not feel
that
the most powerful interest
group in the country is hopelessly opposed to PRD ideology.

From the standpoint of its "wait
and see" policy,
such talks are crucial for the
future resurgence of the PRD.
But what the PRD must do is to make
the military believe that
national development under the Party's
auspices will be
noticeably better than under Joaquin
Balaguer. This is
indeed a difficult matter and
one that will not be eased

“•

p
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politics.
The fourth, and in the
long run, the most
important guideline of PHD
resurgence in Dominican
politics
concerns the Party's .posture
toward the United States.
The
fortunes of the PHD have
always been closely connected
with
United States policy, and
the current situation is
no different. Although the once
close relationship between
the
PRD and the United States
is now damaged, if not
irreparably broken as a result of
the 1965 intervention, the
PHD
cannot ignore the important
role that the United States
Plays in the development of the
Dominican Republic. The
future success of the PRD thus
hinges on the Party coming to
grips with the United States
presence in the country and
formulating a policy that moves
beyond the current stream
of invective and idle threats,
toward a working relationship
with a political and economic force
that is not about to
relinquish its hold on the Caribbean.
(4)

In order to better view what
alternatives are avail-

able to the PRD with regard to the United
States presence in
the Dominican Republic, it is first useful
to examine briefly

how the United States "fits into" the Dominican
political
and economic system and where there are access
points for
the PRD to exert some influence.

Since the departure of
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American troops from the
Dominican Republic in
September,
United States presence
in this country has
shifted
dramatically from one of
political-military intervention
to
one of financial and
economic intervention
(some would use
the word colonization)
.
Not only are the Marines
gone, but
the American Embassy
staff has ceased to play
a central role
in the internal politics
of the nation.
The United States
ambassador during my stay in
the country, Francis Melloy,
made infrequent visits to
President Balaguer,

a sharp contrast from his predecessors
like John Crimmins, who many
Dominicans felt actually ran the
Dominican Republic. The
political staff at the Embassy has
also decreased markedly
(one officer in 1972) along
with the highly influential Military Assistance Attaches Group
(MAAG) which has been trimmed
drastically from an all time high of
sixty-two in

1966.

Along with the lessening of
political-military involvement
IS a quite visible acceptance in
dimplomatic circles
of a

toned-down role for the United States in
Dominican affairs.
The so-called Nixon Doctrine of
non-intervention in the
internal political affairs of Third World
countries is
emphasized constantly in talks with Embassy
personnel. 10
This conclusion was based on a number of interviews
key Eml)assy Personnel in the period of June 3 to July
17,
1972
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But where the United
States attempts to
play down
POUtiCal - military
Dominican attains, it
is in
C ° Untry S flnanCial
connections with the
Dominican Republic that
American influence has
taken a firm
hold,
since the conclusion
of World War II to
1970 the
United States has giv^n
the Dominican Republic
$483 million
111 f ° relgn
ThS k6y t0 this fi ar
e is that $120
9
million
of the total amount
was given to the Balaguer
regime between
1966 and 1970.
In the period of time
from the conclusion of
the civil war to the
early months of the first
Balaguer
administration the
ne Unit-p-ri
united States gave the
Dominican Republic
over $90 million.il
(See Table 3).

^

1

- -o—*

'

.

,

The rate of United States
aid and loans to the Dominican Republic has decreased
markedly from the early days
after the civil war. The
emphasis since 1970 has been
on
loans for community development,
health care, and agricultural modernization. As of
1971 the United States had to
disburse some $23 million in
unused aid and was negotiating
only two new pr ojects. 12 Some
of the United States aid has
llThl da h a is from a staff
memorandum, U.S., Senate
rmmnitf„
f r eign
ommittee
on Fo
_
Relations December 30, 1971

'

.

.

AS

e memorand

™

states, "Except for technical
current aid program consists mainly of
trying
This
rate of disbursement
1
l ack °f Dominican absorptive
,
capacity
i
u
staadards -" The two future loans are for
;
private investment ($4 to $6 million) and
for fertilizer and
agricultural machinery ($10 million).
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een for controversial
projects like the $ 3.5
million publ i c
Saf6ty Pr ° gra“ WhiCh
training the Dominican
National
Peirce. The program
immediately ran into
difficulty as the
United States was seen
by many barrio dwellers
and prd supporters as the principal
initiator of police brutality

^

against critics of the
Balaguer regime. 13

Although official United
States financial aid involvement in the Dominican Republic,
at the
present, is on the

decrease, this has not
diminished the dependence of
the Dominicans on this country.
Statistics tabulated in 1970
show that
56% of Dominican imports
originated in the United States,
while a huge 84% of all the
country's exports were destined
for the United States. The
heavy dependence on United States
markets has placed a considerable
burden on the Dominican
balance of payments. After years
of deficits running anywhere from $200 to $400 million,
Dominican administrators
were able to achieve a $17 million
surplus in 1969. Unfortunately, the country has not been
able to achieve some level
of stability with regard to its
balance of payments, as
13 „

,

Embassy personnel told me that the
program was perhaps their most controversial. Public Safety
Pat Holt the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee representative!
who
to evaluate the program, ran into
considerable difficulty in
the barrio when he tried to question the
people about how
they felt toward the newly trained police.
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succeeding years have
shown both deficits
and surpluses.^
The central factor in
the United States
involved
the Dominican Economy
is sugar cane
Euggr
#
nant place in the export
picture of the country as
it provided revenues in excess
of $176.4 million for
fiscal 1972.
The key to the sugar
cane crop and its effect
on the Dominican economy is the
quota that the United States
government
allocates to the country.
In recent years the United
States
has been quite generous
in its allocations, shifting
portions
of the quota from Puerto
Rico and the Virgin Islands,
with
the result that the Dominican
export capability has risen to
693,000 tons annually. As far
as United States Embassy
spokesmen are concerned, this
present rate of economic cooperation between the two countries
will continue with sugar
quotas favorable to the Balaguer
regime. 15 prd leaders
differ sharply over this, as they
believe firmly that a day
will come soon when the United
States cuts back on the sugar

m

.

^

The country ran an $88 million
in 1971
which was up from a $53 million deficit deficit
in 197^ A surplus
XOn
S achieved in 19 ?2.
See also Juan Bosch's
soelch'atta
k
?S
speech
attacking
the monetary problems of the Balaguer
vaguer
regime, El Sol July 13, 1972.
,

.

,

,

973 the D minican S uota of sugar has
increased
?
J
about inn^nn tons
over last year. It is interesting to note
that while the Dominican Republic could
sell in the world
r
a
ice thG Bala U uer government has seen fit
1? e
to f
fni ^o
!? 5 of
he n
United
states commitment first, thus maintaining
sltlo
a
a key supplier and friend.
P?
See an article in
Jr®
f
tne Tlmes °f2 the
Americas November 28, 1973, p. 4.

? ^.J

,
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quota and seriously disrupts
the Dominican economy
(55% of
Dominican exports are sugar
cane and sugar cane
products)
and weakens the hold of
the Balaguer regime.

The relationship of sugar
cane to the United States
is not merely governmental
but corporate as well.
The major
sugar producing "central"
in the Dominican Republic
is owned
by South Puerto Rico Sugar
Company, a subsidiary
of the

United States conglomerate
Gulf and Western. South
Puerto
Rico Sugar is situated in
the eastern town of La
Romana
where Gulf and Western and res
its Veni-rai
central " president Theobaldo
Resell have made huge economic
strides since entering the
Dominican economy in 1967. Annual
sales figures for La
Romana show a profit of over
$50 million.-^
Gulf and Western has not placed
all its economic
energy on the development of La Romana.
The conglomerate
has expanded into the cattle market
with 23,000 head of
cattle ready for national and foreign
markets by 1973. The
company has also moved into the citrus fruit
industry with
an investment of some $5 million pesos
to plant over 24,000
acres of land. Added to these ventures is a
growing stake
in the tourist industry, cement manufacturing,
and housing

developments.

With such diversity. Gulf and Western is

These figures are taken from an article in the
Dominican magazine Renovacion #196 and #197, April 4 and
18, 1972, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.
,
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rapidly becoming the
strongest and most active
economic
force in the country
besides the government.
Gulf and western is not
the only United States
concern to penetrate the
Dominican economy. Spurred
on by
favorable tax shelters of the
Balaguer regime that create
tax free industrial -zones
for twenty years, other
corporations such as Falconbridge
Nickel ,
IBM, Alcoa,
ITT and

banks such as First National
City and The Bank of America
have made heavy investments
in the Dominican Republic.
In
1970 foreign investment was
$57 million, a 100% increase
over the 1969 figure. Future
predictions of foreign investment are difficult to make because
of the burgeoning increase
of corporate interest in the
Dominican Republic
and the

government's wide-scale effort to attract
the capitalist
entrepreneur. All this private economic
activity and current
success though can only be interpreted
in one manner
Dominican leaders have decided to bank the
future development
of their country on the financing and
technology of foreign
owned conglomerates, especially from the United
States. Any
thought of stifling this activity or controlling
it has been
pushed into the background by the Balaguer administration.
17 Falconbridge has
invested some $200 million on its
nickel plant in the Dominican town of Bonao. Nickel is
destined to become the number two producer of foreign

exchange.
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Given this astounding
increase in corporate
ventures
and genera! trade
dependence, what can be
said as to the PHD
position toward this new
and potentially serious
encroschment of the United states
in Dominican affairs?
For its
part, the PRD, and in
particular Juan Bosch, have
met the
United states presence and
Dominican dependence with frequent and often times venomous
attacks, Bosch's statements
point in one direction— full
and vigorous nationalization
of

foreign owned businesses as the
first step in an effort to
make the Dominican Republic
economically self-sufficient and

strategically independent.

The PRD position is that

f ir, ,

like Gulf and Western are making
enormous profits which they
fail to reinvest in the development
of the Dominican economy.

The presence of these conglomerates
in the Dominican Republic
might expand economic output, but at
the same time sizeable
amounts of corporate profits are being
funneled back
to the

United States.

The only answer then, according to
the PRD,

is for a new leadership to correct the
present imbalance of

corporation activity and profit making by nationalizing
the
major foreign holdings. Through nationalization
the Domin-

ican people could receive the benefits of expanding
indus-

trialization and establish a strong economy free of reliance
on United States development schemes, technological cooperation, and strategic protection.
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Despite the seriousness
of United States
corporate
involvement in the Dominican
economy and its expanding
influence
national decision-making
and planning, 18 the
important concern for the
me prd at -i-h-Jo
this time seems to be
not
whether the United States
is slowly colonizing
the Dominican
Republic, or worse yet
making it a "wholly owned
subsidiary."
The facts speak for
themselves, and furthermore,
most knowledgeable Dominicans fully
recognize the economic control
that the United States
exerts over their country.
They do
not need Juan Bosch to tell
them something that their
president pndefully admits is
occurring. What the PRD must
do
is to decide on an opposition
policy toward the United
States presence in the Dominican
Republic which keeps sight
of the fact that the future
resurgence of the Party depends
a great deal on how the
United States government perceives
the PRD, its leadership and its
ideological positions.
The United States simply will not
allow a regime as
Bosch proposes to gain a foothold in
Dominican politics.
Mixon Doctrine notwithstanding, the
intervention in 1965 and
the constant fear of a "second Cuba"
should be evidence
enough to the PRD that their image in the
White House and

m

4.

•

18 Juan Bosch
in an article in the PRD journal,

Politica, suggests that Gulf and Western and ITT
have formed

a secret alliance which he fears will
eventually control
the economy of the nation.
See "0 Elios 0 Nostros,"

Politica (Junio 1972):

1-12.

the State Department is
important. 19
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This does not mean

that the PRD should ignore
the question of nationalisation
or tone down the criticism
of United States influence
in
the Dominican Republic.
But what the PRD must
realize is
that, whether they like
it or not, their country
and the
Caribbean in general are still
considered by Washington to
be the economic and strategic
domain of the United States.
It is not necessary to
engage in a long historical
discussion of united States policy
in the Caribbean area to
point
out the importance of moderation
and constructive criticism
on the part of any group or
movement outside the established political arena. Talk of
"Dictatorship with Popular
Support," radical change, nationalization,
and revolution
create only fear and hostility among
United States policymakers and lessen the chances of developing
a working relationship with the central economic and
political force
in

the region.

Juan Bosch is constantly telling the Dominican

people and the PRD that they must prepare themselves
for a
time in the future when Balaguer will fall and the
revolution will once again begin.

But where his preparation fails

is in a recognition that only a realistic approach
to United
19 See Slater,

Intervention and Negotiation for the
most comprehensive discussion of the "no second Cuba"
doctrine of the United States.
,

298

ates involvement in
the Dominican Republic
will strengthen
his ability to maintain
power should that
opportunity ever
arise. Bosch and the
PRD must therefore
redirect their
anger against the United
States.
They can no longer
present
themselves as the unreasonable,
revengeful Yankee haters and
hope to gain the respect
and confidence of United
states
officials.
The key to a realistic
approach to the United states
and prd opposition rests
with the nationalization
problem.
The PRD can continue to push
for nationalization but
its
position cannot be couched in
a "get the United States"
format. Rather it must be
presented as a natural outgrowth
Of modernization and independence
in Latin America and not
as a personal vendetta against
the United States government.
Presently the PRD uses the nationalization
issue as a mere
starting point for endless attacks
on past violations of
Dominican society by the United States.
Unfortunately most
of what the PRD states against this
country and its previous
record of foreign policy is historically
correct. But

spurious attacks by Bosch on the United States,
which suggest
that his future regime would find other friends
to support
the economic and strategic needs of the
country, do nothing
to mend an already degenerating relationship.

What is called for then, on the part of the PRD, is
a practical and responsible opposition stance
toward United
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States involvement in the
Dominican Republic. If the PRD
is serious about returning
to power in the near future,
it
cannot make statements and take
policy positions as if the
United States were less than
important to the overall
political configuration of the
Dominican Republic. Both
Cuba and Chile are two contemporary
examples of what uncompromising hostility toward the United
States can mean to a
revolutionary regime. In Cuba, Castro
eventually proved he
could achieve independence for his
country but only after
continued hardships made possible by United
States economic
and political intervention.
In Chile, Allende learned to
his dismay that the United States,
especially its economic
conglomerates, can exert such great economic
pressures that
the success of a radical revolution would
be minimal.
In

the Dominican Republic, the PRD must recognize that
while

revolutionary regimes are possible, their longevity and
prosperity are directly related to the manner in which such
regimes handle the economic and strategic desires of the
United States.

With all the discussion of the PRD's problems and
suggestions for political success, there still remains a

lingering desire to speculate on the future of the Party.

Since political speculation is a highly tentative exercise,
there are many avenues of approach.

But because this is an
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examination of the PRn
RD ' Xt 13 Perhaps
fitting that we
discuss What the Party
and its supporters
see as the way
history will move them
into the position of
national political power in the
Dominican Republic
*
For
or the
th= purposes of
his paper it is
convenient that an essay
by Stanley Plastrik outlines one such
historical scenario that
depicts
,•

+.

•

,

The scenario is as follows:

means "keeping ‘thfpresen?
actions that disturb the goverLent of I-balance^
Y

"publirSder"

incapacity to achieve anv
•“ parliaraen tary

?

/

•

hf,

t

hy exposing its

f^crLyf £y“I t

t0

strength*”
strengthening existing democratic
institutions
d
SUCh mobiliza tion means making
?“
it lifflH
cul?
ult for the present government
to function.

eventual face-to-face encounter
il«een^°I
h-r
tb mobilized
masses, urban and rural, and

6
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the middle class willing to
follow
the PRD
MD leadership
?! !
and program, on one side and i-hn
government forces on the other side
between mobilization and revolution -is a step
itself.
in our
problematic scenario, this may come about
several
years from now. it may begin with
and nonviolent acts of disobedience strike actions
among profeslonals supporting the Bosch movement,
extending to workers' organizations and gradually
peasant
unions. Most likely, it would take
the form of
aSh S lkeS seriou sly hampering the
normal func-Z
tions
of^ ^f
the government and bringing the country
to
a standstill.
At a certain point, the armed forces
ould then be brought in and, in the usual
brutal
fashion, kill some hundreds of strikers
and their
supporters. But this time the military would
be
too powerful. At this point the Army, its
failure
apparent to all, would go to Balaguer to report
its
4- n

kmlng

"

a

pe°p

£

s&o'fs ss-i r

turn over the government

—

L

'

to^he^iuLry

S
n Vi Ct0rY ' the PRD and
Bosc h would then
feel th«t
teel
that ?h
their moment has come.
Bosch and th£
’

nations
chances
anges.

hhaS

S

a P ro 9ram for them , a!
n ' natlonali sm, structural
H^Shas an example to put before economic
He
their
-

“

10613
P ° Wer
"strong
section ^f'thr'M-n”
f th
military
should
respond favorablv
•Su ??
S
n
that the St ^ ike -v^ent Y '
s called off, that
Is'caSld^ff
there is a
lzation" and work, followed by return to "nnrmsi.
negotiations based
h P "°" 1 " e ° f a new deal for
th e country, this
t?m^ K
milltar y* Except for the
ultra^eft^^
ft iaellStaSf Maoists, etc.
Bosch would
hphfni!
e foUGwed.
He may, however be obliged to
deliver
VY re P*: ess;LVe bl °w against the ultra
Left,
anr?
h
and he
would not hesitate.
‘

S f^

.

/

We would see then a political alliance
of
radical middle class and radicalized
officer class
cemented by the PRD's institutions and
timents of nationalism. But the story co*n sen-'
is not yet
section of the military - reactionary,
rrujillist, and pro-American - may reject
this
scenario.
Striking out to start a civil war, it
would attack the Bosch supporters, including
military wing. it cannot "win", but can bringits
about a state of civil war. Would this be
moment for unleashing a new North American the
intervention? Would the Marines land once again?
Given
Washington's capacity for blundering (surely there
would be State Department people and Pentagonists
urging large scale invastion)
one dare not say
this could not happen. But I suspect that this
time, cooler and subtler heads would prevail
("let
them kill one another for a while") , and invasion
would not take place - not yet. Let civil war
rage a while. Then, after a few weeks or months,
the North American g ringos would be welcomed by
both sides. And as the Americans arrive to restore
,
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"peace" e very°ne would
know which side they
support, tad o„ the ruins
of what would rSain,
the whole tragic cycle
would
start all over
again. " 20

The Plastrik scenario
and the current thinking
of
the PRD might lead one
to believe that political
power is
within grasp in the Dominican
Republic. y e t the realities
of Dominican politics
point to a much different
conclusion.
As Plastrik says later in
his discussion;

Only two things can prevent
the unfolding of
scenario:
1. economic development
1
structural changes so that distributlnn
bution becomes more equitable,
and 2. the
lift ing ° f thS threat ° f
^erican
“ilnlTn
,
e
°n
under
any circumstances and no
J"
matter what provocation. 21

^

'

In the Dominican Republic
Plastrik' s two preventive measures

are already being implemented.

Economic development is

spreading at a fantastic rate and thereby
substantially
diminishing PRD opposition and support.
United States intervention, although a written guarantee
has not been achieved,
has become a secondary alternative to
control of Dominican
politics as a more subtle form of economic
colonization has

taken its place.

This switch in control has also made it

more difficult for the PRD to point to the United
States as
a brutal interloper in the politics of their
country.
20 See Plastrik,
pp.

21 Ibid.

,

p.

527.

526-572.
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the scenario has any
value, it is in its
long
range possibilities,
rather than its short
range probabillties. The forces stacked
up against the prd
remain substantial, and the overall
mood in the country seems
apprehensive, if not fearful,
of a PRD takeover and
its expected
backlash. The conclusion
thus seems inescapable-the
PRD
must fight for survival and
continue its vigilant watch
of
the Dominican political
scene.
Perhaps the future may
usher in an atmosphere of
acceptance toward the Party, its
leaders, and its ideology.
But as matters stand now, the
PRD is mired
a powerless opposition role
with little
hope of political success.

m

The generally dismal conclusions
reached on the
opposition role of the PRD in Dominican
politics cannot be
left without some analysis of why
democratic politics, and
in particular "out party" politics,
failed so miserably.
There has been a considerable amount
of discussion of the

fundamental shortcomings in Dominican society
which have
caused the failure of democracy and democratic
institutions.
Some like Juan Bosch stress the weakness
of the middle class
and their unwillingness to support revolutionary
change
along with the close ties of the Dominican military
to
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American defense policy. 22

others like Howard Wiarda
see
the problems of democracy
more in the flow of history
with
legacy of dictatorship
and paternalistic rule. 23
More
recent thought places a
great deal of the blame on
the
extreme economic dependence
of the country on the
United
States which has stifled
an open and competitive
political
system. 24 Finally, the
deficiencies of Anglo-American

democratic government have
been traced to the chaotic
nature
of Dominican social
groups and their refusal to
lend support
to the nationalistic and
equalitarian forces in Dominican
politics 25
.

The failure of democratic
institutions in the Dominican Republic can be traced directly
to each one of these
?or a ^-i- scuss ion of Bosch's
theory of the DominC
S 366 his major work
Dictadura con Respaldo
'
and for a view of, Bosch's belief
in
*

.

Popula^
Popular
the co nnection
between the Dominican military and the
United States fen,

a
1
:i0
e
r
ar ^ a,
"From Fragmentation to Disi n tegration!
The social and^
olitical Effects of the Dominican Revolution,"
unpublished
paper delivered at the Southern Political
Science Association Convention, Gatlinburg, Tennessee,
November 10-12, 1966.

A recent essay by a Dominican economist, Dr.
Bolivar Batista Del Villar entitled, "Dependencia
y Dessarrollo Dommicano Independiente, " delivered at a
conference
entitled Dependencia Externa y Proceso Politico-Economico
para e l Dessarrollo Dominicano Independiente on May 21,
1970
Santiago, Dominican Republic best sums up this
current wave of thinking in some circles in the country.
.

m

25 See

Lowenthal's,
Politics of Chaos."

"The Dominican Republic;

The

^

^
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sources as they all have
contributed tQ
is constantly surfacing
in this country's
politics. Taken
together, though, these
sources of conservatism
and precarious stability are but
symptoms of a much larger
malaise
which has effected many,
if not all, the
countries in Latin
America and the Third
World,
stated simply, the basic
problem is an inability to
settle, after over one
hundred
and fifty years of
independence, the fundamental
issues of
political power and the rules
for the attainment and
maintenance of that power. A
quote in an interview in Robert
Crassweller
latest book probably best
sums up this failure
and its unfortunate effect
on the Dominican people:
Yes

many people, especially the
voimaer
h Ve be ® n shocked at the
divisionism,
f*
and
those who read history and have
it fresh in
lndS merel Y. look .upon the past
and say,
'Mv roH ' we a e still fighting
one another and
aj
^
disagreeing with each other just like
e our
J
grandfather's were. *26
.

.

.

The importance of this lack of
agreement on the
source and structure of political power
is not only that it
creates ingrained antagonisms between
vast segments of the

Dominican nation, but that it also causes
a frightening
cloud of fear among a people who would
rather hide conflict
than solve it. Fear has taken many forms
in Dominican
society and has pervaded all regions and social
classes.
26

Robert Crassweller, The Caribbean Comm unity;
Changing Soc ieties and United States Policies (New
YorkPraeger, iy/2), p. 84.

There is a
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f ear

that democracy, in
whatever form, will
drastically alter the
Dominican life-style and
force political leaders into a mold
of responsibility they
are unwilling to assume. There
is a fear that the
destruction of
paternalistic relationships
may deprive some of the
special
position they have developed
in the country. There
is the
fear that the move for
greater distribution of economic
benefits may weaken an already
shaky class structure. There
is fear that a definitive
break with the United States
may
shut off what has become an
extremely lucrative symbiotic
union.

Fear then is the tragic result of
the years of
unsettled conflicts that mark
Dominican history. Fear can
be found in every corner of
society from the barrio dweller
existing in a crude hut underneath
the Duarte Bridge to the
n ouvea ux riche living in their
homes along the fashionable
Avenida George Washington. The fear that
the Dominicans
exude is that of movement away from the
past and the necessary steps that will have to be taken
in order to achieve
that movement.
To allay these fears Dominican society continues
to

stabilize itself in the traditions, institutions, and
rela-

tionships of the past.

This desire to offset the permeating

element of fear accounts for the longevity of the Trujillo

dictatorship and the developing "continuismo" of President
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Balaguer .

Hardest hit by this environment
of societal fear
are the opposition parties
like the PRD who are unable to
create effective means of registering
criticism. For the
Dominican people and their leaders
to reject these basic
fears for change and begin to
legitimize a democratic opposrtion would demand of them a far-ranging
commitment
to

social, political and economic reform.

The result then is

that the current opposition system, or as
Crassweller calls
it the "politics of extermination," is
in many ways the
key stabilizing element in Dominican society.
Open up the

opposition system and the Dominican people will come
face
to face with the fears that they have sought
so diligently

to suppress.

The opposition system, of which the PRD is

the primary foundation, has the strongest potential for

change, and for that reason it has been maintained in a

state of intimidation, brutality and neglect.

To modernize

and democratize the opposition system by encouraging PRD

activities would open up the floodgates of revolutionary
change and stir up sources of societal conflict that have

gradually been placed in the background over the last seven
years.
As a result, it seems highly unlikely that the

Dominican Republic will move away from its present opposition system of "dual caudillos" carrying on a war of words,

while the opposition activists become the targets of police
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harassment and repression.

There are some leaders within

the PRD who view the future
with optimism and point out
the numerous possibilities for
the Party's success.
But
as Dominican society is arranged
at present, with the domi-

nant proclivity being acceptance
of Balaguer's modernization
program, the future for the PRD can
only be described as
dismal.
Dominican society has to achieve
fundamental
reforms in its social, political, and
economic systems
before the PRD can hope to see some opportunity
for effecting
the future course of the nation. At
present the Balaguer
reforms are designed in such a way as to prevent
any radical
transformation of Dominican society. The PRD is thus
left
as the target in a vicious circle of politics.
The greater
the Party pushes for radical change, the greater the
Domin-

ican people fear the consequences, the greater the support
the stabilizing influences of the Balaguer administra-

tion.

As is the fate of those caught in such a predicament,

the future is one of constant conflict and gradual degeneration.

With this dismal analysis and prognosis of the PRD
in the Dominican political system complete, it is necessary
to conclude with some brief comments on democracy, institu-

tional reform and political stability in Latin America.

Although the PRD is one party in an admittedly small area
of the Latin American region,

the problems of the Party
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point up well the drastic
shift in politics and
political
development that has occurred
in the past few years.
Gone
are the days of wide-eyed
optimism and faith in the ability
of democratic regimes to
bring peaceful, participatory
and
stable modernisation. 27 Gone
are the days of so-called
democratic Left reform parties
like the PRD that were seen
as the catalysts of moderate
but progressive reform. 28 Gone
are the days of the restrained
military corps that pledged
allegiance to constitutional procedures
and promised cooperation rather than dominance in the
development process. 29
Finally, gone are the days of
expectation in the ability of
the United States to create the necessary
conditions for
area wide economic renewal without serious
restriction or

interventions

.

3

As an example of this thinking, see Susan Bodenhe uner , T he Ideology of Developmentalism;
American
Paradigm - S urrogate for Latin American Studie s
(Berkeley
Hill, CalT:
Sage Publications, 1972)
pO

Abraham Lowenthal discusses the fall of the democratic Left parties or Apra-type parties in a "Review of
Grant Hilliker's The Politics of Reform in Peru: The
Aprista and Other Mass Parties of Latin America," Economic
Development and Cultural Change 21 (July 1973)
29

Only Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela and Costa Rica
are presently not controlled or directed by the armed forces.
And even in the first three countries there is some question
as to what influence the armed forces exerts in the political
system.
°See Juan de Onis and Jerome Levinson, The Alliance
that Lost Its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for
Progress (New York: Quadrangle Press, 1970)

310

The problems of the PRD in
current Dominican
politics, in many ways, mirror
present day Latin America
where economics has replaced politics,
where stability is
enforced rather than negotiated, and
where alternative
routes to national development are
stifled in their infancy.
Strangely, it is a Latin America that
has changed noticeably in the past decade, yet has not
changed
at all.

it is

a Latin

America that still remains in the grip of
those
social and economic forces that have controlled
this region
since the days of independence. What is different
is that

Latin American leaders now seem determined to achieve
the
economic development that they know is necessary for sur-

vival in an ever-demanding world, even if that development
means curbing personal liberties and intimidating the proponents of alternative routes to change.

In the face of

popular demands for economic and social modernization,
there has arisen an equally forceful desire for stability
and reform, but not a stability and reform based on politics

and political organization.

The Latin America that the PRD

finds itself in today has given up, at least for the time
being, the pursuit of political participation, political

opposition, and political reform.

Such concerns will just

have to wait their turn until internal circumstances necessitate a return to political activity.

While history moves

toward that "new era of politics," the PRD and many other
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opposition parties and movements
will have to do what they
are most practiced at—
patient
survival.

In a more general,
theoretical manner the difficulties of the PRD in sustaining
a high level of party

opposition cannot simply be seen
as the result of Balaguer's
oppressive governmental regime or
the current mood of key
modernizing elites in the country.
Rather it is also important to see the problems of
opposition-government conflict
the Dominican Republic in terms of
the unique political
environment that can be found in many, if
not all, Latin
American countries. The ever present
confrontation between
established power holders and oppositions

m

on the fringes of

power is not about to be curtailed by democratic
institutionalization.

A solution to this problem lies much deeper

than the introduction of Anglo-American models
of politics

and governmental organization.

The answer it seems lies in

a thorough understanding of the Latin American
system and

the possibilities of managing opposition-government conflict

from within that system.
In all of Latin America there is not the long heritage
of democratic development which guarantees a legitimate

status for parties or groups outside the decision-making
apparatus; or for that matter the unique components of political culture which permit the successful transfer of opposi-

tion politics into Anglo-American style institutions.

Latin
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America is an area steeped in a
quite different
sociopolitical heritage and value
system.

Instead of seek-

ing to handle fairly the demands
of the groups in society,
the Latin American experience has
been to recognize the

demands of only those who are "worthy"
of recognition—
those whose power in society cannot be
ignored. Also
instead of conducting politics from within
a value system
that expects change to be attained through
some manner of
bargaining and compromise, Latin American
politics works
from the perspective that visualizes societal
transformation as being achieved through the efforts of
the paternalistic leader.

Politics in Latin America thus, as stated

earlier, becomes a zero-sum-adversary system where the

object is to be obedient to the winner and show no mercy
toward the loser.

There is indeed scant evidence in Latin

American history that nations in this region have been able
to master effectively the Anglo-American democratic model

and institutionalize opposition politics by developing
strong, hierarchial party organizations and autonomous,

professionalized legislatures 31
.

The distinctive qualities of repressive political
31see John Mander s The Unrevolutionary Society,
The Power of Latin American Conservatism in a Changing World
(New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1969) for an excellent discussion of Latin America's inability and unwillingness to shed
the past and make rapid, revolutionary changes.
'
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systems, strict social
stratification, paternalistic
leadership, and economic
underdevelopment that are dominant
in Latin American society
must be the starting point for
the determination of what
can be accomplished with
regard
to opposition-government
conflict
As
c cseen *
as ran
ca n k
be
from the
examination of the PRD and the
Balaguer government, the

institutionalization of democratic
structures and procedures did nothing to curb, manage
or even cope with the
potentially destructive nature of
conflict between

those

out of power and those in power.

in all fairness, the

Dominican political system, like others
in Latin America,
could not be expected to acclimate
itself to the demands of
a development model that was
foreign and sought to

create a

framework for politics that relied on
toleration, cooperation, and participation, rather than on
personalism,
repression, and depoliticization.

Unfortunately, all the experiment in democracy in
the Dominican Republic has been is a test of
Balaguer'

ability to create and develop an illusion of constitutional
structures and procedures.

In reality the Dominican leader

has continued to rely on the traditional modes of formu-

lating public policy, gaining public support, and con-

trolling opposition dissent.

It is as if Balaguer and his

supporters knowingly sought to conduct politics along a
two-track" formula.

For appearance sake the accoutrements

Of democracy
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legislature, parties, election,
and

oppositions

were allowed to exist
and function, but only
a cursory and impotent
fashion. Beneath this
facade,
real political power and
decision-making was conducted in
a manner which exhibited
a propensity to employ
centralised
rule, elite favoritism,
and a special relationship
with the
dominant forces in Dominican
society-the military and the
United States. In many respects
it is an ingeneous balancing of democratic form with
traditional Latin American
practice, and like the struggle of
the PRD, is the Dominican
method of survival in a changing
world.

“

The future of government-opposition
relations in the
Dominican Republic should not be surprising.
We can expect
more of the same— depoliticization,
subversion, and repression by the government; propaganda
efforts, strategic and

tactical disputes, and ineffectual attempts
to counteract
the programs and actions of the Balaguer
regime by the

opposition.

There is little chance that the democratic

institutions in the Dominican Republic will be able
to

remedy the inequalities of opposition politics or
curb the
increasing potentiality for renewed revolutionary activity
and instability.

From an Anglo-American point of view such a prognostication seems dismal and incomprehensible given the
ordered nature of many governments who model their political
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systems in terms of
democratic structures and
procedures.
But from a Latin American
perspective this future view is
approached in a quite different
manner. True, the continued
conflict between opposition
and government is indeed
bothersome and disruptive of the
modernizing process. But many
powerful Latin American leaders
like Joaquin Balaguer are
not terribly disturbed by
the failures of democracy in
controlling government-opposition
conflict.
Rather they seem
content to conduct politics in
the traditional zero-sumadversary manner while using
democratic structures and
procedures only to legitimize their
rule and, where applicable, to expand and solidify their
power.
They also seem
willing to accept the tentativeness
of political power in
the Latin American context simply
because the social, economic, and political elites, who have
dominated this region
since its inception, have been able to
remain in control,
despite numerous attacks from Left-wing
reformers and

revolutionaries.

In short, why bother to change a formula

for power and social control that has worked
so well for

hundreds of years?

To expect then the Latin American

leaders like Joaquin Balaguer to throw off the heritage of

personal rule, elite dominance, and "ordered instability"
in favor of an Anglo-American democratic model of open

Political activity is certainly wishful thinking, if not
foolhardy.

Modernization, in whatever form, will of
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necessity be achieved in
the Dominican Republic
from within
a uniquely Latin
American sociopolitical
framework. Opposition politics from parties
like the PRD will continue
to
be conducted from a
standpoint of "winner take all—
loser

take survival."

This prognostication is indeed
a negative
one from an American or
British point of view, but it is
the only view possible given
the present status of Dominican
politics and the realities of Latin
American power relations.
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